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Abstract 
 
This research seeks to address the issue of media consumption and the formation of 
diaspora identity within second and third generation British-born residents of 
Pakistani origin. In recent years there has been much debate centred on this group 
within the context of domestic and wider international geopolitics of winning hearts 
and minds, the ‘war on terror’ and the rise of the internet and social media as 
unrestricted spaces of self-expression. This has had a profound impact on the sense 
of belonging that transcends national boundaries and becomes a more transnational 
experience creating new communities of interest.  
 
The role of the media and other forms of communication may be a key or important 
determinant in how these groups, represented by the Pukhtoon and Punjabi in this 
study, not only see themselves but view representation of their identify and sense of 
self to a wider public arena. The perceived relationship between Islam and the ‘war 
on terror’ as formed by the media has had a profound impact on perceptions and 
mindsets of many of the diaspora. New technology has created a new smartphone 
generation able to reassess and reaffirm their emerging hybridity set within a new 
discourse of equal rights and respect for cultural and religious values within a 
transnational context.  
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the following for their support in this work: 
 
All the members of the cohort groups – members of the Pukhtoon community in 
Oxford who came forward facilitated by Amer Akbar and Hamid Akbar, and of the 
Punjabi community in Luton, similarly facilitated by M. Ifraz Khan – without whom this 
study would not have been possible. 
 
My parents, family and friends in England and in Pakistan.  
 
My supervisor, Professor Yunas Samad, for his guidance and encouragement. 
 
Bill MacKeith, for his support in editing.  Maria White for additional support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction                                                                                   1 
 
   
 
Chapter 2 Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity                            16   
 
Chapter 3 Methodology                                                                                  81   
 
Chapter 4 The impact of Islamaphobia       124 
      
Chapter 5 Media production and identity      172 
      
Chapter 6 Transnationalism and identity affirmation     208      
 
Chapter 7 Conclusion         269 
         
 
Bibliography          281 
       
1 
 
Chapter 1   
Introduction  
The research aims to understand and analyse the construction of Pakistani 
diaspora identity through mass media consumption. Its objective is to assess 
whether the range of media consumption has an impact on the creation and 
development of a single or multiple identity amongst the British-born Pakistani 
populations of Luton and Oxford, of Punjabi and Pukhtoon backgrounds.  
 
The study will encompass gender, class, and socio-economic variations that 
also contribute to a personal sense of belonging in Britain. The impact of all 
forms of media will be assessed, including television, radio, newspapers, cable 
and satellite broadcasters and new media formats such as the plethora of social 
media and what can be described as existing and emerging ‘smartphone’ 
technologies. 
 
With respect to the Pakistani population in Britain, there exists a body of 
literature on aspects of their cultural, social, political, economic, religious and 
racial status through the generations. These are past and present 
representations, whether as early migrants or as British-born citizens of 
Pakistani origin. This has all been recorded and analysed in the context of work 
signified by, amongst others, Husband (1994, 1996), Lewis (1991, 2003), Shaw 
(1994) Ansari (2002), Modood (2003, 2005, 2010), Alam and Husband (2006) 
Samad (2006), Samad and Sen (2007), Malik (2006) and Manzoor (2007). 
 
Many have focused on the relationships these communities have with their 
space in contemporary Britain. There is some literature available on the media 
in respect to British Muslims as a whole (Poole 2002, 2006; Ahmed 2006). 
However, there is little written about the role and impact of the media on these 
specific cultural groups within the Pakistani diaspora community. They are a 
distinct group in their own right that form the majority of the Pakistani population 
in Britain. They retain a sense of common belonging to the sub-continent and 
inherited attitudes to their reflected cultural identities.  
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In essence, this study seeks to examine and deconstruct a number of key 
issues and themes that relate to two specific cultural communities – Punjabi and 
Pukhtoon (or Pashtun) – of the Pakistani diaspora. The aims and objectives of 
the research question therefore provide a route map of this exploration as it 
seeks to: 
 
 Investigate the type and range of mass media utilised by the Pakistani 
diaspora within two specific cohort groups, namely the Punjabi and 
Pukhtoon, and consumption of new forms of media by second and third 
generation Pakistanis, by gender and class. 
 Assess the impact of the range of media consumption on the formation, 
redefinition or enhancement of identity. 
 Assess any differentials based on cultural variations within the two specific 
cultural cohort groups (Punjabi and Pukhtoon) of British-born Pakistanis. 
 Investigate whether the media plays a significant part in the reinforcement of 
personal and/or group identity within the Pakistani diaspora and how this is 
reflected and translated on a day-to-day level. 
 
Inevitably, across the globe, the media is playing an increasingly dominant role 
in society. Yet it has a specific significance in relation to the Pakistani diaspora 
within this research, conducted at a time of much complexity in their lives; mass 
media attention on Muslims, animosity towards the Iraq war, perceptions of 
scapegoating and apprehension in those they can trust in their own 
communities, Islamaphobia. They all contributed to a sense of rejection 
articulated through the narratives. Associated within this discourse is the 
importance of increasing technological advances within new media, equipment 
and the means of mass communication. This includes the internet, 
smartphones, 4G and growing social media developments such as Facebook 
and Twitter. This has created a clear divide between age groups, between 
those who are the youthful ‘smartphone generation’ and the ageing population 
who are more likely to be technophobic in this new media age, unfamiliar, if not 
willing to engage, with instant messaging and video or music downloads 
generally.  
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The Leveson Inquiry (2012) findings also provide a useful backdrop and 
examination of the role, functions and relationships of the press in Britain with 
power, the political class and corruption, and the ability to influence and control 
news. Its televised proceedings and appearances of politicians, celebrities, 
news media editors and proprietors provided an insight to the public at large 
into the day-to-day and behind-the-scenes modus operandi of this powerful and 
intrusive medium.  
 
The evidence given in the Leveson Inquiry is part of the discourse on the 
changing nature of diasporas that have themselves been subject to much media 
attention and analysis, among them the Pakistani and Muslims in Britain. At the 
heart of this discourse on changing nature is an understanding of the evolution 
of multiple identities forging a new Britishness that is not one single component 
but made up of many symbiotic elements that make up this hybridity of identity, 
a process in which mass media representations play a role.  
  
These elements can be considered as the essential building blocks of this study 
that together will provide some understanding of the subject of investigation. As 
part of that process, this introduction will set out the context and structure of the 
population group, namely the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, and relate it to a 
strong sense of religious obligation to the Islamic faith. For the purposes of this 
research question, the terms ‘sample diaspora’ and ‘diaspora’ may be used to 
signify the respondents recorded in this study. This qualification is necessary, 
as the interviewees are a small segment of the British Pakistani diaspora and 
therefore, while providing their thoughts, perceptions and analysis of their media 
consumption, cannot be concluded as representing the totality of the British 
Pakistani diasporic community.  
 
A comparison is made between how these two groups of British-born Pakistanis 
of Punjabi and Pukhtoon backgrounds utilise the mass media and how the 
mass media, in turn, defines their presence and contribution to British society as 
citizens. The study reveals a difference in approach and emphasis in how the 
Pukhtoon and Punjabi draw a distinction between each other within a wider 
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Pakistani community setting, a difference that could shape and reinforce a 
sense of cultural, political and social identity within a transnational context, as 
reflected in the literature.  
 
 
1.2 Thesis outline 
 
Chapters address the key issues that have emerged from the data. Chapter 1 
introduces the study itself, setting out the rationale for the chosen research 
question, the value of the investigation and its overall aims and objectives, as 
they relate to the specific area of interest, namely the Pakistani diaspora. The 
chapter also provides data on current media consumption in the UK as a 
backdrop to the discussion that is the focus of this research.  
 
Chapter 2, ’Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity’, sets out the body of 
literature reviewed for the purposes of the research. It encapsulates the wider 
discourse on identity, the relationship with hybridity and connections with 
transnationalism. It also seeks to assess the relationship of the specific 
diaspora with issues associated with culture, and Islam as the dominant faith 
and belief system that interrelates to personal, if not, group identity reflecting 
the societal culture defined by Kymlicka (1995). It provides an overview of the 
South Asian communities’ early presence in Britain and settlement.  
 
In addition, the chapter has sections that explore the role and function of the 
mass media and its relationship with power, capital and special interest groups 
considered inter-dependent, as assessed by some commentators, within a 
wider and global political, economic and social sphere. The evidentiary nature 
of the Leveson Inquiry (2012) is also discussed, to emphasise the current public 
interest and concern with media intrusion, which reinforces elements of racial 
and religious demonisation of particular minority groups. This is then related to 
the role of Orientalism and the impact of Islamophobia, in an attempt to assess 
their contribution to the wider discourse related to media consumption and 
interpretation of information by the diaspora, as expanded upon in Chapter 4. 
The importance and differences between new and social media are also 
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mentioned in this Chapter 2, providing a better understanding of their 
significance to the diaspora in the context of this study.  
 
Chapter 3 sets out the methodological framework and pathway in its entirely, 
with a step-by-step elucidation of the approach used and techniques adopted in 
gathering the data for this study. This account moves from initial overtures in 
recruiting individuals, to enhancing confidence between the researcher and 
interviewees, to coordinating the respondent Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort 
groups in the two fieldwork sites of Oxford and Luton. The theoretical basis of 
this investigation is also elaborated upon in this chapter, supported by literature 
as to why this method was found to be the most appropriate for the 
investigation. A risk analysis is also addressed within this section and how any 
adverse interventions can be mitigated. In the final paragraphs, personal 
reflectivity is explained as providing a positive input into this study and a more 
profound empirical insight into the research data and analysis. Ethnography and 
emic/etic approaches are contributed also. Some final assumptions are made 
regarding how the analytical process may produce certain outcomes from the 
data captured and reviewed, and how the process of enquiry may be repeated, 
in line with the grounded theory approach.  
 
Subsequent chapters are shaped by the analysis of the data collected from the 
respondents. Chapter 4 focuses in more detail on the key issue of 
Islamophobia, exploring its impact through the media prism, guided by 
respondent perceptions. The impact of religious, cultural and racial stereotyping 
perceived by the diaspora is analysed in this section, with commentary provided 
by respondents highlighting their experiences in this regard. How this has 
impacted on their sense of identity within Britain is examined further and 
analysed to provide a basis of understanding of whether these observations are 
accurate.  
 
Chapter 5 addresses issues related to media production. It provides an 
overview and analysis of how programming and information within mass media 
bodies are created, formatted and disseminated, with observations and 
perceptions made by respondents. The analysis is related to the prevailing 
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literature in seeking to validate the data captured and analysed. A brief account 
is given of attempts to elicit a response from media stakeholders and 
government, for purposes of objectivity and right of reply.  
 
In this way the scene is set for Chapter 6, in terms of exploring the 
consequence of discrimination leading to a sharper sense of a transnational 
identity that also relates to a collective and personal sense of safety and 
security. The role the media has played and is playing in this process is 
discussed in this context, with an explanation of how new social media and the 
internet have allowed the diaspora to find new meaning in their religious and 
cultural identity through global connectivity with similar communities of interest 
across the world. This process has allowed a new assertiveness to form and 
grow that encapsulates a cultural and religious identity combined with a more 
modern, if not Westernized, outlook and value base. Within this development, 
the class differential between more affluent and economically disadvantaged 
members of the Pakistani diaspora is analysed.  
 
In the final stage of this investigation, Chapter 7 focuses the discussion on a 
number of key issues that have emerged from the research findings. Included is 
an analysis of the impact of the media on the Pakistani diaspora community 
resulting from the data and analysis of the Pukhtoon and Punjabi subgroups in 
Oxford and Luton. Observations by the principal, also referred to as the lead 
researcher; describing myself, are included and aligned to the literature to 
consolidate the arguments raised. Conclusions follow as to how the media has 
had function and form in the evolution and definition of Pakistani diaspora 
identity. This will be interpreted with regard to what this means for the Pakistani 
diaspora in the study, but also more widely. In so doing, it is hoped that the 
overall aims and objectives of the investigation will have been met and the 
research question itself given much more amplification and understanding. It is 
also hoped that it will have contributed a new angle to the discourse related to 
these specific groups that enhances the current published literature.  
 
There has also been scope within this study to identify any gaps within the 
research methodology and, more fundamentally, within the analysis of the data. 
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Possible gaps in the analysis were assessed during the important stages of 
discussion of themes that were generated. Furthermore, based on the empirical 
data, a vital component to enhance the analysis from the point of view of the 
researcher was to gain further explanation through the continual interaction with 
interviewees over the long duration of the investigation.  
 
In summary, this study has a specific focus on two distinct Pakistani 
communities of the diaspora and their consumption of a range of media 
including engagement with new media. The data analysis indicates some key 
elements to consider in how British-born Pakistanis regard their status and 
future within Britain. This research seeks to offer a unique contribution to the 
study of British Pakistanis as a diverse set of cultural groups with a shared 
societal culture. The impact of their media consumption in formulating their 
shared or unique identities is the subject of discussion and examination.  
 
As a result, this study provides weight to the central argument that media 
representations of the British Pakistani diaspora, and of their faith, have 
impacted on their sense of safety and security as citizens of their country of 
birth. This, in turn, has created an insecurity of belonging aided by very strong 
perceptions of Islamophobia that reinforce wider feelings of discrimination which 
in turn fuel alienation from mainstream society. As a response, new media and 
smartphone technologies are being utilised to reassert a sense of British Muslim 
identity that is transnational and supported by the wide use of the internet, 
social media and opportunities for self-expression through for example 
YouTube, The role of new media in creating a new assertiveness cannot be 
overemphasized. It has allowed what Bhabha (1994) refers to as the evolution 
of hybridity and third space. This has allowed the diaspora in this study to locate 
to transnational virtual space as the ‘smartphone’ diaspora generation. 
 
 
1.3 The comparative approach and definitions 
 
The Pakistani population is not homogenous. It spans a number of traditions 
and heritages that relate to the four geographical regions – Punjab, Sind, 
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Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan – of the nation state called Pakistan. It 
forms, as Kymlicka (1995) has argued, a societal culture whereby: 
 
 ‘a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life 
across the full range of human activities, including social, education, 
religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and 
private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and 
based on a shared language. I have called these ‘societal cultures’ to 
emphasise that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also 
common institutions and practices.’ (p.76) 
 
The concept of a societal culture is also relevant within the Western context, 
relating to the early migrants from South Asia to the present diaspora. It 
incorporates an accommodation between East and West; acceptance and 
valuing of the culture of the host society by learning the language, while, to 
date, not letting go of a past history and culture that is relevant also in the of the 
new generation’s identity. This will be explored further in the chapters.  
 
The Punjabi and Pukhtoon sub-populations differ in their languages (Punjabi 
and Pashto respectively) and main areas of concentrations in Pakistan (Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab) but share English as a vernacular for both in Britain 
and also share a faith, and alignment of inherited traditions and cultures. This 
broad grouping – Pakistani, British and Muslim – relates well to the wider 
diaspora and will be the focus of this research; the sub-populations and their 
diaspora share a common lexicon, group norms and practices that make them 
distinct in their own right.  
 
Diaspora may be referred to in the following way, using a definition provided by 
Connor (1986) – ‘that segment of people living outside the homeland’ (p.16) – 
that is enhanced by Safran (1991, p.83) where the concept of diaspora may be 
applied to 
 
  ‘expatriate minority communities whose members share several of the 
 following characteristics:  
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 1) They or their ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original 
 “center” to two or more “peripheral” or foreign regions; 
 2) They retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original 
 homeland – its physical location, history and achievements;  
 3) They believe they are not and perhaps cannot be accepted by their 
 host society and therefore feel alienated and insulated from it;  
 4) They regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as 
 the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually 
 return when conditions are acceptable.’  
 
Alternatively, the researcher recognises a diversity of meanings for diaspora, 
from early Jewish dispersal to the movement of labour and capital referred to by 
Vertovec and Cohen (1999). Others have related it to the spatial politics of 
culture identity and hybridity recognised by Hall (1992) and Blunt (2005) 
amongst others quoted by Bonnerjee et al. (2012, p.13). There is of course a 
strong correlation with transnationalism, given the nature of the relationship with 
home and place in another land. The above definition for this research seems to 
be the most appropriate for the subject matter. Additionally, in the context of this 
research, therefore, the mass media plays into the configuration of identity and 
hybridity referred in the literature referred to above.  
 
   
1.4 Background: Development of new media  
 
As already stated, this investigation has its roots in an interest in the 
development of the Pakistani community in Britain and more specifically, in the 
rise of the British- born generation of Pakistani origin who now regard Britain as 
their home and base for meeting existing and future aspirations.  
 
The size of this population nationally remains low in comparison with other 
ethnic groups in Britain, despite large concentrations of the Pakistani 
community in some major cities and conurbations. Ethnic classification became 
a recorded element of the national census in 1991. From 1993, in line with 
discrimination legislation and analysis of migration, the Office for National 
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Statistics (ONS), police, health authorities and others have used the ‘16 + 1’ 
categorisation (16 classifications of ethnicity such as White, Black, Asian with 
sub categories such as, under Asian, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, plus 
one category for ‘not stated’) This is the standard formula used throughout public 
bodies and agencies) to record the size of minority communities in Britain. The 
Pakistani population represents 2% of the make-up of the Asian community, 
around a million people, just below the Indian population at 2.4% (1.4 million) 
(ONS, 2012). The data also suggests a continual and steady inflow of migration 
from South Asia, namely India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, that maintains the 
cultural patterns of these communities through marriage, kinship and extended 
family relationships.  
 
These continual links to South Asia also illustrate the strong cultural and social 
connectivity of the British-born diaspora with the homeland of their parents, 
often reinforced by regular visits to Pakistan and through daily communication 
via telephone, email and, now, through Skype and expanding social networks 
such as Facebook and Twitter.  
 
For this group of people, the media plays a dominant, if not intrusive, role in 
their everyday lives that exemplifies and amplifies the expansion and 
proliferation of new media communications at a global level; a daily way of life 
for a vast majority of young people (Livingstone and Helsper, 2007; Jorgensen, 
2010; O’Keeffe and Clark Pearson, 2011; Cohen et al., 2012; ONS, 2012; 
Smith, 2014; Watkins, 2014; Chan-Olmsted et al., 2015). For the Pakistani 
diaspora this is becoming an increasing area of interaction and interest, in 
formulating a diasporic identity that seeks to accommodate both Eastern and 
Western modes of behaviour within the scope of anxieties concerning public 
policies relating to community cohesion and the potential that some may 
become radicalised young British Muslims. As a consequence of these 
perceptions and fears of the diaspora, related to belonging in Britain, the role of 
the internet and new media platforms is an important element of their personal 
and group narratives. They are vehicles for not only self-expression but also 
methods of networking and validation within alienated members of the Muslim 
communities of which the Pakistani diaspora are part.  
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Within the terminology, it is important to differentiate between the terms mass 
media and new media within this study, to ensure greater clarity of meaning 
when referring to the two. It is also essential to realise the distinctions within 
both meanings of what has been traditional media forms such as television, 
newspapers, radio and so forth and new media, which has become of age to a 
wider and more diverse populace and societies. 
 
‘Mass media’ is therefore defined in parallel with the term ‘mass 
communications’ and refers to the ‘organised means of communicating openly, 
at a distance, and to many in a short space of time’ (McQuail 2005, p.4). 
 
New media ‘refers to a wide range of changes in media production, distribution 
and use. These are changes that are technological, textual, conventional and 
cultural.’ (Lister et al. 2009, p.13) 
 
Furthermore, new media is, as set out by Lister et al., placed in discourses that 
define its characteristics as ‘digital, interactive, hypertextual, virtual, networked 
and simulated’ (ibid.). In addition, new media are a tool by which the user can 
independently promote social, political and other issues of concern and interest, 
much more so than is the case in traditional mass media.  
 
Within this sphere, the researcher seeks to explore the evolution of the 
diasporic identity of the British-born Pakistani whereby, in a context of 
innovations and new technologies, a new form of accessibility has opened up to 
explore multiple identities within a wider transnational setting. 
 
Also, within these more efficient networks and channels of transnational 
communications, via texting (short message service, or SMS), instant 
messaging, mobile internet and applications devices (apps), the diaspora seeks 
to explore its own sense of belonging that links past heritage to future 
aspirations. It is this smartphone generation that presently is so reliant on 
personal iPhones and android smartphone systems, which are of great interest 
within the parameters of this study. Within the 16-24 year age group between 
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2002 and 2007 there was a sustained increase in the use of the internet for 
news from 36% to 56% (Ofcom, 2013). 
 
The importance of the internet and value to the user is articulated by the 
regulator in the following terms: 
 
 ‘It acts as both a push and pull mechanism for news stories and allows 
 users to tailor their own news interests. Within online, social media is 
 becoming a valuable source for breaking news in its “word-of-mouth” 
 role, as many users learn of breaking news through friends’ posts. It 
 also offers a space to contribute to the story or debate with others.’ 
 (Ofcom, 2012, Annex 4, p.5) 
 
In fact, the use of cellular or electronic forms of interaction has increased so 
greatly in the last decade that it will be more advanced and available than any 
other form of mass communication. According to the official UK regulator 
Ofcom, 76% of the adult population has fixed or mobile internet connections 
(Ofcom, Q4, 2012), whilst 50% of the adult population use social networks 
(Ofcom, Q1, 2012) and 39% of people use their mobile phone to access the 
internet (ibid.). An overwhelming mass of the population rely on mobile phones, 
with 92% in 2011 owning or using such hand-held devices and on average 
sending 200 texts a month across the range of systems (Ofcom, Q4, 2012). 
Data from comscore.com, a company that measures people’s digital viewing 
habits, highlights YouTube as the dominant video viewing source in the UK, 
exceeding more established knowledge media bases such as the BBC or 
independent television. 
 
As Figure 1.1 illustrates, in terms of consumption, 2,415,292 people accessed 
YouTube as opposed to 79,416 viewers utilising BBC sites and just over 39,000 
people using ITV sites for internet viewing (comScore, April 2009). This is 
evidence of a clear dominance of this new form of media that is user-led in 
many ways and is so outstripping traditional viewing habits and networks. 
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Figure 1.1 Number of videos viewed, by owner of 10 most used sites, April 2009 
   
 
Note: Among Google sites YouTube has the most recorded hits. Source: comScore (July 2009) 
 
Also of interest is the increasing role and influence of digital television within this 
analysis made by the official national regulator (Ofcom, 2012); over 96% of the 
population with digital television watches on average a total of just over four 
hours of television per day, whilst radio listening is less than half that figure, at 
42% (Ofcom, Q1, 2012). The data shows a significant increase in those using 
this form of media to source key information, whether, news, sports or light 
entertainment and movies. Its dominance is evident in wider society, as is its 
potential influence, as this study investigates.  
 
The increase in digital television viewing has also allowed an increase in a 
range of cable and satellite channels that relate to the specific cultural, social, 
political, economic and material needs of different global communities of 
interest based on a range of shared attributes. A plethora of small and specialist 
broadcasters exists to inform transnational communities, related to the wider 
discourse of British Muslim identity that has been highlighted by Modood 
(2003), Samad (2006), and Ramadan (2006), for example.  
 
 
1.5 Specific research questions  
 
Within this research, a number of key lines of enquiry sought to collect 
information from the participants: 
14 
 
 
1. Defining participants’ personal identity at the time of investigation and 
during the stages of this research study, to assess modifications.  
2. The specific characteristics of group identity.  
3. What national, transnational and international media were consumed. 
4. The range of media sources utilised by the diaspora and the reasons 
for the choice made. 
5. The role of new media and how is it utilised. 
6. How differences within the Pakistani diaspora are distinguished. 
7. How cultural and religious practices are reflected in this formation of 
identity. 
8. Impact of the media in reinforcing or deconstructing this identity, in 
particular new media. 
9. The major responses to mass media, if any, with respect to identity 
formation. 
10. The role of new media within this construct. 
 
These key points developed supplementary queries that enhanced the study 
and further clarified the research question. It was essential, however, that the 
data formed the basis of this study and that participants were allowed to explore 
the subject matter within their own sense of awareness and understanding of 
the mass media. Their interpretations and understandings were important, in 
how these had manifested themselves in their own sense of status. The 
questions therefore had been ‘open’ to elicit wider debate and co-operation, in 
order to ensure the discussions were fruitful and significant in providing 
meanings and understanding of the diasporic viewpoint.  
 
 
1.6 Methods of research 
 
It is imperative therefore that the methodology, as set out in chapter 3 was in 
tune with the desired outcomes as set out above.  
A qualitative approach was the best framework to take this study forward as the 
researcher believed this was the most adaptable and flexible method of having 
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analysed the data within the context of grounded theory. The cyclical nature of 
the data collected in the fieldwork phase and the following on-going analysis 
shaped the pathway of this investigation. This then led to semi-structured 
cessations with cohort member’s and one to one interviews that enhanced the 
study further through probing and enhancing the narratives collected from the 
Punjabi and Pukhtoon participants. In all respects, this was an evolutionary 
process that assisted in building trust and relationships with cohort members 
that benefited the research as a whole. 
 
It is also within this model that the researcher understood the significance of the 
diversity within this community of study, in terms of political, economic and 
social constructs that defined individuals within the Pakistani diaspora that 
maintained a sense of transnational allegiances, out of a desire for self-
awareness and understanding of their heritage. The study allowed the 
researcher to validate or reject personal assumptions and hypothesis that were 
formed in line with the environmental conditioning and history of the Pakistani 
communities and migration to Britain. Empirical data therefore provided 
additional support to this specific area and had informed the on-going analysis 
as part of the theoretical approach.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity 
 
There are a number of key interlocking themes this chapter intends to consider 
in relation to the available literature, which will provide a greater overview of the 
issues and debates related to the research question. The issues of media and 
identity are considerations within a much broader context that need to be 
addressed, as they collectively impact on the investigation.  
 
The wider discourse of the British Muslim and the Pakistani and their role and 
purpose in British society has been amplified and invoked in many column 
inches and television scripts. It is highlighted in the newspaper headline ‘How 
would you describe your identity?’ (Guardian 2004). This sentence resonates 
with the research question in this study. It seeks to address the fundamental 
relationship, in its newspaper columns, between a racial minority presence and 
Islam in Britain. This chapter aims to contribute further to the existing body of 
work on the particular diaspora of interest, the Pakistani British Muslim. 
(Modood et al1994, 1997, Modood 2003, 2010, Poole 2002, Ansari 2002, Alam 
and Husband 2006, Shaw 1994, Bologani and Lyon 2011 Samad 2006, 2013).  
 
This chapter therefore sets out the interlinks between faith, identity, 
transnational belonging, ethnicity and diaspora. Through subjective and 
objective definitions, it evokes a complex set of emotions and relationships 
between spatial environments and a sense of being as a citizen. In adding to 
the wider literature, it emphasises the role of the media in how it relates to Islam 
and to the Pakistani diaspora. The impact of geo-political situations is also 
addressed within the arena of transnationalism and hybridity impacted upon by 
international media representations. The final summation will focus on how new 
technologies can source alternative meanings to identity that are assertive, 
global and empowering to the subjects in question. 
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2.1 South Asians in Britain  
 
There is already a robust body of literature on the early arrival of South Asian 
communities in Britain and their settlement. (Woods 1960; Desai, 1963; Dahya, 
1974; Saifullah Khan, 1977; Ballard, 1982; Barton, 1986; Eade, 1996, 1997, 
2007; Ansari, 2006; Singh, 2006). It highlights the arrival of the Pakistani, Indian 
and Bangladeshi communities to begin a new life in Britain, pre- and post-
independence. They referred to their early identity in Britain as Indians until 
partition gave them compartmentalised cultural belonging that became 
separated by faith (Brah, 2006). The ranged from the seafarers of pre-partition 
India, who remained to provide labour for the production of armaments for the 
war effort, to the rural dwellers of newly formed Pakistan and Bangladesh 
(Mirpur and Sylhet respectively) who came to work in the industrial centres of 
Bradford, Birmingham and London (Eade, 1996; Ansari, 2006; Abbas, 2007). 
Two other centres of settlement documented by the researcher in more detail in 
this work are Oxford and Luton.  
 
The patterns were similar in other cities across Britain where South Asians first 
made their homes, with predominantly male settlement, before spouses and 
children followed later, and before new immigration laws imposed further 
barriers (McLoughlin et al., 2014). These were the poor areas or ‘zones of 
transition’ left vacant by well-to-do locals taking ‘white flight’ (Abbas, (2007, p.3).  
 
In placing this section in context, the researcher does not intend to set out a 
chronological anthology of migration and settlement from the Indian sub-
continent. The study aims, rather, to provide an overview of the social and 
cultural reception and recorded accounts of those early periods of transition and 
accommodation into new ‘societal cultures’ (Kymlicka, 1995; see previous 
chapter, 1.3).  
 
It sets out the argument that is a central theme throughout this research 
analysis of the South Asian migrant and the future diaspora, evidenced by the 
experiences of the sample Pakistani diaspora in this study, of being the 
continual outsider, being repeatedly reminded of their external status.  
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Furthermore, the researcher feels that the shaping of the ‘other’ in these initial 
periods of migration pre- and post-independence, was embedded early on 
within mainstream society arising from colonial legacies (Kabbani, 1987), 
perceptions of which have impacted on the diaspora generations, as set out 
below and analysed in the main body of this work.  
 
In those early years, the dual elements of racism and exclusion were a feature 
of the lives of these people of colour, moving into class-based mono-cultural 
urban cities of Britain. This began with an existing racial and cultural stereotype 
exported through negative narratives of former colonial masters who policed 
and managed the old empire (Brah, 2006). Accordingly, interactions between 
new migrants and the indigenous community were framed within a colonial 
legacy and framing, by what Zubaida has referred to as ‘returning working class 
soldiers and middle class administrators’ (Brah, 2006, p.36, quoting Zubaida 
(1970)). This created myths and misrepresentations that reinforced the 
‘inferiority and servility of “native” populations’ (ibid.). In these very early stages, 
the visualisation of the ‘other’ is already taking hold in the minds of mainstream 
British society, aided by the discourse of Orientalism (Said, 1978a) and 
exoticism of the East in the early British understanding of these ‘other’ peoples.  
 
Animosity towards them would become further exacerbated and entrenched at 
times of economic and political crisis that are emphasised and adapted to 
increase tensions (Brah, 2006; p.36, quoting Zubaida (1970). From the outset, 
status, sense of home and security, were tenuous for the South Asian migrant. 
Allied to this was the language of hate, of Asians smelling of curry or living 
collectively in large groups, and simply being ‘here’ (Brah, 2006; Sivanandan, 
1986) that reinforced a ‘them and us’ mentality at its crudest level. The growth 
of the far right, the National Front, increased tensions and fears amongst the 
immigrant populations with marches in predominantly South Asian areas to 
raise tensions and anxiety among new settlers. It was a period the researcher 
recalls when he was growing up in Bradford, with white groups chanting ‘Paki 
out’ as parents reminded children firmly to remain indoors and not even look out 
of the window.   
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This was the period of the first generation of the diaspora growing up, attending 
British schools and receiving a British education. Identity formation seeking to 
align East and West was emerging within these early British South Asian 
diasporas. Such development had, however, created an academic and societal 
discourse of a so called ‘culture clash’ (Brah, 2006, p.52) within this new 
growing generation. Brah (2006) argues that this is problematic on a number of 
fronts as it is based on the premise that there are only two specific dominant 
cultures within this frame. He contends that there is no one British (referring to 
middle-class and working-class) culture or equivalent single Asian culture 
(differentiated by a range of identifiers, such as caste, religion, regional culture, 
language). Brah’s viewpoint is evidenced by partition of the Indian sub-
continent. Brah (ibid.) also offers several other counter arguments on this 
subject. The term ‘culture clash’ disallows ‘cultural interactions’ (ibid., p.53) 
whereby cultures can be joined and merged, that relate to the development of 
hybridity in diaspora communities more widely (Safran, 1991; Samad, 2013). 
Brah also points to the falsehood of the debate on transmigration as being only 
one way. There is a failure to recognise earlier centuries of trade and 
relationships between the then India and the West, both before and during 
colonial rule.  
 
Brah (ibid.) ends with two key points in his argument against this notion of 
cultural clash and identity crisis within the South Asian youth. First, there is a 
lack of evidence in this regard, and although limited numbers may have 
personalised cultural conflicts, this cannot be hypothesised across the wider 
diaspora generation. Second, other contributors of anxiety, such as racism, 
gender variations and even issues of sexuality are not factored into this 
equation. In general terms, there are also periods of transition for young people 
from adolescence to adulthood, fraught with their own anxieties and concerns; 
similar to Western youth.  
 
What Brah (ibid.) addresses is the continual emphasis on difference, on the 
alien world the South Asian belongs to, the antithesis of British values and 
norms. Hutnyk (2006) also identifies with this view by stating how 
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anthropological studies of South Asians have tended to reinforce conservative 
stereotypes. He argues: 
 
‘To assume that caste, kinship, arranged marriages and religious 
traditions are the main keys to comprehension of the social and political 
experience of South Asians in Britain is a common delusion, born from 
the work of anthropologists bent on finding rural and village subjects 
conveniently replicated in metropolitan settings.’ (pp.75-6).  
 
There is, therefore, a tendency through such studies (and through the lens of 
the media, as is the subject of this study) to reinforce a framing of the South 
Asian in what has been described as a ‘double strategy, either as demons, or 
exotica’ (ibid., p.77).  What Hutnyk (ibid.) seeks to do is to readdress the 
balance of the discourse on South Asians created within the field of 
anthropology and to ‘reconstruct this absent history’ (p.77). It signifies how 
these ‘myths of the orient’ (Kabbani, (1987) have become so entrenched that 
even British-born South Asians of the diaspora generation can still be viewed as 
the ‘other’. This typology, the researcher would argue, exists within present 
discourses on South Asian communities, particularly those more socially 
excluded, as is the case of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population.  
 
Indeed the cities with which South Asians have become predominantly 
associated with – Bradford, Leicester, Birmingham and London – have at times 
acquired names more associated with the Indian sub-continent: Little Mirpur, 
Little India or Brad-istan (McLoughlin, 2006; Singh, 2006). These racialised 
terms seek to reflect the impact of faith and elements of conservative culture 
more akin to village life than urban living, even though the major cities of the 
Indian sub-continent personify modernity at its best (Brah, 2006).  
 
However, the South Asian diasporas made in, and of, Britain, unlike their 
parents, have grown up challenging racism rather than accepting or denying it. 
The second and third generations of the diaspora have signified a mélange of 
identities that capture both East and West.  
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In addition, the politicised youth were at the ‘vanguard of black struggle’ 
(Sivanandan, 1986, p.140) articulated through the creation of Asian youth 
movements in the 1970s and 1980’s, in Southall and Bradford for instance, as 
an anti-racist movement response to police indifference, inaction and 
institutionalised racism. These were political responses across the country by a 
more assertive youth, who were also challenging the widely prevailing discourse 
of that time, the ‘between two cultures analysis’ (Alexander, 2006, p.259; Brah, 
2006; Singh, 2006). These ‘BrAsian’ (Ali et al., 2006, p.1) communities were 
shedding the need to conform or acquiesce to the prejudices and animosity of 
the majority culture that had defined the lives of the first migrants from the 
Indian sub-continent.  
 
For many young people, the new assertiveness was perceived as self-defence 
against an onslaught of racism expressed in the rise of the National Front. It 
was also a bold statement of intent: We are British and we are here to stay. It 
was echoed two decades later in the mid 1990s in the streets of Bradford in the 
Manningham riots, with young British Asians protesting against perceived Police 
brutality and racism, as well as wider socio-economic marginalisation and 
discrimination (Foundation 2000, 1995). Six years later, the much analysed riots 
in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham (Cantle, 2001) can also be seen as a new 
diasporic response to far-right extremism attempting to march into areas with 
significant Asian populations. Many did not wish to repeat the experiences of 
their parents nor would they allow far-right foot soldiers to shout abuse on their 
doorsteps. More importantly, they wished to defend their status as British 
citizens the equal of their opponents (Jan-Khan, 2001). The prevailing discourse 
in political and social policy was marked by what Cantle (ibid.) referred to as 
minority and white communities living parallel lives. The emphasis placed on 
minorities to conform was another reminder of the ‘other’ within British society 
two generations on (Kundnani, 2014). 
 
Yet the political consciousness of the diaspora youth has been assessed by 
Alexander (2006) as a time of transforming the term Asian itself, from a multi-
ethnic meaning, encompassing many of the Indian sub-continent of many faiths 
to one referring to ‘essentialising religio-cultural identities (ibid., p.265), setting 
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the Islamic traditions of Pakistani and Bangladeshi against the Indian, of the 
Hindu and Sikh faiths. The politics of the sub-continent have indeed created 
sectarianism based on religion, where Islamic political identity has now replaced 
what was once a collective Asian sense of belonging (McLoughlin, 2006). 
Ironically, this is a division also perpetuated by the English Defence League 
with its anti-‘Islamisation of Britain’ campaigns that also signify the rise of 
cultural racism after 9/11 and London bombings in 2005. (Silverman and Yuval-
Davis, 1999; Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015)  
 
In that sense, the South Asian experience has split across socio-economic, as 
well as religious, lines, with the Indian communities in the main prospering 
economically and educationally, while the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
performing worst on many social and economic indicators (Cabinet Office, 
2003; Thandi, 2006 Atkin, 2006). An exception is educated and affluent 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (McLoughlin, 2006). 
 
The Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities have similarities in terms of socio-
economic positionality within British society. The faith of Islam and being a 
British Muslim unites them, even if the communities were divided by the split of 
East Pakistan from Pakistan to form Bangladesh. For instance, the work of 
Eade (1996, 1997) on the Bangladeshi community of East London highlights 
that the ‘firm grounding of individual personality is dependent here on a 
composite social identity where Islam holds pride of place and cultural traditions 
do not contradict Islamic injunctions’ (1977, p.153) 
 
As this research study will highlight, Islam and the religious identity of the 
Pakistani diaspora are integrated into the hybridity of these Muslim diasporas 
emerging British identity. This correlates to the transnational movement of 
people, the mix of cultures and wider global events that impact locally and thus 
interlink and impact on the lives of diverse communities (Eade, 2007).  
  
In looking at the literature of Alam (2002), Eade (1996, 1997), Abbas (2007), 
Alam et al. (2009), and Alam and Husband (2011), on the development of the 
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Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities and diasporas in Bradford, Birmingham 
and London, the complexity of belonging is highlighted. Internal personalised 
debates on being British, Muslim, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi are 
simultaneously taking place in these urban centres. They not only provide the 
historical setting of these populations but also their continuing place in their 
locale, centred on extended family networks of generations residing in the same 
vicinity. Such narratives may include the decline of the early thriving industries, 
the rise of unemployment, and localised skirmishes between minorities and the 
majority population, as in the Abbey Mills Mosque dispute (Eade, 2007).  
  
The insider/outsider approach is highlighted as important, if not essential, in this 
analysis of how these specific communities are not only written about but 
personified (see Brah and Hutnyk above). McLoughlin (McLoughlin et al. 2014,  
p.38) points out the critique of liberal discourse on Muslims by Alam and 
Husband (2006) in their analysis of first-hand narratives of Bradford’s Muslim 
diaspora following the London bombings in 2005. Like Poole (2002) and Poole 
and Richardson (2006) commenting on media representation of Muslims, Alam 
and Husband speak of an equally negative research discourse of demonising 
British Muslim culture as problematic, through liberal (Eurocentric) interpretation 
of British Muslim lives.  
  
This symbolises for the researcher the modernity to date of the continuation of 
the ‘other’ that emerged with the first wave of non-white migrants into Britain, 
the way the Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslim within many urban cities of 
Britain is portrayed, maintaining a specific anthropological interpretation pointed 
out by Hutnyk (ibid.).  
 
As an alternative and counterbalance, the edited volume of narratives of 
Pakistani young men ‘made in Bradford’ (Alam, 2006) provides a remarkable 
insight into the reality of the lives and identity of British-born Pakistani citizens in 
that city. This approach seems to correlate with the internal debates on identity 
occurring within the Bangladeshi diaspora in London (Eade, 1997) as well as in 
places such as Birmingham (Abbas, 2010; Isakjee, 2012). It signifies, in many 
respects, the continual ‘insider/outsider’ interest in and impact of South Asian 
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communities of the past, the present diaspora and future generations living in 
Britain. It is such a level of examination, often academically forensic and 
persistent, playing a spotlight on specific South Asians of Muslim faith, that has 
generated this research question. 
  
Indeed, it is these two South Asian groups, Pakistani and Bangladeshi, that now 
form an important part in localised (urbanised) global cities and that also relate 
to the growth of greater diversity (Eade, 1997; Samad, 2013; Vertovec, 2010). 
The global city is marked by international business and a transnational society 
that, as Eade (2010a) points out, facilitates diasporas to have belonging to a 
range of homes according to their centres of origin. In addition, hybrid culture is 
enhanced through film, television and other art and virtual forms, and national 
governments are powerless to disallow these international connections that 
maintain a dominant role in developing diasporic identities and transnational 
relationships (Gajjala, 2010; Rinnawi, 2010).  
  
It is in this context that the Pakistani diaspora and media consumption and 
identity are explored further in this study. Commencing with an analysis of the 
literature in this chapter, the study then initiates some key debates emerging 
from the wider literature. This aligns to the analysis of the data collected from 
the two fieldwork sites, in Chapters 4-6.  
 
 
2.2 Defining identities 
 
As Hall (1997) has argued, identity is a construction of many facets, including 
language and other internal and external characteristics. It is apparent that 
identity within minority communities reaches a sense of crisis and is the cause 
of much agonising, because of overtly negative feelings that prevail in society 
against the ‘Other’ (Hall, 1997). The Government Office for Science report 
Future identities (2013) defines identity as being a set of characteristics setting 
out who and what an individual is, containing perceptions of oneself that also 
may be aligned to, or different from, other people’s views.  
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An alternative approach is put forward by Anthias, who speaks of the limited 
empirical value of concepts of identity and rather engages in ‘narratives of 
location and positionality’ (Anthias, 2002, p.491) that relate to notions of 
collective identity. She argues that there is more value in this method of 
investigation of belonging. It directly relates to assertions and acknowledgments 
made by individuals about their position in society and about their sense of 
belonging, in totality or in part, to wider society. This supports a better 
comprehension of broader social relationships that make up and are constituted 
in this process (ibid.). 
 
The researcher believes this concept to be the core element that relates to the 
Pakistani diaspora in this study. It corresponds to the wide body of literature but 
also to the data captured amongst respondents within the sample diaspora.  
 
The use of language in identity is also an important element in how it 
symbolises community connectivity, as argued by Barker and Galasinski (2001) 
within their work on discourse analysis. Language use creates codes and 
signals that become established within identity. This is clearly the case for the 
groups involved in this research, both Pukhtoon and Punjabi, via their use of 
fusion language in their daily interactions and sub-culture.  
 
This range of views highlights the complexity of settling on a definition of the 
term identity and interjects a stronger sense of elasticity in how individuals can 
or cannot relate to a sense of belonging within a given territorial boundary. This 
discourse will be revisited later in this chapter.  
 
The relationship with the media is set out within the following concept, where 
Chul-Byung (2002) challenges the cultural imperialism view of viewers as 
passive recipients of news. He suggests that public audiences are active 
participants in media consumption, utilising global media mechanisms to be 
creative. In many respects, this rather reflects the empowering nature and 
process of self-framing within the context of media growth and representation, 
rather than acquiescence to the rigid roles and rules set at the behest of capital, 
as argued by Herman and Chomsky (1994). It is Chul-Byung’s analysis that 
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corresponds with the sample diaspora and the central argument in this 
research, of how the Pakistani diaspora are becoming active citizens via new 
technologies to promulgate their transnational hybrid identity. 
 
There is also an explanation offered of how personal and public identity can be 
articulated within wider society. Chul-Byung refers to this as the intimacy and 
informality of what is known as the ‘back region’ or ‘back stage’ as opposed to 
the image portrayed to others in the ‘front region’ (Goffman, 1969, in Chul-
Byung, 2002). The boundary between the two can be blurred, given societal 
circumstances and experiences of the affected groups. There would also be 
fear of further alienation and animosity if private feelings were reflected within 
the public arena. This may be true of the experiences of many of the diaspora 
reflected in this study and addressed in the following chapters. The researcher 
recognises the power of the current dominant media conglomerates (News 
International, Time Warner) in relation to independent operators such as 
Democracy Now.  However, social media provides a strong lever for more 
citizen activism to challenge media hegemony (Wasley, 2009) and is an area to 
monitor in the future.   
 
Consistent with this viewpoint is the important role and impact of the ‘state’ as 
espoused by Sen (2009), who speaks of a theory of impartiality that is confined 
exactly within the borders of a sovereign state. It proceeds along territorial lines 
that do, of course, have legal significance but may not have similar political or 
moral perspicuity. This is not to deny that individuals often think of their 
identities in terms of groups that include some and firmly exclude others. 
However, the sense of identities – in fact people have many – is not confined 
within the borders of the state. People identify with individuals of the same 
religion, same language group, same race, same gender, same political beliefs, 
or same profession. In other words, even within specific boundaries such as 
those of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland there exists diversity in 
terms of geography, language, ancestry and other traits that relate to a 
transnational hybridity within the British state. 
 
27 
 
Other attributes contribute to this diversity of identities, that are cultural, faith-
based rituals described as symbols by Parekh in a report commissioned by the 
Runnymede Trust (2000) on the future of multiethnic Britain; they are 
associated with specific group personalities that are essential components 
within the scope of a multicultural society (ibid.). However, in recent decades in 
Britain, these are frequently viewed as challenging a sense of an indigenously 
dominant cohesiveness and Britishness (Fekete, 2011a). 
 
This is in many respects a challenge to the Sen argument (2009) whereby, 
through state intervention in the direction of civil society, individual and group 
identification is subject to standardisation of status and citizenship by legal and 
other regulation. The citizenship test is one such example, as are policies set up 
to promote community cohesion between minority communities and indigenous-
origin populations. It places the emphasis on minorities fitting into a societal 
norm and conforming to the rules of society as directed by the majority (Poole 
and Richardson, 2006). 
 
Such an approach is distinct from promoting a sense of minority rights as 
Kymlicka (1995) has argued and is related instead to the importance of societal 
culture within the Western context. It is that Asian culture – the Islamic faith, the 
language of their parents fused with English, Hollywood and Bollywood, 
Pukhtoon, Punjabi, or just Pakistani – that is so important to the diaspora 
individually and collectively. This is their expression of neo-societal culture in a 
British setting that relates to their need to have their rights not only recognised 
but enshrined institutionally as a matter of justice and equality. As Kymlicka 
(ibid.) argues, the culture of origin provides an anchor for migrant communities 
adapting to majority culture. This was the case for the South Asian workers 
described in section 2.1. It is also relevant to the present diaspora, who feel 
marginalised and subject to discrimination and close media examination. The 
continual discourse of conforming to British values and of integration, as well as 
the portrayal of the ‘other’, has led the British-born diaspora to find solace in 
their heritage, faith and evolving Britishness. Using Kymlicka’s (ibid.) framework 
of minority rights in this context requires that the diaspora be provided with legal 
protection to tackle inequality and discrimination. However, as pointed out in 
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Chapter 4 (4.1), current legal safeguards are inadequate to address the specific 
concerns of the diaspora, or non-existent. 
 
 Similarly, Turner (1994) correlates with the right of citizenship closely tied to a 
sense of belonging to society. It underlines the relevance of Anthias’s concept 
in this analysis. In the current discourse of policy making, these communities 
would be redefined as ‘aliens’ in their own society. This reinforces a sense of 
‘separateness’ and segregation and a need for alternative affirmation that, as a 
consequence, creates a link with transnational and cultural networks (Samad, 
2013). These parallels are a common trait of diaspora population groups 
although Samad (n.d.) has highlighted the different emphasis of meaning and 
strata of transnational movement. This fluidity in meaning is also represented in 
the work of Engbersen (2007) referring to a multi-level of status in society, from 
citizenship to denizen. He refers to the 
 
‘transmigrant [who] does not move from one society to another, but is 
someone who is part of both societies at the same time’. (p.124) 
 
Engbersen (ibid.) argues that this type of person is part of a new cross-border 
transnational community rather than remaining or integrating into the host 
society. The emerging diaspora, may, in part, be more attuned to this paradigm 
of fixation within a ‘no man’s land’ with a perception that they are not welcome 
or at home in the country of their birth and are also seen as interlopers in their 
country of origin. This is a key area of exploration using Engbersen’s study of 
migrants in the Netherlands (ibid.); concepts of which, in the view of the 
researcher, relate to the empirical analysis and perceptions of the Pakistani 
diaspora in a new media age. 
 
Engbersen (2007) speaks of migrants operating between two worlds, the host 
country and place of birth. Movements across these two are related to 
networks, affiliations, economic and political interest, and familial connectivity 
through communication and limited visits back to the place of origin. As 
Engbersen states, ‘this involves fundamental questions surrounding admission, 
integration and identity formation’ (2007, p.124). This, the researcher would 
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argue, is true for the Pakistani diaspora in Britain, reflecting their status in their 
‘home’ society. In the data analysis, they too maintain an economic and political 
interest in their ‘other’ land, Pakistan. This is evident through property-buying or 
renovations on existing family homes, handed down through generations and 
now modernised with Western comforts (electric generators, en-suite 
bathrooms with flush toilets), and through the adoption of a Western approach 
of having closed houses with a roof and floors, as opposed to a series of rooms 
built around an open courtyard). In a political sense, they have an interest in the 
political parties of Pakistan such as the Muslim League (MLN), Pakistan’s 
Peoples Party (PPP), and the more recent Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI, Pakistan 
Movement for Justice, all with noticeable and charismatic leaders such as 
Nawaz Sharif, Asif Ali Zardari and his Oxford-educated son, Bilal Zardari 
Bhutto. The involvement of a former cricket star turned politician, Imran Khan, 
has been the driving force for the PTI, which has much appeal amongst the 
young in Pakistan and the diaspora in Britain. The vexed question of Kashmir 
and dislike of Indian occupation of part of that region is also a political issue 
uniting transnational communities and identities (Werbner, 2000; Ali, 2003; Ellis 
and Khan, 2010). 
 
The relationship with the extended families in Pakistan is evident in the 
empirical data in the use of smartphone technology, instant messaging 
(Whatsapp, Viber, and Tango), social media (Twitter, Facebook) and face-to-
face visualisation through Skype or Facetime. In addition, cable and satellite 
television informs on a rolling basis with news and information from the 
provinces as well as the capital of Pakistan. In a slight deviation from 
Engbersen (2007), this collectively raises fundamental questions of acceptance, 
integration and identity formation for the diaspora in this study.  
 
The relevancy of the term ‘transmigrant’ within a new media age for the 
Pakistani diaspora is set within the literature of exploring diasporas and 
transnationalism. In their work on Diaspora and Transnationalism, Concepts, 
Theories and Methods,  Baubock and Faist (2010) discuss the related literature 
on this subject. For the researcher, the idea of the ‘transmigrant’ is enhanced by 
Dahinden’s (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009) suggestion of ‘diasporic 
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transnationalism’. This refers to ‘the ties of migrants and their collectives who 
entertain sustained social formations across borders while being settled in 
countries of immigration, thereby forming transnational fields or spaces’ 
(Baubock and Faist, 2010, p.17).  
 
The Pakistani diaspora reflects that definition as they articulate their concerns, 
anxieties and relationships with the country of origin whilst residing in the 
country of their birth. This fits in with Safran’s view that ‘diasporas exist in a 
triangular socio-cultural relationship with the host society and the homeland. It is 
above all the ties among dispersed people with each other that have 
significance’ (1991, p.20). 
 
It is, as the researcher will expand upon in later chapters (4-6), their lack of 
security and discrimination (see chapters 4,7) that aids this new form of 
transmigrant; for some a return to the homeland as a response to insecurity of 
living in their settled home, explored in 4.7. They regard themselves as in a type 
of ‘no man’s land’ of belonging that relates back to cultural, political and social 
heritage through new media that channels their evolving sense of being. This 
relates directly to new definitions of identity, diaspora and transnationalism so to 
the work of Safran (1991) and Dahinden (ibid.) that, together with Engbersen’s 
(ibid.) narratives, reshape and redefine how the Pakistani diasporic generation 
perceive themselves to be. It is a place of origin and place of destination that is 
being explored and evolving, within which new media plays a dominant role in 
defining a new form of transmigrant of the media age. Thus a sense of 
community is provided, and also a space and locale that relates to the global 
context and more widely to globalisation (Gajjala, 2010). 
 
It is within this sphere that hybridity related to these special concepts of 
attachment is evolving. Bhabha (1994) refers to hybridity as a third space and 
speaks of cultural production being most creative when it is indecisive; this may 
be true of the Pakistani diaspora in assessing its own sense of hybridity. The 
media has impacted and precipitated this process within the last decade for 
these specific groups. 
 
31 
 
Therefore, proactive involvement in what have been referred to as ‘transnational 
social fields’ undertaking ‘transnational activities’ (Engbersen, ibid.) is a 
prerequisite for someone to be defined as a transmigrant. In the context of this 
discussion, a transmigrant might be said to have one foot in each of two camps, 
East and West, in a kind of no man’s land. However, this concept has to be 
explored within a new age of technological advances and media expansion, as 
to whether a new form of media savvy transmigrant exists within a virtual world. 
With the use of such technologies for new purposes, one has to consider these 
new developments within the framework of the emerging diasporic identity 
amongst young men and women who may wish to create their own self-defining 
public sphere. Whether this formulation leads to yet another redefining of the 
term new transmigrant, is an interesting issue.  
 
As an example, Naficy (1993), in discussing Iranians in Los Angeles, writes 
about the continued processes of social and cultural fusion that are the 
essential elements of these groups The Pakistani diaspora can be seen in a 
similar light. This is the opposite of the ‘ghettoisation’ within the new media age 
as articulated by Akhtar (BBC News, 2006a) in the portrayal of these diasporas 
as imposing self-isolationism upon themselves. They may, in fact, be embracing 
what Downing and Husband (2005), in their analysis of race and media, have 
referred to as a process of ‘cultural negotiation of dual nationality and dual 
citizenship of past and present’ (ibid. p.57).  
 
Appadurai (1997) argues that media and migration are linked, particularly for 
migrant populations arriving in a foreign land. In many ways, Appadurai 
highlights the re-energising of identities and the media input into that process 
via specifically cultural media rather than the indigenous homegrown equivalent. 
sentiments echo Vertovec’s (2003) view supporting transnationalist networks 
that give a sense of being part of a nation, not dependent on the legality of 
status or rights but based on a real sense of membership of society with a 
validated common bond. Cultural media and other forms of transnational modes 
of communication and cross-border affiliations are an essential element of 
minority self-affirmation and endorsement. As Sauter (2003) reflects, they 
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provide a much desired cultural anchor as well as a place of refuge in an 
antagonistic and alien environment many miles from home. 
 
Furthermore, the impact of globalisation and new mass media proliferation 
through new technologies such as the Internet and mobile phone 
communications are potential vehicles to promote, disseminate and seek 
membership of wider transnational networks (Eade, 2006). This includes social, 
political and economic spheres that reflect sameness, with a desire to 
investigate, and find, much needed global validation of specific group identity. 
This may be more than apparent within the emerging diaspora seeking space of 
their own to accommodate and co-exist with their intended personal 
composition and state boundaries. It is perhaps best described as retaining a 
legal sense of residency without an attached sense of belonging to that nation. 
 
Correspondingly, Vertovec (2003, 2009, 2010) recalls and reinforces this idea 
as he refers to these sets of transnationalist communities within the context of 
increased world technologies. They connect people together via modems, 
calling cards, cultural cable channels based overseas that provide an easier 
and more economical way of keeping in touch with kin abroad that is cross 
generational, albeit in a different form. Whilst for early migrants from Pakistan, 
cross-continent tape recordings and airmail letters were always anticipated in 
advance, these have now been replaced and made redundant by the visual 
interface created by Skype and instant messaging for the diaspora. The ability 
and adaptability of new technologies have spurred a new generation to think 
and act more creatively. From the early arrivers from the East, of whom 
Kabbani has spoken as ‘transplanted communities’ (1987, p.5), moving from 
rural agrarian cultures to city life, have emerged the diaspora. They are a 
growing modern generation wishing to explore and contribute to the wider 
discourse that is conceptualised in what Downing and Husband (2005) have 
referred to as ‘diasporic public spheres’ (p.45).  
 
In essence, seeking to define a new public sphere of the diaspora’s making is a 
difficult challenge within a mainstream media and societal setting, given the 
recent global geo-political situation. What may emerge, either as part of a new 
33 
 
transnational cultural discourse set as ‘hybridic Asianness’ (ibid.) may yet be 
seen as a developing process. It is this potential for the growth of a fused 
identity bred within an East-West experience that has shed the politics of old 
cultural dogma, caste, regional or tribal loyalty and replaced it with the politics of 
modernity and self-identity, that is referred to in the narratives and analysis of 
the data. In addition, new street language is created through the use of what 
can only be described as a mix of Urdu, Punjabi and Pukhto with English, thus 
creating a new currency of communication amongst sections of the diaspora, 
namely the more socially excluded related to their contributions to this study. It 
is also significant of the cultural and racial differences in the use of social media 
that are now beginning to form. (Shivers 2014, Watkins 2014) 
 
This method of creating this synthesis culture mirrors an analysis provided by 
Krieg’s (1999) exploration of identity and hybridity through the novels of Salman 
Rushdie. He highlights multiple identities that organically grow as opposed to 
evolving identity that requires constant analysis. A comparison can be drawn 
with Sauter’s (2003) work with young Turkish people in Frankfurt, who link 
home and attachment to security. For the British Pakistani Muslim there is a 
similar feeling of referring to a place as home that they feel secure and 
accepted within.  
 
The relationships between these levels of ambivalence and insecurity may 
symbolically express a much sought after assertiveness, as well as raise a 
heightened sense of ‘political’ identity and awareness through art forms that are 
subliminally, rather than overtly, political expressions of identity. This is akin to 
the early development of hip-hop as a medium for social action within the 
discriminated-against and marginalised black communities of urban America 
(Samy-Alim, 2005).  
 
Similarly, the Pakistani diaspora has utilised mobile phone video imagery via 
new media smartphone technology to depict and express transnational and 
traditional cultural traits with inserted Western music. These are symbolic 
interpretations exploring multiple identities through a form of asserted social 
action in a new media age. What also emerges from this process is a distinct 
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class divergence of the diaspora between the street-smart diaspora and those 
more educated, aspiring middle-class members of the Pakistani community also 
born in Britain.  
 
As an example, the riots in Britain of August 2011, when materialist 
consumption was in mind for the vast majority of looters, were strategically 
aided in their movements by new media. Indeed, the smartphones of youth 
outsmarted the law enforcement agencies and exemplified the new means of 
mass communication as a flexible and available tool for organised protest 
(Guardian, 2011). The ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East, particularly Egypt, also 
illustrates this trend in using new media as a form of assertive social action and 
civil disobedience (Campbell and Hawk, 2012). Additionally, this has created a 
strong link with highlighting perceived injustices to emphasise within this 
modern sphere the need for minority rights and grievances to be addressed, 
which relates directly to the views of Kymlicka (1995). 
 
It could be argued that the formation of minority privileges and developments in 
the new media age are intrinsically linked, as they embody an assertive element 
of self-identification. This is achieved through a range of new media visual and 
audio forms that the early dispersed settlers did not have at their instant 
disposal to communicate with loved ones in distant lands.  
 
There is a further element of this hybridity that needs equal consideration for the 
Pakistani diaspora in this discourse. Within the media, and social and political 
commentary, it is currently in vogue to speak of Muslim identity, and more so 
within British society, where much interest has been ignited in what this really 
means and relates to. The media has played a dominant role in contributing to 
this debate, through reporting, framing and subjective representation (Poole, 
2002). It has therefore added to negative perceptions, articulated by political 
commentators and extremist groups (Gardiner, 2010; Az and Mo Productions, 
2012). This has in turn created uncertainty and re-awakening of the diaspora in 
its own notions of British Muslim and Pakistani identity within a wider 
transnational context. 
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Some have argued that religious identity has come to the fore as a reaction to 
the increase in the right-wing movement that has created insecurity within the 
diaspora. The polarisation and increased sense of crisis has been seen as one 
explanation for the rise in the concept of asserting Muslim identity (Moussa 
2004). It personifies the evident rise of cultural racism as a new tool of targeting 
this specific racial and religious group. An increased sense of spiritual identity 
for the diaspora, therefore, is a way of dealing with these animosities. 
 
Furthermore, the significance of being Muslim in Britain is an essential 
component of their own sense of Britishness; as it is so inherently linked to the 
specific population groups who are the focus of this investigation. The plurality 
of identities, class distinctions, economic and social empowerments are also 
considered within this sphere. The related issues of race, perceptions of 
discrimination and anti-Islamic sentiment, within a wider global geo-political 
framework also provide an important context to the data analysis featured in 
later chapters. 
 
The overt emergence or re-affirmation of a distinct religious identity with a 
political edge (Modood, 2003) has resulted from what many see as a malign 
discourse on Muslims in the wider and dominant Western media. It is 
characterised by a forensic examination of the cultural aspects of race, rather 
than the biological differences that were a previous preoccupation of community 
and race relations in Britain (Silverman and Yuval-Davis, 1999). 
 
The global ‘war on terror’ and the importance of Pakistan in this equation have 
created an element of instability amongst the Pakistani British diaspora, 
subjected to superficial debates on loyalty inspired by politicians and the media. 
This was echoed at the time of 9/11, the London bombings of 2005 and more 
recently in the context of Syria and some British Muslims fighting against Syrian 
government forces in the name of Islam (Malcolm Rifkind, BBC Radio 4, 2014).  
 
Their defensive response to this interpretation would bring about a stronger 
sense of asserting their right of presence in Britain, as well as their cultural and 
religious identity being heightened as a consequence. As Werbner (2004) has 
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argued, group identity is heightened at times of personal or social group 
instability if not insecurity; this would apply to the British Pakistani diaspora in 
the current political environment. Within these discourses there has been a 
strong emergence of faith as a central element of how the sample diaspora view 
their own world around them and perceive their reality. Identification as a 
follower of Islam is an important part of their lives, as emphasised in the data, 
and it would be useful to define this strong religious affiliation.  
 
 
2.3 What is a Muslim? 
 
According to Sardar (2006), the term Muslim refers to believers of Islam who 
make a declaration known as the shahada, translated in the literal sense as 
‘witness’ or ‘testimony’ of reciting the words, ‘there is no god but Allah and 
Muhammed is his prophet’ (ibid., 1). This simple statement provides an 
affirmation of faith not only as to the religion but to the belief in one god, that 
being Allah, the most beneficial and merciful. In that regard he is an all-powerful 
god is entrusted with life and death, and creator of all things. Muhammed is 
regarded as the final prophet in a long line of prophets including Adam, 
Abraham, Moses, Jesus and others, who are also respected and acknowledged 
by Muslims. As the final prophet, Muhammed brought the word of god onto 
earth through the Quran, which is in itself a literal text from god via the angel 
Gabriel.  
 
The word Islam has a two part meaning of ‘peace’ and ‘submission’ that relates 
to the faith being a complete way of life, governing legal, economic, political, 
social and personal norms of living and adherence. These are reinforced by the 
Sunnah, which is ultimately referred to as the sayings and the actions of the 
prophet Muhammed during his life. Muslims are also asked to use the prophet 
as a role model for their conduct and behaviour in day-to-day living; this 
includes committing oneself to the five pillars of Islam: prayer, fasting, hajj 
(pilgrimage to Mecca), shahada (declaration of faith) and zakat (giving part of a 
person’s income to the poor and needy). Sardar (2006) and (Ramadan, 2004) 
have argued not only for diversity within the faith to encompass a range of 
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branches of belief, but also for followers to critique and debate the religion as 
Islam itself requests. Such an internal and external discourse amongst Muslims 
allows for an individual’s faith to be made much stronger through analysis and 
understanding of the religion itself.  Islamic identity can be more universal as 
part of the wider Ummah (Said, 2008) whilst Muslim identity is much more 
personal and can encapsulate cultural beliefs that become part of the faith, 
although these may not be prescribed in the Quran; often criticised by 
modernisers such as Ramadan (2006). It is such interpretations that often 
cause much debate within Islam and its followers as these chapters highlight. 
 
There is also of course, much disagreement and tension within Islam itself, 
most openly evident by the split between Shias and Sunnis. This is often 
exemplified in sectarian violence seen in Pakistan, Iraq, Bahrain and other parts 
of the Muslim world. These strains are historical and derived from the 
succession of the son-in-law of the prophet Muhammed, Ali, following his 
murder in what is modern-day Iran over two thousand years ago. There are 
theological differences in the branches between those who are referred to as 
Deobandis and Barelvis, the former being more orthodox in their interpretation 
of the faith, the latter revering the prophet more enthusiastically through 
chanting after prayers, a practice despised by the Deobandis. Sufis, also known 
as mystics, are a popular branch of Islam who believe that god is all present in 
all things and they focus on the spiritual nature of Islam. These differences 
highlight the complexity and relationships in the faith as a whole and the diverse 
belief systems that are eclectic to Islam’s millions of followers. These believers 
exist not only in the 57 states that define themselves as Islamic republics, but 
also in the non-Muslim world, where they are major population groups, as in 
Russia, China and India. (Said 1997, Ramadan 2004, 2006, Sardar 2006, 
2010).  
 
Most up to date research suggests Islam being the fastest growing religion and 
on course to reach parity with Christianity by 2050 (Pew Research 2015). The 
illustration below provides a diagram of the changing global village based on 
demographic changes. 
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Figure 2.1   
 
This global diversity, which crosses borders, cultures, traditions, and political, 
economic and social systems, is seen by Sardar (2006) as reflecting his view 
that each ethnic community brings with it its own historical customs and cultural 
practices, which are often seen as their ‘Islamic identity’ (ibid., p.8). This view 
clearly aligns with the rise of the Pakistani diaspora in Britain which signifies 
diversity, not only in terms of faith but also in cultural groupings, as in this study 
of the Pukhtoon and Punjabi. Being a Muslim is not an added extra of identity, 
the researcher would argue, but an integral part of the human essence of an 
individual that governs their lives in their totality, daily and universally. It relates 
to and enhances their sense of transnational and hybrid identity that is a more 
modern interpretation of their understanding of their faith and fitting in with 
modern, specifically Western society. This in turns plays into a wider evolving, if 
not complex, identity.  
 
However, identity may remain a personal issue and subject to many individual 
constraints and choices in life, based on a whole range of indicators and facets. 
39 
 
In the current climate, these are not only national but also global in outlook, 
redefining not only the term Muslim but also Pakistani Britishness, as one media 
insider, the film producer Naveed Akhtar, has described: 
 
 “British Muslim” is a title with an empty page; we have a good 
opportunity to start defining it.’ (Akhtar, 2005) 
 
In that respect, there are many issues that need consideration on that page, 
which relate to the wider geo-political focus on the Pakistani diaspora, the 
British Muslim and the world at large.  
 
 
2.4 New class and identity  
 
Within that plurality; of wider British Muslim communities as well as the 
Pakistani diaspora, there are, of course, class divisions that need to be 
recognised that align with media consumption. Before opening a wider 
discussion arising from analysis of the data in this work, it should be noted that 
there are those who have already set the scene in this direction. Moll’s (2007) 
study is further articulation of this path of construction in which distinct class-
based Muslim identity is played out within the new and emerging media formats. 
In essence, these authors are evolving a sense of British Muslim identity that 
may respond to what is perceived as a bias, adopted by mainstream Western 
mass media (Poole, 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006).  
 
By analysing two specific media periodicals, Emel and Q-News (now no longer 
functioning), Moll has outlined their dual role in setting a Muslim agenda for 
those of the diaspora and, in doing so, in reshaping British Muslim identity in the 
context of Islamic modernity.  
 
There is much debate as to whether this identity is constructed organically or 
manufactured to introduce a uniformity of purpose and conformity for all British 
Muslims. It may be setting defined parameters of inclusion, mostly epitomised 
by the specific readership of these publications. The class basis of this 
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movement is thus not only defined by economics but also by education and 
would, in most cases, create a separation between those most economically, 
socially and politically disenfranchised and the formation of the new diasporic 
cosmopolitan elite. In addition, the need by politicians and media for uniformity 
of purpose of the Muslim diaspora places an emphasis on what has been 
described as a ‘culture-free Islam’. As an acceptable post-modernist concept 
that would also reflect class distinctions:  
 
‘Deculturalised Islam is a means of experiencing a religious identity that 
is not linked to a given culture and can therefore fit within every culture. 
(Roy, 2002, p.24) 
 
In the vanguard of this approach is a new breed of academics who emphasise 
and endorse the new age thinking that espouses a more Westernised form of 
religious, if not sanitized, identity, that significantly corresponds with the political 
discourse of diaspora allegiances to their country of birth. Notably Ramadan 
(2006), Arkoun (2001), Talbi (1986) and Wadud (2002) are all referred to in the 
New Voices of Islam compendium of thoughts on this subject (Kamrava, 2006). 
The new approach is characterised in the opening pages of this volume of work:  
 
‘There is a dramatic intellectual struggle between modernists and 
traditionalists for the legacy of the Islamic heritage….’ (Dorraj, 2006, 
quoted in the preface to New Voices of Islam (Kamrava, 2006))  
 
Such a revealing statement could also be attached to the wider Muslim 
fraternity around the world. This is referred to in this chapter with respect to the 
current impetus of mass media to project a global struggle involving intolerant, 
old Islam, with a more endearing image of Western liberal democracy and 
values of freedom (Dabashi, 2008).  
 
Some may question this type of manufactured British Islamic identity as a 
promulgation of a liberal version of Islam, in line with those who believe in a 
new Islamic renaissance based on a European and Western Islamic hybridity 
(Ramadan, 2004). It seeks to strip away predefined cultural belonging that 
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relates to embedded beliefs and rituals of certain Muslim societies, namely, 
those least educated or of a certain class. For it is these groups the researcher 
would argue, have amalgamated their national and regional cultures with their 
faith. This was clearly evident in the discussions with cohort group members 
and in the final stages of analysis. One may instinctively consider this as an 
elitist redefinition of an eclectic mass of humanity spanning many shades of 
opinion, ethnicities and cultural relationships as already referred to by Sardar 
(ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, it would seem to eradicate the importance of specific Muslim 
populations reflected within British society as a whole, to be replaced with a 
vague pan-European or Westernised Islamic uniformity. It would negate the 
totality of experiences and transnational structure of communities such as those 
of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi. The diaspora in that respect would be asked 
to show allegiance to a wider European Muslim identity, however that may be 
manufactured or constructed or defined, although no one has yet defined this 
European Islamic identity given the cultural, social and political complexities of 
Europe itself. 
 
Clearly this discourse is intended to be more in tune with the interests of the 
most socio-economically advantaged and in institutionalised arenas; it is 
possible that this perspective is disconnected to the reality of wider diaspora 
life. It is here that a parallel and contradictory debate is being constructed within 
urban settings by the streetwise, smartphone self-defining and re-emerging 
Pakistani diaspora. This assessment would concur with the analysis of both 
Moll (2007) and Modood (2003), who speak of a discourse of ownership, where 
Muslims, such as the diaspora, themselves are reasserting their sense of 
belonging to this country utilising enlightened media forms. They are not 
ultimately absorbed or captured in new age periodicals such as, for the Muslim 
populace of Britain, Emel, Islamic Times, Passion Islam, Muslim News and 
others. This may be a passing trend, as suggested by the demise of Q-News, 
which ceased publication in 2007 due to the lack of a viable following.  
 
42 
 
 A distinction has to be made between what have been termed ‘lifestyle’ 
publications, such as Emel, and newspapers and sites providing information on 
Islam and an Islamic way of life. The ownership of identity is therefore 
predisposed on social stratification and class-based identification with specific 
mass media consumption. These two realities sit side by side in the Pakistani 
diaspora with the new sense of ownership also determined by the level of 
attachment each member of the new generation feels towards his or her own 
environment and status.  
 
What is clear, however, is how the mainstream use of imagery and language 
has created a lexicon that is viewed by both affluent and low-income members 
of the Pakistani diaspora as culturally racist. This is not often displayed in the 
overt messages that are so often the principal diet of right-wing groups, but in 
more subtle uses of techniques and language aimed at wider society.  
 
 
2.5 Islam and the media – understanding the discourse  
 
It is the understanding of the use of language and the signs and metaphors in 
common use daily that are of primary interest here. This section sets out the 
methods used by the mass media to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis Islam. As 
argued previously, Muslim identity is a central tenet of the Pakistani diaspora 
personality. Current national and international debates on the religion, as 
articulated by Western newspapers, magazines, journals, television and radio, 
have a profound impact on the generation in question.  
 
Language is an important element of how society and cultures function; it is not 
only the lexicon of communication but also the innate object of human society 
with all its vast breadth of diversity. Linguistic analysis is related to the wider 
examination of text, the actual word that is disseminated within literature and in 
this modern age across the globe through virtual and other media and forms of 
mass communication. This is the main area of interest that signifies media 
discourse analysis. Discourse is defined using Van Djik’s (1983) thought 
process of referring to the spoken or written word that in the wider sense can 
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provide space for words of meaning that are often articulated in different ways 
and meaning. Van Djik (1993) also refers to the concept of elite racism whereby 
‘through influential text and talk elites manufacture the consent needed to 
legitimate their own power and leadership in maintaining the dominance of the 
majority ethnic group.’ (ibid., p.2). Van Djik (ibid.) argues this is a familiar 
process of elite racism played out in business, the political sphere, in education 
and wider academia to construct a dominant power balance.  
 
This phenomenon may be further explained in terms of giving ‘recognition that 
our social practice in general and our use of language in particular are bound up 
with causes and effects which we may not be at all aware of under normal 
conditions’ (Soefner and Zifonum, 2008, p.57). 
 
In other words, the use of language is an important element in the practice of 
power in how people relate to each other. This often leads to the creation of 
hierarchies and cognitive dissonance in delivery of key messages, opinions and 
thoughts, similar to media output post 9/11 (Pintak, 2006). These conversations 
are vehicles of ideological meaning; they convey key signals and metaphors of 
how relationships are, and should be conducted, and in many ways shape 
identities.  
 
In examining media discourse critically, one has to engage with the dual 
elements referred to as communicative events and the order of discourse that 
once analysed highlights the discursive elements related to power, inequality 
and prejudice. How the media shows events displays a bias, with power elites 
setting the agenda, as evident in tabloid headings, television programmes and 
news presentation. Anti-Muslim sentiment is elicited through the portrayal of a 
villain, a Muslim terrorist, for instance. 
 
The order of the language within the discourse is also important as it signifies 
the trajectory leading to cultural and social changes that put together 
classifications and dialogues that are then organised according to their 
meanings. In its entirety, it is the dissecting of the language that is used and 
displayed, the rules of language and the syntax that overtly and covertly give 
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authority to corresponding phonology. These are all facets of how journalists 
and broadcasters construct their output to fit within a social, political and 
economic agenda. Examining this technique will enhance the debate in relation 
to the research question itself and provide some vital evidence of how 
manipulative if not controlling mass media has become.  
 
This is a framework, related to and assimilated in Anthias’s (ibid.) conceptual 
thinking, within which to investigate the role and function of the British and 
Western media in relation to the Pakistani British Muslim of the diaspora.  
 
Examination of grammar used is itself interesting, given the role of text and 
language in placing ideologies and the practice of society towards targeted 
groups, within a narrow and deliberate context. It could be that this has been 
the case with members of the Pakistani community and the wider Islamic 
fraternity in Europe and further afield. The use of words such as ‘Muslim’ or 
‘militant’ could be suggestive and emotive terms as would be ‘Al-Qaeda’ and 
‘Osama Bin Laden’ within this discourse. This has been best exemplified in the 
work of Lewis (1971, 1990, 1991, 2003). 
 
Abdullah (2009) has drawn attention to the terms ‘holy war’ or ‘jihad’ as 
synonyms of ‘Muslims’ that are part of the daily repertoire of Western reporters 
commenting on Islam and extremism.  
 
Another element often ignored in this analysis of how words and meanings are 
played out, is how it affects the private space of people's lives and the 
conversations they engage in with friends, family, colleagues and others within 
their social and professional networks. Often at work or in the home it is said: 
‘Did you see that programme on the television last night?’ which encourages 
what Bourdieu has analysed as a 
 
 ‘complex dialectic [that] seems to exist between the media and the 
conversational discourse of everyday life.’ (1977, p.64) 
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For Said (1997) this development in how mass communications have influenced 
the public’s mind is referred to as ‘media conditioning’ (Said, 1997, p.55), which 
depicts and generates the ‘Other’ in a way that is not complimentary.  
 
The relationship between capital and ideology is also important to consider in 
this context. The conceptual framing is based on what Poole (2002) has 
articulated as the dominant capitalist power representing society through its 
own values and interests. The media as part of that global system is thus not 
objective but subjective, as journalists are constrained and embedded within 
that capitalist system (ibid., p.28).  
 
This convergence of international policy and the role of the media within it has 
been mirrored in the work of Herman and Chomsky (1994), who pronounce 
such attributes as conducive to perpetuating a ‘propaganda model’ that 
personifies power and disparity within society, based on wealth and how these 
different levels impact on mass media interests and choices. They assess the 
role of capitalism through its use of money and power actively to ‘filter’ out 
information they wish to conceal and, by so doing, sideline critics and allow the 
‘dominant elites’ – government and private interests – to disseminate their key 
messages to the general public, without much opposition. In their assessment, 
key strands of this theory relate to the size and possession of mass media 
organs that are financed predominantly by the right to promote via advertising. 
This is aligned to sourcing news that also requires mechanisms to deflect 
dissension within a supposedly 'democratic' society that in many ways 
highlights the tolerance of alternative views. There is also a strong anti-
communist stance in this paradigm, which denotes the wider geo-political 
context at the time. As argued previously, to some extent, since the demise of 
communism, this has been replaced by Islam as the new threat to 'Western 
interests and values'.  
 
The significance of these filters is further emphasised by authors who elucidate 
on how they are orchestrated, as they clearly set the agenda, subjectively 
assessed as worthy of coverage, that can be redefined as minor propaganda 
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campaigns that seek to influence the prevailing mindset in society (Herman and 
Chomsky, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, the filters are controlled by the ideology and interests of 
‘gatekeepers’ who define what is to become important news and what is not. 
Those who do not support the prevailing capitalist ideology, it is claimed, do not 
receive any attention or focus. The relationship between corporate business 
and advertising determines what is seen on the media outlets to advance the 
interests of big business. Public broadcasting programmes that are critical of 
these groups are often marginalised with funding cut or taken away, by 
removing vital advertising revenue from independent media providers that do 
not support the key messages of corporate America or the government (ibid.). 
 
This analysis is based on detailed investigation of the available data on media 
outlets and the production of news items across the globe, on less 
diversification and more large-scale media conglomerates controlling the 
airwaves and printed pages, crossing boundaries, cultures, languages and 
societies, often without hindrance. 
 
This is self-evident in how mass media globally is controlled by only 24 big 
corporate organisations that are in turn financed by advertising revenue 
supplied by big corporate business. Another element is how the media is 
sourced through linkages and networks between journalists and government 
and private sector media departments. This close relationship harnesses news 
output with journalists being constantly supplied with information and 
intelligence. Such sources have prestige and credibility and are often not 
thoroughly checked out, except on the rare occasion by a reputable 
investigative journalist. The so called ‘dodgy dossier’ on Iraq and its ‘weapons 
of mass destruction’ is a case in point, with information fed by government to 
the media (Prince, 2009). The power of major news conglomerates, such as 
News Corporation, was highlighted in Britain by the phone-hacking scandal and 
corrupt practices involving the Metropolitan Police and journalists that were 
much scrutinised in the Leveson inquiry (Guardian, 2012). 
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The final filter of the propaganda model, the former threat of communism so 
present during the Cold War now replaced by an equal nemesis of ever 
increasing present-day Islam, was recently echoed in Poole’s (2006) work. It is 
the external threat to Western civilisation portrayed by image, language and 
subtext, to remind audiences of the 'other' within the wider global community. 
The 'evil empire', the 'Islamic militancy and terrorist' have all become 
synonymous with these ideas (Dabashi, 2008). 
 
The aftermath of the Second World War created new power allegiances that 
were either pro-communist or pro-Western and in turn created allegiances 
between old foes, such as Germany, Japan and America. The philosophy of 
communism, anti-capital and anti-private business, struck at the heart of 
American values. The constant Cold War between these foes kept the world on 
standby for potential conflict between two mighty superpowers, the Soviet Union 
and the United States of America, each seeking to increase its power and 
patronage. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Soviet Union 
ended much of that fundamental animosity that threatened capital and the 
interest of big business. The bogeyman of the West had capitulated and a new 
force of hate had to emerge to capture the thinking of the power elites. Islam 
could be considered as that new communism, challenging the West, its power, 
capital and influence, competing for resources and the spirit of millions. The 
concept would support a pro-American, Western value-based ethos playing in 
the information age a key role in foreign policy (Drake and Metzl, 2001).  
 
There is also concern, within this argument, with the pretence of objectivity that 
provides further cover to the media and journalists in their daily work, as iterated 
by Herman and Chomsky (1994). Government machinery is often highly 
influential in how it can control information and content globally whilst giving the 
impression of media impartiality. The funding of the BBC World Service and 
Arabic channels direct from the Foreign Office budget was one area of influence 
(such control is now more indirect since the World Service was taken in-house).  
 
Another is the Voice of America and its daily output across the globe, 
highlighting the importance of a strong hand in the ‘information war’ and 
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‘winning hearts and minds’ that Tatham (2006) and Heimann and Ozer (2005) 
have iterated.  
 
The literature as set out below will provide further weight to this argument within 
the analysis of media discourse, by demonstrating the role of the media as 
proactive in the spheres of economic, social and political life, rather than as a 
passive and independent observer of a complex global social space. Within 
these works, the level of hostility, animosity and ambivalence is reflected upon. 
The impact on the Muslim minorities viewed as the ‘Other’ supports Bhabha’s 
conceptualisation (1994) of how diasporic groups seek to create new social 
spheres framed within their own sense of identity, multiple or otherwise. It is 
their response to the media and its depiction of their faith which in turn reflects 
on their status and sense of security within what they consider as home.  
 
Wider geo-political issues feed into this insecurity and in turn lead to the 
culturally racist ideology perceived by Muslim minority populations in Western 
countries. It is not only these media depictions but the relationship between 
power and political intentions and objectives that will now be considered. 
 
 
2.6 Global thinking, local impact 
 
It is perhaps also essential to discuss the relationship between the present 
wider political context and the research question. The global political 
environment has a principal bearing on the attitudes of the Pakistani diaspora 
and their media consumption that requires explanation and exploration within 
this thesis. It is important to acknowledge that the global political environment 
has cast a shadow over this investigation and that global events have a local 
impact within the transnational setting. The world in many respects changed 
after 9/11 when the neo-conservative agenda and ideology were catapulted 
onto the world stage. This has been described as an American manifestation of 
preemptive global military power, aligned to capital and the conglomerate 
enterprise that is defined by imperialist power and media manipulation (Sardar, 
2006; Dabashi, 2008).  
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The importance of the media and its uses and effects within the new age of 
communication has created some useful models to support this research. 
Gilboa (2001) has reviewed the role of media in diplomacy and statecraft 
through a range of models and techniques used to win over minds in hostile 
environments. This echoes the work of Rawnsley (1996) in how radio was used 
previously via the BBC and Voice of America (VOA) as a propaganda tool in the 
Cold War era. This strategic element is emphasised in the work of Wilcox et al. 
(1992), who charted the role of public relations within state policy making as a 
tool for premeditated advancement of ideology. O’Heffernan (1993) is of the 
view that these relationships between the government and media 
conglomerates are systems for mutual benefit, particularly in US external 
relations where stakes may be high in winning influence with global societies. 
These various models are very similar in espousing the role of media in an 
extension of a nation’s foreign policy objectives that use marketing and media 
advertising techniques to sell their brand of ideology or political doctrine, which 
is now turned on Islam (Poole and Richardson 2006; Dabashi, 2008). 
 
Underlying that framework is the assumption of the superiority of the West and 
a continuation of the Orientalist philosophy defined by Said and now reinvented 
as neo-orientalist dogma (Said, 1997). The mantle is now assumed by writers 
such as Dabashi (2008) who, many may argue, chiefly among them the neo-
cons he attacks, is a polemical anti- American writer who condemns America’s 
liberal values. However, he argues the falsehood of the prevailing right-wing 
orthodoxy, and the much promoted neo-con narrative, that has perpetuated the 
myth of the clash of civilisations. This has created the ambiguous, loaded and 
antagonistic declaration of war in the discourse of ‘Islam and the West’ (Lewis, 
1990; Huntingdon, 1993; Mansur 2006; Dabashi, 2008). 
 
At its height, the political and ideological manifestation of this ideology fed the 
W. Bush administration with its practical implementation of neo-con doctrine in 
renewed American global power-play post 9/11. This was achieved through its 
many advocates at the heart of government: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, 
chiefly amongst others. The approach was characterised within a lexicon 
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reminiscent of past crusades as the ‘war on terror’. Conquest soon followed in 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that cost the lives of not only Americans but also 
countless poor Iraqi and Afghani men, women and children. An extension of this 
war was in parallel play, spearheaded within the new media age and referred to 
as ‘winning hearts and minds’. It was coordinated and sponsored by the 
American state and the vast powerhouse of American mass media. The Fox 
network and others who hold political views on the right of the political spectrum 
were 'on message' with Islam at war with the West. The state role in promoting 
this agenda was more than apparent and fuelled the Western media appetite to 
be critical of Islam as a whole and of Muslims in particular (Said, 1997; 
Goodman and Goodman, 2006; Halliday, 2006; Gottschalk and Greenberg, 
2008). 
 
A rise in anti-Muslim hysteria was coupled with an increase in Muslim anger 
towards what was seen as a global crusade against their faith, bringing into 
sharp reality the Huntington theory of conflict between two monolithic faiths and 
societies (Said, 1997).  
 
The Pakistan diaspora has become embroiled in close identification with this 
war on terror, given the proximity and direct involvement of Pakistan, its loose 
connection with Al-Qaeda, terror camps and the importance of the transnational 
movement of the diaspora. This is evident in a statement by then UK Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, articulating his opinion, and by default government 
perception, that ‘What happens today in Pakistan matters on the streets of 
Britain’ (Blair, 2007) 
 
The death over half a decade later of Osama Bin Laden, found and killed in 
Abbottabad in Pakistan, not only raised questions about the validity of that 
country’s commitment to the war against terrorism but suggested its active 
support of extremist violence via its intelligence service and the state (Hasan, 
2011a). The ramifications extended with yet more suspicion directed towards 
Pakistanis in Britain and the diaspora following the attacks in London in 2005 
and continued warnings over British-born Muslim recruits attending terrorist 
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training camps near the border with Afghanistan (Council for Foreign Relations, 
2011).  
 
This heightened sense of unease and semi-paranoia give rise to many 
examples of false accusations and reprisals. In one such case, Rizwaan Sabir, 
a doctoral student based at Nottingham University, was arrested for alleged 
terrorist offences but released later after evidence provided by his supervisor, 
Dr Rob Thornton. Dr Thornton was then suspended for allegedly implicating the 
University of Nottingham in Sabir’s arrest for suspected terrorism offences 
(Fekete, 2011b). 
 
There are of course many other cases of British Muslims and some of Pakistani 
origin that have been arrested under terrorism laws and later released. Arrests 
of Pakistani students in Manchester, Bradford and elsewhere (IRR, 2003; 
Wilkinson, 2009) also highlight what many have come to believe are injustices 
that have led to a heightened sense of personal awareness and need for 
understanding of a dual inheritance. The impact of racial profiling has been 
immense and profound on Muslim communities and young men in particular, 
including those of the diaspora (Fekete, 2006), as has the race talk (see next 
section) within the media lexicon, continually promoting the Muslim as the 
‘Other’. 
 
 
2.7 Talking race 
 
The emphasis placed on race by the media plays a pivotal role in how wider 
society views people of colour and members of minority communities. It 
reinforces and adds to the wider combined elements of societal exclusion and 
suspicion of minorities, including their allegiance to societal norms and values 
that the majority defines. The racialisation of specific minorities within the 
media, where there is no compulsion to refrain from stereotypes, is reinforced 
and played out on a daily basis, in what hooks (1995) has defined as ‘race talk’, 
defined as: 
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‘The explicit insertion into everyday life of racial signs and symbols that 
have no meaning other than pressing African-Americans (or other 
minorities) to the lowest level of racial hierarchy’. (p.3)  
 
It is in through this representation of people of colour within the media that the 
philosophy of race talk is immersed within popular culture, film, cinema, 
advertising, literature and television (Balkran, 1999; Poole and Richardson, 
2006), continually citing the racial minority in a negative light. The work of 
Downing and Husband (2005) emphasises the appearance of a racist typology 
within mainstream media that now places the Muslim as the new threat of the 
'Other' (Korhan, 2006), also found in the domain of cultural racism (Poole, 
2002). This depiction is relevant to what Malik (2006) speaks of as ‘Muslims in 
diaspora’ (ibid., 6) so evident of the British-born Pakistani within the current 
political landscape in the wider context of the ‘war on terror’. As an example of 
these perceptions that persist within minority communities and people of colour, 
Alice Walker, a Pulitzer award-winning Black writer, spoke of her experiences of 
the media and reasons for visiting Russia during the Cold War at the height of 
the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962: 
 
 ‘I had a sense that I was being badly informed. I never trusted the media 
ever, and part of that was because they had lied always about black 
people so there was no reason to think it would tell the truth.’ (Walker, 
2013)  
 
This quote emphasises a long-established concern about bias within dominant 
Western media that has historical significance for many generations who 
believe that it has portrayed people of colour in most negative terms in the 
mainstream of broadcasting and news. As previously stated, this media 
discourse has now extended into the realms of cultural racism that is manifestly 
creating an emphasis for transnational relocation within the Pakistani diaspora.  
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2.8 The media’s Islam  
The elasticity of the language used to signify Islam as the ‘enemy' parallels that 
of the Cold War era of East–West animosity. A continuous battle of ideas and 
information through the mechanisms and medium of mass communication is 
fought on the airwaves, in legions of print media and a cacophony of audio and 
visual investigative reporting and book launches, which the liberal media itself 
fears: 
  
‘In a climate of anti-Muslim prejudice, their disproportionate and 
sensationalist treatment can only feed ethnic tensions.’ (Milne, 2007) 
  
The typology and rationale has been analysed by leading commentators on 
Islam who reflect on this wider media configuration. Said, celebrated for his 
work on Orientalism (1978) analysing and challenging post-colonial 
assumptions of the East, has used that same prism to forensically examine the 
depiction of Islam within mass media. In Covering Islam: How the Media and 
the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (1997), he highlights 
how Western media, in particular, has articulated, or rather reinforced, an 
Orientalist view of Islam.  
 
A study by Zick and Pollack in Germany (2013) further emphasises this feeling 
of the lack of Western compatibility of Islam. In this ten-year study, the authors 
find many Germans and Europeans regarding Islam as a threat to the West. 
Within the report comparisons are made between the lack of contact with 
Muslims, Hindus Jews and other minority faiths among mainstream Germans, 
but Islam is the only religion regarded with hostility. The role of the media is 
emphasised as the key element in this finding (ibid.). Similar studies in other 
Western countries have highlighted corresponding findings of the fear of Islam 
and the dislike of Muslims in particular (Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). 
 
Said (1997) and Dabashi (2008) have argued that this is set within a narrative of 
Islam as a threat to Western civilisation that is supported by a phalanx of 
academics, so-called experts and journalists alike. These cumulative opinions 
add weight on a daily basis to the commentary of individuals such as Samuel P. 
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Huntington and his much-publicised paper on the ‘clash of civilisations’. 
Primarily articulated in a lecture at the American Enterprise Institute, it found 
voice and favour as a published article in Foreign Affairs (Huntington, 1993) that 
led to much international debate via the Western media. The title of his thesis, 
first used by Lewis, whom Said describes as a prominent Orientalist, became a 
rallying call. The article argues that cultural and religious identities will be a 
source of conflict in the post-Cold War arena as summed up in this critique:  
 
‘Huntington’s observations about “the friction between Islam and every 
single culture with which it is in contact” are even more pertinent in a 
globalised world; Islam is distinguished by the “penury, servitude, 
violence and mediocrity of Muslim societies worldwide.” ’ (Sardar, 2010, 
p.46) 
 
This has been the foundation of the continuing resentment between the West 
and the East, expanded after the 9/11 attacks in New York in 2001 (Said, 1997) 
with much political patronage under and during the time of the Bush 
administration (2001-09). Said has described this as the division of the world 
into two, the Orient and Occident, that is part of a wider political process by 
Western powers, particularly America, to imprint their own values and way of life 
onto other non-Western states. It is this manifestation and obsession with that 
goal which, he argues, sets out the ‘misinformation, repetition and avoidance of 
detail, an absence of genuine perspective. All of this can be traced, not to Islam, 
but to aspects of society in the West and to the media which this idea of “Islam” 
reflects and serves’ (Said, 1997, p.44). 
 
The correlation made between the New York bombings and those in London 
four years later has by virtue of these narratives and commentary conflated and 
embedded Islam with terrorism in the public imagination. Additionally, within that 
mix has been a concerted programme to harness the power of the media, public 
relations and opinion against this mindset that so unjustifiably links the two 
together, most notably with Islamic militancy at the fore (Snow, 2006).  
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Islam, as a global faith, has therefore become a central topic of interest for the 
media. There is widespread daily reporting of an atrocity committed in the name 
of this overarching faith. The reporting has been, in the main, adverse to its 1.5 
billion followers, specifically those resident in the West and following events 
such as 9/11 and the London bombings in 2005 (Poole, 2002; Halliday, 2006; 
Gottschalk and Greenberg, 2008). This section intends to focus on that 
reporting and the discourse related to media depictions and representations.  
 
The media messages are often framed to be suggestive, rather than assert 
direct responsibility, in subtle ways which are open to interpretation by the 
viewer and or listener. For instance, a BBC headline seemed to focus less on a 
factually based reporting but instead emphasised the ‘Trimmed Bin Laden in a 
media-savvy war’ (BBC News, 2007). The emphasis on the neat beard may all 
be too intentional, in depicting the image of the mullah of the East, or even 
Pakistani nationality, although he was of Yemeni origin. The emphasis, and the 
language relating to it, are essentially reserved for one faith and in one faith 
alone. This small but essential misrepresentation is reflected upon by Conte, 
who comments: 
 
‘We interpret Bin Laden’s distorted imaginations as “true Islam” whereas 
other religious cults with charismatic leaders are regarded as beyond the 
scope of Judaism and Christianity. American TV evangelists are derided 
as fraudsters but Bin Laden is regarded as a true representative of 
Islam.’ (Conte, 2001)  
 
There is an emphasis placed on other charismatic terrorist leaders using the 
name of religion to promote a predominantly political agenda as Conte further 
reflects in his work (ibid). These and other examples further embody what has 
often been described as anti-Muslim racism (Ramadan, 2006), which has 
become more vociferous and gains daily momentum that feeds into wider 
resentment.  
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As will be elaborated in a further chapter, the Runnymede Trust in 1997 defined 
this as Islamophobia – hatred and fear of Islam (Muslims by definition) – by 
investigating the impact of anti-Muslim feeling and hostility, defining it as:  
 
‘the practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination 
against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of 
Muslims from mainstream and political affairs.’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997, 
p.5)  
 
The role of the media is therefore inevitably an area to be further researched 
given its influence on wider society.  
 
The Islamic Human Rights Commission, in its report The British Media and 
Muslim Representation: The Ideology of Demonisation (Ameli et al., 2007), 
found much evidence of negative media portrayals of the Muslim and Islam, 
with language and narratives that accompanied images of terror. Investigations 
undertaken by Islamic interest groups reiterate this and the wider body of 
opinion. For instance, the report Muslims in Britain by the Minority Rights Group 
International is a fairly robust overview of life for Muslims in Britain in the social, 
political, economic, educational and other spheres of everyday life (Ansari, 
2002).  
 
The reports referred to above not only reflect an internal fear of the deep 
underlying animosity towards their Muslim faith, but also wider societal 
discrimination, as referred to in earlier sections. It is within the media frame that 
the images, words and constructs act like a catalyst to compound these fears 
and prejudices prevalent in dominant groups.  
 
The Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia also reported that Britain 
was ‘institutionally Islamophobic’ (BBC News, 2004a). The chair of the 
Commission acknowledged this fact after hearing evidence from Muslims 
across Britain, highlighting intense insecurity concerning how media depictions 
threatened their existence as citizens of Britain. This has been perpetuated by 
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continual ignorance of not only the faith, its diversity and belief systems, but 
also of its followers and minority communities (Doward and Hinsliff, 2004).  
 
In more recent times, Owen Jones writes of the experiences of a fellow Muslim 
journalist stating: 
 
‘To be a prominent Muslim means suffering a daily diet of bigotry and 
even outright hatred. This week, Mehdi Hasan – who, other than my 
colleague Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, is Britain's only prominent Muslim 
journalist – wrote of how, every day, he is attacked as a “jihadist” and a 
“terrorist”. He has been described as a “dangerous Muslim shithead”, a 
“moderate cockroach”, and worse. The message from his critics is clear: 
Muslims have no legitimate place in public life.’ (Jones, 2013) 
 
The discourse is therefore ongoing and in many respects increasing with much 
ignorance, placing all Muslims as a homogenous group and failing to see the 
significance of the fact that the 9/11 hijackers may have defined their religious 
identity as followers of Islam yet, at the same time, were in all manners, 
economically, traditionally and culturally, set apart from the established Muslim 
communities in Britain. 
 
There is also, as stated before, a proliferation of think-tanks and special interest 
groups that seek to perpetuate the negative image of the Muslim in parallel with 
the media. For instance, legislation to deal with the aftermath of 9/11, such as 
the 2000 Terrorism Act and the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime Security Act, has 
fuelled concern in local communities. Figures showed 35,000 Muslims were 
stopped and searched in 2003 with less than 50 being charged, compared to 
only 2,000 similar stops three years previously. The Muslim prison population 
has also increased from 731 in 1991 to 6,095 in 2001 making them 9% of the 
prison population, whilst making only 5% of the British community (Berman and 
Dar, 2013). According to one organisation that aims to be ‘a non-partisan, not-
for-profit international policy council and think tank dedicated to educating the 
public about what the mainstream media fails to report’, the Muslim prison 
population has been said to have increased to 13% and accounted for a 200% 
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increase from 1997 (Kern, 2013). It promotes a sense of independent data 
being used to emphasise a specific message that in this case is concerned with 
terrorists and or potential terrorist within the British Muslim community being 
dealt with. It is, as Poole (2002) relates, a frenzy created by the media to allow 
politicians to give the impression of having dealt with an external threat. 
 
The facts as reported therefore often do not mirror the myths that perpetuate 
the high-profile raids that have been in the media spotlight across a country 
where, under the new terrorist laws, religious and racial identity is perceived as 
a reason to be targeted. As one investigator has found, those convicted out of 
the raids conducted under these new laws are predominantly white loyalists 
and/or racists, not Muslims (IRR, 2003). One investigator found that, following 
9/11, 609 people were arrested, 99 were charged under the 2000 Terrorism Act 
and there had been only 15 convictions as of June 2004 (IRR, 2003). Poole 
(2002) has described this as an ideological construction of the media within 
wider social representation that signifies the continued threat of the external 
Muslim challenging British norms and values (ibid., p.23).  
 
Indeed, Poole’s (ibid.) research emphasises the sensational reporting of 
Muslims in Britain by media, including the liberal press, that gave conflicting 
messages of the rights of freedom of expression and liberal rights, the former 
when artists protested at the extension of hate crime to cover Islam, the latter 
over arrest and holding of individuals without charge (ibid.). 
 
For Pakistani Muslims in Britain, what is often referred to as the ‘London 
bombings’ have resulted in greater scrutiny not only by the security services but 
by the British and global media as a whole. It has perpetuated sentiments such 
as the following: 
 
‘The 9/11 hijack trial has revealed an Al Qaeda “conveyor belt” for young 
men who hate the West. British prisons, mosques and Imams are fertile 
ground for recruitment and motivation of terrorists. How much is foreign 
culture beneficial to British society?’ (BBC Radio 4, 2006b)  
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The debate has at times been framed in emotive language that has 
sensationalised the depiction of the British Muslim as the benign saboteur within 
their midst. It is the ultimate in racial stereotyping within religious representation 
(Poole 2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006) that is so powerful a script in the 
public domain. As another example, a prominent Dispatches documentary 
(Channel 4, 2014) entitled ‘Undercover Mosque’ that seemed to highlight 
radicalisation within a Birmingham mosque as a recruitment hub for alleged 
'fundamentalists', was itself soon the subject of a West Midlands police 
investigation raising concerns of overzealous editing. The use of isolated and 
highly charged statements and of out-of-context images shown to reinforce the 
‘militancy’ of ‘Islam in Britain’ was of much concern (Islamic Times, 2007). 
These incidents are not isolated and collectively add to a wider process of 
disseminating information to convey many meanings and interpretations to feed 
into the existing conditioning of distrust of Muslims in Britain. Such episodes 
also reflect of Chomsky’s view, as a seasoned observer of Western media, that: 
 
‘In the media you can easily find systematic biases about what’s 
permitted, what’s not permitted, what’s stressed, what isn’t stressed.’ 
(2005, p.142)  
 
The political reality is reflected in the account, reported in a leaked secret 
memo, of talks between Blair and Bush about coverage of Iraq by Al-Jazeera, 
where Bush discussed bombing the Qatari-based headquarters of the Arab 
media organization in retaliation (Goodman and Goodman, 2005, p.191). If such 
sentiments had been expressed about the BBC, Fox or CNN or any other 
Western network, a much stronger response from Western media may have 
ensued.  
 
In essence a number of key components synergise to make the lexicon into a 
powerful discourse that combines many parts of media production into a single 
entity through a stepped approach. As described by Said: 
  
‘One is that a specific picture – for it is that – of Islam has been supplied. 
Another is that its meaning or message has overall continued to be 
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circumscribed and stereotyped. A third is that a confrontational political 
situation has been created, pitting “us” against “Islam”. A fourth is that 
this reductive image of Islam has had ascertainable results in the world 
of Islam itself. A fifth is that both the media’s Islam and the cultural 
attitude to it can tell us a great deal not only about “Islam” but about 
institutions in the culture, the politics of information and knowledge, and 
national policy.’ (Said, 1997, p.44) 
 
It is interesting to note how Said has distinguished between the reality of the 
faith and what he has referred to as the ‘media's Islam’, which provides a useful 
separation of the myths from the facts about the religion and the attached 
phraseology. Poole (2002; Poole and Richardson, 2006) has reinforced Said’s 
observations within an Orientalist framework and describes it as a ‘Eurocentric 
discourse’ (ibid., p.31) which in totality encompasses the strategic and vital 
interests of the Orient and Islam (Al-Azm, 1981) through stereotyping and 
depictions that have led to what Sardar (1999) refers to as neo-Orientalism, 
whereby the breadth of modern mass media and communications are at play to 
remind society of the differences between the Orient and the Occident.  
 
The lexicon, as referred to earlier, is couched in the phraseology of ongoing 
conflict and rage in terms such as 'holy wars', ‘jihad’, ‘extremist’, ‘anti-Western’ 
and an ‘uncivilised’ if not a barbarian creed. This staple contribution of grammar 
is fed into the worldview that has distinguished Islam as a religion that is 
monolithic as opposed to other major belief systems. It is what Halliday (2006) 
speaks of as ‘Islam fulfilling [the] Western need for a menacing but 
subordinated other’ (ibid., p.3). 
 
It is essentially the same mechanistic form that accompanied the flow of 
information about the communist bloc during the Cold War era. The vogue 
terms in that period resemble those of the present; politicians spoke then of the 
‘evil empire’, as stated famously by the then President Ronald Reagan 
(Reagan, 1983) of his view and ideological dislike of the Communist countries 
and principally of the USSR. 
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It was an important element then, as it is now, to ensure success in the battle 
for hearts and minds that is an integral part of domestic and foreign policy. This 
is and was represented, that within the media of communication, by the Voice of 
America and the BBC. The recent coverage of strife within Muslim countries – 
Libya, Egypt and Syria – has exemplified how this force, at various levels, 
precipitates the media into an obsessive and compulsive frenzy (Hamza, 2012). 
 
This ‘cultural apparatus’ (Said, 1997, p.47) is the mode of how information is 
delivered to the mass public. Islam is therefore seen through audio and visual 
networks, daily circulations, whether they be the so-called red tops or ‘quality’ 
broadsheet newspapers, through magazines, and cinematography all of which 
reinforce the imagery of the ‘Other’ and of foreign lands. It is accordingly the  
 
‘communal core of interpretations providing a certain picture of Islam 
and, of course, reflecting powerful interests in the society served by the 
media. Along with this picture, which is not merely a picture but also a 
communicable set of feelings about the picture, goes what we may call 
its overall context. By context I mean the picture’s setting, its place in 
reality, the values implicit in it, and, not least, the kind of attitude it 
promotes in the beholder.’ (ibid.) 
 
Supporting this process in recent years has been the increasing use of ‘experts’ 
on Islam within the media domain. They elucidate and pronounce on the ‘war on 
terror’, the Taliban, Pakistan, Al-Qaeda and related subjects. They have 
increased dramatically in number and have been provided with air time and 
column inches to give us their ‘expert’ opinion from their academic, political, 
social or cultural perspective. They are often Western by either birth or 
residence and are often used repeatedly to raise their profile but also meet a 
specific media agenda. Their assessments of political Islam have at times 
created the level of cognitive dissonance of Western media (Pintak, ibid.) within 
Muslim populations. The experiences of the Pakistani British Muslim diaspora 
are also real and essential in shaping their own ideas of media representation 
within their religious sphere. British news reporting has exemplified this media 
narrative as cited earlier by the Muslim Human Rights Commission report on 
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demonisation (Ameli et al., 2007) and fits within the cultural racialisation of 
minorities (Downing and Husband, 2005; Korhan, 2006) illustrated in the minor 
case study that now follows. 
 
 
2.9 The case of Bradford 
 
The Manningham disturbances in Bradford between 9 and 11 June 1995 were a 
response to the perceived insensitivity of local policing and resulted in 
demonstrations and a standoff between the predominantly white officers and 
the largely Pakistani youth of the diaspora. This racial divide only fuelled the 
interest of the media, which added to it a religious and ‘Islamic’ twist, as 
observed by community groups (Foundation 2000, 1995).  
 
The area of Manningham itself was considered as one of the most deprived 
localities in the district. Within this electoral area, the Pakistani population 
amounted to over 55% of the population as opposed to a white population at 
over 26%. The youth element was estimated at over 54% under the age of 25 
and the youth were blighted by economic inactivity and an unemployment rate 
of over 31% (Bradford West Area Profile, 1995 quoted in Foundation 2000, 
1995). 
 
More recent data indicates that the level of unemployment amongst young 
people from the Pakistani community remains high and that the population itself 
is increasing year by year. At the district level, the Asian community currently 
accounts for 20% of the population with the Pakistani population being the 
highest within that group at just over 16%. Those under 16 are stated to be 34% 
of the population, compared to the Bangladeshi population at 37% and white 
population 19% (Bradford Observatory, 2010).  
 
This is reflected in Manningham, where the poverty levels remain high, with 
children on free school meals twice the national average, and with most adults 
on benefits. The incomes of households in the area are on average two thirds 
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less than the district average, alongside poor housing and low employment 
(Bradford City Council, 2011). 
 
The media interest generated by the 1995 disturbances was recorded in a post-
riot community response report, The Voices Must Be Heard (Foundation 2000, 
1995), which stated that the media not only perpetuated the ‘Asian and Muslim’ 
characteristics of the majority of participants, but they also seemed to portray 
the British-born youth as seen through an Eastern and militant prism, by asking 
them to place scarves over their faces to depict them as archetypical Muslim 
mujahedeen on the streets of Bradford.  
 
The tabloid and assembled national media wished to draw further parallels 
between Bradford and a Muslim state by claiming that the existing community 
campaign against prostitution was an Islamic-inspired attempt to cleanse the 
local area. The murder of a local prostitute at the time of the disturbances was 
also linked to this false belief (Foundation 2000, 1995). 
 
In essence, there was an attempt by the media to characterise Bradford as a 
Muslim entity and minor caliphate in all but name. The burning of Salman 
Rushdie’s book, the Satanic Verses, in 1989 added to this fixation on what 
some sections of the media refer to as ‘Bradfordistan’. Bradford through the 
book burning signified a disconnect with Islam and liberal values that 
challenged the liberal consensus that accommodated multiculturalism (Poole 
and Richardson, 2006). The minor depicted 'clash of civilisations’ was defined to 
include, as one senior police officer remarked, a generation gap between 
parents and the diaspora (Moyes and Cusick, 1995). 
 
A specific narrative was therefore shaped and reinforced through imagery and 
commentary of angry, out-of-touch and rebellious Pakistani ‘Muslim’ youth who 
broke the law. The mass disturbances in Bradford were shown in the same light 
as the Rushdie book-burning in 1989, depicting a radicalised Muslim minority 
that were anathema to Western liberalism. Future riots in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham became fundamental elements of a policy change seeking community 
cohesion to what were described as parallel lives (Cantle, 2002). It reinforced 
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once again this backward and localised Orientalist positioning of predominant 
Muslim youth, the emerging diaspora, as the subversive ‘Other’.  
 
Inevitably, it is this interlinking discourse of how identity and faith are reported 
that impacts on the Pakistani diaspora in question. The outcome has been to 
create an assertiveness that has turned to new media as a vehicle for self-
expression and active citizenship, which Chul-Byung (2002) speaks of. 
 
 
2.10 New media, new challenges  
The term new media and social media are often interchangeable in everyday 
dialogue and vocabulary. They have become common phrases used by mass 
media, the public at large and many corporate conglomerates.  
Over the last 20 years, social media has grown rapidly as a phenomenon that 
has different meanings, according to Pridmore et al. (2013), who regard new 
media as a term that reflects modernity within newspapers, television, radio and 
books, which themselves are often spoken of as the ‘old media’, for which they 
prefers the term ‘traditional media’ (p.1). This argument is based on the belief 
that it is the mechanism of distribution that separates the old and new media. 
The analogue signalling of television is now replaced by digital; the system of 
printing newspapers and distributing them to wholesalers and then newsagents 
to sell has changed with the advent of new media. Images and data can be sent 
via the internet and mobile smartphones through wi-fi connectivity rather than 
transmission towers defacing local landscapes. Indeed this technological 
revolution of the age is similar to what Manovich (2001) has described as the 
integration of the computer and mass media that began in the early 21st 
century, with the arrival of moving and talking cinematography.  
The terms ‘new media’ and ‘social media’ therefore are synonymous with an 
emphasis on the emergence of innovative technologies and advancing 
societies’ engagement and interactions with one another in a virtual world. It is 
what Everett (2012) describes as ‘ “old” versus “new” media ecologies’ (p.151) 
that have not only challenged the hegemony of the traditional mass media but 
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also allowed media production, in most basic terms, to be accessible to the 
many. This is evident today through new smartphones, laptops, MP3 players, 
tablets and other fast-changing technological devices in our fast-paced world.  
 
 According to Chan-Olmsted et al. (2013) ‘social media is a collective term 
describing a great number of applications that enable users to connect, interact, 
and share contents’ (p.150). It is this two-way conversation that is an important 
element of social media as opposed to the old media, where the consumer was 
always a recipient of information prepared and edited by established 
broadcasters and the print media. In the social media arena, individuals are 
themselves engaged in responding to, creating and distributing information to a 
wider group of consumers. Mayfield (2008), a new media entrepreneur advising 
corporate brands on marketing products via this new technological revolution, 
sets out some of the key characteristics that he believes define social media.  
 
Primarily it is about participation that seeks a two-way dialogue and does not 
separate the recipient from the provider, as is the case of traditional or ‘old 
media’. There is much more ‘openness’, therefore, that further enhances social 
media for the audience to use as a tool for feedback and engagement. In 
addition, social media is not restricted by any form of control or arbitrary 
protection that limits input and involvement by others. The process allows 
‘conversation’ as a free-flowing element that is an alternative to media 
transmitted by larger organisations to an audience. It therefore allows 
‘communities’ to be created and grow with key interests and shared attributes 
based on a shared interests, such as those with a keenness on collecting 
stamps, or taking photographs, or following a group or band. These 
communities have special interests that can be shared with like-minded 
individuals across borders and also virtually. In doing so, social media enforces 
the final element, according to Mayfield (ibid.), of ‘connectedness’ that creates 
relationships with other sites, individuals and resources. The four features 
(openness, conversation, community, and connectedness) are in his view the 
essential building blocks that drive this new technological empowerment. The 
range of applications that has seen significant increase in use by are placed in a 
number of categories that include social networking sites, blogs, wikis, 
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podcasts, forums, content communities, and micro-blogging. They all offer the 
same characteristics as highlighted by Mayfield (2008), yet have different 
features and functions for members that, as will be described later, are, 
according to Ellison (2013, p.3), ‘social and technical affordances’, so aligned to 
social media.  
Clearly, in defining the terms ‘new media’ and ‘social media’, one can clearly 
state that the former is much more of a technological advance within a digital 
arena that has changed the process of communication drastically, and that 
social media tools and applications are the vehicles of use. The researcher 
intends to focus within in this study on the latter – that is, social media and an 
assessment of its use in creating new public spheres for the diaspora that are 
transnational and affirm their personal, political and wider community identity.  
The most popular tool or application in social media is social networking through 
sites such as Facebook and Myspace. Social networking sites are the fastest-
growing and most popular tools of the social media revolution. Annual research 
conducted by Pew Internet – a project of the wider Pew Research Center that 
specifically focuses on the use and changes in social media, highlights the rise 
in uptake of social marketing sites. Although the study focuses on the use of 
social media in the United States, the trend is relevant to young people across 
the globe. 73% of teenagers using the internet belong to a social networking 
site. For instance, over half of the youth online (55%) used social networking 
sites in November 2006, a figure that  increased to 65% by February 2008. 72% 
of online young people aged 18-29 utilise social networking sites according to 
the data (Pew Research Center, 2010). In Britain, studies conducted by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) as part of their opinions and lifestyle survey 
indicates that 87% of young people aged 16-24 are active on social networking 
sites. Internet use in Britain among adults has risen significantly from 16 million 
in 2006 to 33 million in 2012, making the UK second only to the Netherlands in 
the use of social networking by all individuals across Europe as a whole (ONS, 
2013). 
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Table 2.1 Proportion of UK social network users by age group (%) 
16-24 90% 
25-44 74% 
45-54 44% 
55-64 29% 
65-74 19% 
Source: ONS, 2013. 
 
2.11 Variations in social media use  
Although Livingstone and Helsper’s (2007) research highlights the lack of a 
social divide among young people, unlike adults, in accessing and using the 
internet, there do exist societal differences as the new media develops and 
grows. There are differences as regards gender, with boys more active than 
girls, and differences in types of use, although there does not seem to be a 
large socio-economic divide in accessing social media and the internet. 
However there is a gap in the platforms utilised (Pew Research Center, 2015b). 
There is also still a small percentage of around 5-7% who have no access to the 
internet, whether out of choice or because of cost.  
There is a global north/south division based on access to resources and 
technology, with poorer nations being most disadvantaged (Raffer and Singer, 
2001). Different patterns in use, depending on different regions of the globe, 
have also been distinguished in research by Jorgensen (2010) looking at 
empowerment in Uganda using ICT in urban and rural settings. His analysis 
found that the internet and modern technology have allowed economic and 
social connectivity for urban dwellers, while for women in the countryside it has 
provided access to conventional media and ‘creation of spaces for conversation 
and dialogue’ (ibid., p.4). It has in these case studies allowed marginalised 
women a public voice and a level of participation in economic, social and 
political life. This discourse speaks of a ‘media diffusion’ referred to by 
Beechman Petersen (2006a, 2006b) whereby ‘focus is directed towards the role 
and interaction of the various media across platforms’ (Jorgensen, p.6). In this 
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context, both old and new media are utilised interactively for information and in 
developing spaces for active citizenship. This, the researcher would argue, 
would also be the case for some marginalised communities who feel excluded 
and disenfranchised from mainstream society, corresponding with Jorgensen’s 
(ibid.) case studies and work of Karim (2010).  
 
In other countries, social media applications have served for open and free 
opposition to the established political regime. The Arab Spring is a good 
example of citizen social media power being critical of the status quo. Wasley 
(2009) argues that this type of citizen uprising via social media also brings with 
it dangers of further repression, arrest and beatings in less open states such as 
China, Uzbekistan, Iran and Jordan amongst others. The case of Raif Badawi, 
the Saudi blogger sentenced to 1,000 lashes for writing a blog critical of the 
state, is cited (Black, 2015). The internet and social media applications, have 
allowed the outside world and predominantly Western media to obtain pictures 
and videos uploaded by citizens of nations where anti-government protests are 
banned and or repressed by force. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine coined a 
new media term, the ‘flashmob’, signifying instant group protests orchestrated 
via social media, text and instant messaging (ibid.).  
 
In the ‘free world’, social media has been instrumental in releasing material that 
governments have not wished to share with their public. Wikileaks is a case in 
point, with its release of classified American intelligence material that has led to 
severe criticism of the site by American and Western politicians critical of its 
‘irresponsible’ approach to national security (Sydney Morning Herald, 2010)  
 
These issues highlight that no government, whether described as ‘free and 
democratic’ or ‘authoritarian’, is immune to the openness of new media and the 
range of social media platforms that allow a much wider free flow of information 
to reach the mass public globally, without restriction. The empowering process 
is their ability to allow citizens to comment, articulate and even demonstrate 
concern over state actions and political leaders.  
 
69 
 
Another feature of social media has been the view that many users of social 
media are categorised as ‘echo-chamber’ users who significantly are attracted 
to information that relates to them – the ‘Dailyme’ syndrome (Kahne et al., 2011, 
p.3). In other words, ‘individuals increasingly watch, read, or comment in forums 
that align with their perspectives, and it may mean that there are fewer forums 
that speak to a diverse public’ (ibid., p.3). However, their research also found 
that users with ‘political sophistication and political interest’ (ibid., p.4) were 
more likely to source both information that they would relate to and alternative 
opinion.  
 
A paper in the journal of the American Academy of Paediatrics highlights 
research providing evidence of societal behaviour online that exists in the real 
world. According to O’Keeffe et al. (2011), this includes bullying, the forming of 
cliques and sexual experimentation among young people. It has resulted in 
cyber-bullying, the lack of privacy and ‘sexting’ in addition to internet addiction, 
a lack of sleep and even what they describe as ‘Facebook depression’ (p.800). 
The lack of regulation itself can lead to dangers, as relationships develop 
between unsuspecting young people and predators that can lead to violent 
outcomes, as in the case of Breck Badnar, a 14-year-old stabbed by a 19-year-
old online predator (BBC News Essex, 2014).  
 There are also cultural and racial differences related to social media and how 
different communities utilise these new forms of expression. Pew Research 
indicates that in the United States there exists a ‘black/white divide’ that relates 
more to the differential platforms used by racial groups but also to socio-
economic issues and access to the internet. There is a class differential, with 
affluent African-Americans similar to their white counterparts, while poorer 
blacks have less access to the technological revolution at home (Smith, 2014), 
like economically disadvantaged whites (Pew Research, 2015). 
Racial hierarchies also seem to exist in the usage of specific social networking 
sites that highlight racism among some young people. For instance, research in 
the United States highlights MySpace as being regarded as an area referred to 
by some white teenagers as for ‘ghetto kids’ (Boyd, 2012, p.203). This 
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racialisation of social media again seeks to reflect wider societal prejudices as a 
whole, as people access platforms that relate to their own set of values and 
types of user.  
On the other hand, Twitter is a platform much used by young African-Americans 
that has resulted in what is referred to as ‘Black Twitter’. Black Twitter is a 
dynamic set of practices that are marked not only by race but also by class, 
gender, geography, social experience, and varying degrees of social capital (i.e. 
social networks) and cultural capital (i.e. style, linguistic practices and prestige) 
(Watkins, 2014). Its importance, according to Watkins, lies in how it is used by 
young black people to challenge media stereotyping and stigmatisation of black 
people in America. The media’s images of Michael Brown, the young black man 
shot by police in Ferguson, led to riots and protests across America; this was a 
catalyst that created a popular critique and response to the mainstream media. 
Under the hashtag #if they gunnedmedown, African Americans responded to 
the negative images of Brown and others in the press by countering negative 
photos with positive ones and,  as Watkins (2014) argues, provided a response 
to the discourse of black criminality.  
This event emphasised two important elements of social media use: the 
increasing use of smartphone technology (Pew Research, 2015b) by an often 
ignored and socially excluded racial minority, and a challenge to the narrative of 
digitally poor and internet-illiterate black youth. The use of Twitter as Black 
Twitter has formed a movement of artistic and assertive black young African 
Americans micro-blogging as a means of protest and a new form of civil action. 
It has been described as the equivalent to rap music in its time, a lyrical protest 
against injustice, and reference is made to ‘social media as the CNN of Black 
America’ (Watkins, 2014). Additionally, the election of a black president in 2008 
was partly the result of African Americans challenging the racial status quo via 
new media in the digital form that continues to stand up to the deep-rooted 
structural racism in America (Everett, 2012). In every way, this is a form of new 
media civil rights campaigning in process that seeks change in modern 
America, providing a voice to millions of disenfranchised and economically 
disadvantaged people in black communities.  
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Cohen and Kahne (2012) have referred to ‘participatory politics as interactive, 
peer-based acts through which individuals and groups seek to exert both voice 
and influence on issues of public concern’ (ibid., p.vi). More importantly, the 
researcher would argue, in this new media age, new media is providing young 
people across the globe with an important voice to address their concerns and 
promote their interests – without controls being placed on them. It has allowed 
grassroots communities to speak up and to act up to assert local, national and 
international injustices. It is described, as quoted in Cohen and Kahne (ibid.), by 
one US congressman as ‘individual citizens rising up’ (p.v). The same thing is 
evident within South Asian communities in Britain, in the use of social media as 
a means of articulating concerns, to challenge stereotypes, and create and 
communicate with transnational networks (Karim, 2010). 
This is a new protest media for mainstream youth of the new generation, that is 
virtual and powerful for excluded youth of minorities in asserting racial 
expression. As Shivers (2014) states, ‘Social media allow racial and ethnic 
groups to establish an online identity pre-scribed by them; they also furnish a 
space where groups can connect and mobilize interests in ways that were 
previously difﬁcult, especially for marginalized populations’ (p.1052). In fact, it 
allows the initiation and development of connections with like-minded people 
within the shared cultural frameworks (Shivers 2014). 
However, this sense of cultural identification has a partly negative connotation 
in the discourse of some young participants. The uninhibited and unregulated 
social media has also created forums for racial and religious abuse. Using 
street culture slang, the racially loaded terms of ‘Nigger’ and ‘Paki’ have been 
highlighted as being among 10,000 racist and offensive tweets posted each day 
in the UK (Bartlett et al., 2014). Similar cultural groups, such as those of 
Pakistani origin, have used the derogatory term in daily communication, as a 
self-deprecating descriptor of their own cultural identity. This allows others to be 
more polemical in their views of minorities and of faiths, with anti-Muslim 
messages in particular being posted on Facebook and Twitter suggesting 
Muslims should be hanged or are rapists (Twist, 2015), particularly when high-
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profile issues arise, exemplified by the Rotherham sex cases1, or terrorism and 
violence by Muslim extremists. This new form of racism is referred to as cyber-
racism 2 and new terms such as Troll have been created for individuals who use 
bad language and abuse other users on social media.  
 
2.12 Exploitation of social media 
Other areas of the real world have been attracted to new media: the use of 
social media can assist unlawful and illegal causes. Internet crime is a fast-
growing phenomenon, with cyber-crime estimated to cost $400 billion globally a 
year (Durbin, 2014), Companies and even governments are hit by what is 
described as ‘hactivism’ (ibid.) with online attacks by individuals and groups 
seeking to disrupt global business and state security.  
Many people use internet banking both on laptops and on mobile phones as 
well as using these to book flights and buy a range of consumer items. Credit 
card details are often placed within cyberspace and have been the subject to 
hacking by criminal gangs. A recent example involved one of the world’s largest 
online hotel booking sites, Bookings.com. Nearly 10,000 customers were 
subject to what is known as ‘phishing scamming’ whereby bogus emails 
purportedly from the company went to customers asking for payment in 
advance for hotel bookings. (The company as a rule asks customers to pay the 
hotel on departure, rather than pay the booking agency in advance as is 
common practice with most other reservation sites.) (BBC Radio 4, 2015). 
                                                 
1
 A number of Pakistani men were sentenced for raping and sexually exploiting a number of young girls 
(Caucasian) in 2014 in cities such as Rotherham, Oxford and elsewhere. There was much debate in the 
media of the men’s ethnic and religious characteristics.  
 
2
 Cyber racism is most commonly defined as racism which occurs in the cyber world. This includes racism 
which occurs on the internet such as racist websites, images, blogs, videos and online comments, as well 
as racist comments, images or language in text messages, emails or on social networking sites.  
Online activities or published material that result in offensive comments in relation to a person’s race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin have the same effect as similar offline activities. Cyber racism may 
present as racial hatred or cyber bullying. (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2011) 
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Criminals had been able to obtain usernames, passwords and financial details 
that were all intended to be secure. Companies and security experts are 
increasingly, and at huge cost, looking at ways to safeguard personal and other 
sensitive information in the growing virtual world of e-commerce and e-
government. There is not only increasing alarm at the sophistication of criminal 
activity but also a fear of terrorist threats on cyberspace and in the use of new 
media to promote extremist ideology and propaganda.  
 The use of online social media for ‘terrorist’ purposes has become not only a 
new field of research but also of much concern to politicians and law 
enforcement agencies alike. The video clips of Osama bin Laden on the internet 
accepting responsibility for the 9/11 attacks in New York seem now to be 
outdated in comparison to Twitter and other instant messaging and micro-
blogging techniques. Terrorism and terrorists, like the mass of the population, 
have turned their attention to new social media as a means of furthering political 
and ideological ends (Kunkle, 2015) The group Al-Shabaab, based in Somalia 
and deemed a terrorist organisation, found Twitter a useful tool to plan and 
claim responsibility for the Nairobi bomb attacks in May 2014 (Ishengoma, 
2013). A terrorist site illustrates bomb-making techniques on its website as well 
as other lethal methods of harming other (ibid.). The World Wide Web and 
social media have become intrinsically linked to the organisation and 
preparation of violence, much as much the Kalashnikov is recognised as the 
choice weapon or tool of fighters.  
Terrorists, like corporate multinationals, use social media because of its global 
spread and ease of access to peoples of the world. Its uniqueness lies in its 
unrestricted and unregulated global role as a simple tool of communication 
aided by smartphone and other new technologies. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, in its report on the Use of the Internet for terrorist purposes 
(UNODC, 2012) states its importance as a ‘network with a truly global reach, 
and relatively low barriers to entry. Internet technology makes it easy for an 
individual to communicate with relative anonymity, quickly and effectively across 
borders, to an almost limitless audience’ (p.3). The ease within which terrorists 
can therefore operate transnationally is not lost upon UN member states, 
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specifically the United Kingdom, a sponsor of the UN report, which is acclaimed 
within it as at the forefront of tackling online cyber terrorism (ibid.). The report 
highlights six key areas in which the internet is of use to terrorists: propaganda 
(including recruitment, radicalisation and incitement to terrorism), financing, 
training, planning (including through secret communication and open-source 
information), execution, and cyberattacks (ibid., p.3).  
 
In its most modern form, the terrorist group calling itself Islamic State IISIL, 
ISIS), has been the most innovative of the terrorist groups to use social media 
as a means to promote its ideology and attract followers. It is claimed they 
hijacked the hashtag #worldcup2014 at the same time it was used by 
supporters of the game worldwide (Edelman, 2014). ISIS is claimed to have 
recruits who are computer literate and multi-lingual, including University of 
Massachusetts, Boston-educated Ahmad Abousamra, their telecommunications 
expert. ISIS has, for instance, created specific Twitter hashtags related to 
hostages who are subject to beheading (ibid.).  
 
As an example of ISIS’s operation, a former German politician and writer who 
travelled to Iraq and Syria to meet IS under a safe passage guarantee, spoke of 
his application to visit as a sophisticated media operation. This included making 
contact via Facebook with known jihadists in Germany and through them with 
the IS media centre, which organised the permission to visit, including a 
safeguarding pass sent out via Twitter to ISIS fighters by the leader of the so-
called Caliphate (Tödenhofer, 2015).  
 
More recent reports of British Muslims and others from Europe attending 
training camps in Syria and fighting for IS have precipitated concerns of British-
born jihadists ready to attack British cities (Whitehead, 2014). This growing 
extremism and fundamentalism within European cities is seen to be aided by 
the internet and social media.  
 
The interesting corollary within some communities has spawned the use of 
social media to denounce terrorists, as evident by the hashtag #STOPISIS as 
well as the accounts of how Kenyans responded to the Nairobi attacks by using 
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social media to support victims and raise money (Ishengoma, 2013; Edelman, 
2014). 
 
This highlights the value and reach of social media and its use t for social, 
political and economic as well as terrorist actions. As such it has become the 
modern tool for expression that is instant and accessible to millions across 
continents and types of societies. This includes the diaspora in this study, which 
examines its use in developing and enhancing their identity.  
 
 
2.13 Social media and identity  
Guo-Ming and Chang (2010) argue that globalisation has resulted in a change 
from the old society to a new one that allows much diversity of competition but 
also the need for cultural co-existence. Globalisation has thus redefined the 
sense of community as it was in the traditional sense, so that it is now one 
where local is more global, allowing citizens to transform their identities. New 
media has synergies with globalisation, further allowing ease of communication 
at a transnational level that impacts on the nurturing of cultural identity.  
 
A more specific technical approach on social media and identity was provided 
by Ellison (2013) for the publication Foresight. It provides a description of the 
dynamics of social media and identity. She argues that on social media social 
network sites (SNSs), identity markers can be masked, hidden and even 
reinvented. What are described as ‘social and technical affordances’ (p.3) affect 
identity in that the settings can be used to provide the external world with a 
picture of you as you wish to be seen. In that sense, the researcher would 
argue, the technology is open to abuse as a vehicle for potentially criminal 
activities. SNSs allow the user to frame his or her identity as they may like to be 
seen, even a fantasy image appealing to external audiences and denying their 
true identity.  
 
Social media therefore offers the opportunity to ‘share self-presentation’ as well 
‘branding’ leading to micro celebrity – the commitment to deploying and 
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maintaining one’s online identity ‘as if it were a branded good, with the 
expectation that others do the same’ (Ellison, p.5 quoting Senft, 2012).  
 
Karim (2010) points out that diasporas also use the internet not only to source 
specific cultural references but also for medical conditions such as sourcing 
bone marrow from same-ethnic-group donors. Additionally, communities seek 
such cultural consumption as an alternative to the mass output of the dominant 
culture, such that ‘using online media can participate to some extent in cultural 
production rather than merely consume media content’ (ibid., p.163). 
Transnational groupings by diaspora are evident, as is the use of social media 
sites such as MySpace and Facebook by groups dispersed over generations 
seeking to make cultural contacts with their ancestry. Karim (ibid.) highlights 
Sindhis who were separated by the partition of India and Pakistan and are now 
using internet chat rooms to facilitate acquaintances across the world.  
  
The online virtual world Second Life is another example, where followers are 
linked to Indian clothing shops and clubs aligned to Bollywood music (Gajjala, 
2010).  
 
Political action is also a feature of both the internet and social media. According 
to Karim (ibid.), it is used to challenge misrepresentations of communities as 
well as attack other hostile websites virtually. For many migrant groups as well 
as diaspora populations, the internet and social media have provided an 
important and integral tool to not only promote their identity and transnational 
connections, but also to correct erroneous and malicious representations that 
damage their standing in society.  
 
Multiple identities of an individual, therefore, can be presented through different 
networks and accounts and may not be in line with the offline identity. For 
others, social is an opportunity to promote and share their true cultural identity 
with like-minded others, and to source transnational networks.  
 
In many ways it is the need for a sense of a relevant ‘community’ that defines 
the locale for the Pakistani diaspora (whether in Oxford, Luton or Birmingham, 
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or in Attock, Punjab and Mirpur) in this situation, as it does for other South 
Asian diasporas (Gajjala, 2010). Accordingly, permanent residence is not fixed 
but ‘two-dimensionality of memory and nostalgia’ may be sought (Karamcheti, 
1992, quoted in ibid., p.211). The world of the internet and social media offer 
what Gajjala (ibid.) refers to as ‘cyberspace contact zones’ for ‘cyborg 
diasporas’ that are essentially ‘digital diasporas’ that ‘occur at the intersection of 
local-global, national-international, private-public, off-line-online, and embodies-
disembodied’ (ibid., p.211). 
 
Accordingly, the internet and social media  are a space for a diversity of 
representations that bring together media modernity defined by the new media 
age and one-to-one connectivity and dialogue place between diasporas. 
Despite being described as merely ‘virtual’, such relationships are in themselves 
actual communities in their own right (Watson (1997) quoted in Gajjala (2010, 
p.214).  
 
This development of hybridity and evolution of transnational identity within the 
media frame for many South Asians of the diaspora relates specifically to the 
primary subjects of the research question of this study.  
 
 
2.14 Summary  
 
The growth of the Internet and technology such as YouTube video uploads are 
an area to watch, as is new mobile phone technology, which is easily accessible 
and fast-flowing for an image-conscious diaspora, keen to be in touch with the 
latest gadget craze 
 
This global intrusion is welcomed by many, particularly in developing countries 
and those with little material comfort and in relative poverty. It is a way of 
connecting communities by informing, educating and reinforcing values and 
systems of conformity, particularly with regard to capital. The rise of new 
interactive and engaging media has, however, brought not only more 
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awareness but political activism, especially amongst the younger generation, 
with independence of mind and an anti-capital and anti-big business philosophy. 
Internet broadcasters such as Democracy Now and the Palestinian Youth 
Association for Leadership and Rights Activation (PYALARA) are two examples 
of direct public reporting media. The Huffington Post is a similar but alternative 
format online publication promoting public journalism through open access 
engagement. 
 
In addition, the increasing use of YouTube and social media generally has 
allowed many to assert a more political identity (Lawrence, 2010) through short 
snippets of self-made video films with a global reach. Such mini documentaries 
articulate a new exchange of minds and ideas within the same cultural and 
social groups that go beyond borders and boundaries.  
 
A study by the public relations and communications conglomerate Burson-
Marsteller (Burson-Marsteller, 2012) highlighted the significance of the 
dominance of social media as a fast-growing medium, with audiences of 500 
million for Facebook, 100 million for Twitter and 250 million for YouTube 
respectively (ibid.). These are now becoming a more dominant global force that 
is challenging large media corporate power and interests to create a new self-
designed political reality and relevancy. The recent acquisition by Facebook of 
Whatsapp – an instant Internet-based messaging service – highlights this 
vertical integration and importance of new media (Kuchler and Bradshaw, 
2014). 
 
Such technologies have facilitated easy access to global cultural, social and 
religious networks and not only evoked a new sense of identity but also 
increased transnational links between similar affiliated groups, whether social, 
political, religious or cultural. This has allowed much more freedom of 
expression and avoided state regulation and censorship for individuals and 
groups who feel targeted or insecure as a result of the attention given to them 
by the media and the authorities and functionaries of the state. This is a positive 
aspect of new media that has empowered people with minority and majority 
interests, and allows self-expression and a right to reply to dominant mass 
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media, becoming part of a growing mosaic that is itself part of an expanding 
interest base of modern youth culture. It is these new additions to the mass 
media world that are allowing much more independence of mind and 
assertiveness for many excluded and disenfranchised groups, whose voices are 
often sidelined by mainstream media. It is an opportunity for such communities 
and groups to articulate and develop ideas, concepts and their own realities that 
also create security and virtual or fixed locations, to which they belong. It may 
offer security and ambivalence at a time of conformity and dominance of 
mainstream media.  
 
This chapter has therefore focused on the complexity of identity and its evolving 
nature, which is not always situated within defined and specific borders. There 
are multiple identities at play that relate to ethnic, racial, gender and other social 
variations that are also influenced by political situations and global events. The 
dual issues of location and feeling secure, as the literature suggests, are 
essential components in the making of a citizen, of whatever characteristic.  
 
Within that paradigm is the role of the mass media in influencing and setting 
perceptions of the ‘Other’ and of difference in society. Its influence rests within 
geo-political, law enforcement and corporate organisations that seek to maintain 
the status quo with which they are so familiar with and secure about. The 
relationship with specialist paid interest groups supports a symbiosis that plays 
a consistent role in information management which is not suspected by the 
mass audience, as articulated by writers cited in the chapter. The production of 
the media and its broadcasting of key messages is not a passive process of 
entertainment or just reporting, it is a complex structure in the art of corporate 
management, a business lobby that validates its own self-interest and portrayal 
of independence.  
 
Its core powerhouse is the legion of journalists presenting Western values of 
liberal democracy and freedom that pursue a capitalist agenda in the pursuit of 
profit. Additionally, the mechanisms used to promote specific messages within 
the minds of audiences encourage indifference and hostility to the ‘Other’. For 
the specific diaspora, these have all impacted on their sense of identity, 
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resulting in a transnational sense of belonging that is creating an evolving 
hybridity. At its core is the concept of location and security that reaffirms and 
reassures such transmigrant populations of their place and acceptance within 
wider society. The role of the media is therefore pivotal in perpetuating 
representations that can lead to animosity and alienation. In this case it leads to 
the lexicon of race and cultural racism set within a more global political and 
economic context viewed as anti-Islam and Orientalist.  
 
In respect to the diaspora, there is a better understanding of these issues and 
dilemmas that results in a creative response and exploration of transnational 
multi-ethnic media. This is reinforced by the rise of hand-held devices and 
‘apps’ that allow greater utilisation of these niche broadcasters as well as 
alternative video and graphic technology that provide distinct cultural social 
spaces. 
 
This will in many respects result in the formation, if not the extension and 
increasing rise, of the media age generation, or in this case the diaspora, 
engaging with their multiple identity within a wider framework of mass 
communication, easily accessible at the touch of a screen. This will no doubt 
place a new emphasis on hybridity and transnationalism, perhaps consumed 
within one single transnational meaning of identity. There is a clear importance 
and vitality in the new media in potentially enabling the diaspora to articulate a 
more positive and assertive transnational sense of belonging.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology  
 
This chapter sets out the methodological approach used to carry out this 
research investigation. Having considered a number of options for the 
theoretical basis of this study, the researcher came to the conclusion that 
grounded theory was the most appropriate way forward in exploring the 
construction of Pakistani diaspora identity. This took place through ‘hypothesis 
generating’ (Robson, 1993, p.19) once the primary source data had been 
collected and analysed; in other words, generating an initial hypothesis from the 
primary data helps form the next methodological stage,  
 
Another way of stating this is outlined by May (1997), in what he refers to as 
‘induction theory’, whereby the data emerging from any investigatory aspect of 
community life is used to develop a hypothesis which itself is interpreted in line 
with the literature to form a theoretical argument.  
 
An additional benefit is to ensure a non-Eurocentric methodological basis of 
inquiry that has the flexibility to take into consideration social and cultural 
nuances related to the specific group of subjects, in order to explore 
transnational hybrid identity. The researcher will show that a new discourse can 
be seen in the interpretation of the data and the cyclical analysis of the themes 
and emerging issues. To support this, discourse analysis was an essential 
element in deconstructing the way the media articulates its message and how 
the interviewees assess the media they consume on a daily basis within their 
own realms of identity. This approach is seen as critical, in the following sense: 
 
‘ “Critical” is a recognition that our social practice in general and our use 
of language in particular are bound up with causes and effects which we 
may not be at all aware of under normal conditions. (Bourdieu, 1977)  
 
The researcher also considered the use of language and visual aspects of news 
stories via semiotic analysis as espoused by Hartley (1982), including the use of 
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visual codes to depict key presentations that use a range of camera angles, 
emphasising different shots, the use of categorisation of stories and use of 
linguistic codes that can define and set the news agenda. Examples of this 
emerged from the data collected and from case studies of media articles and 
broadcast material as set out and discussed in the literature review. Critical 
linguistic and social semiotics is a process where text is investigated as 
‘multifunctional, always simultaneously representing the world (ideational 
function) and enacting social relations (interpersonal function)’ (Fairclough, 
1995, p.5). This is where the text is vital to the construct of social ideas and 
ultimately leads to ideological definition. Newspaper headlines in tabloids or the 
red tops are simplified text that gives great meaning to a few words to a wide 
audience base and ultimately have an impact in the daily lexicon. The phrase 
‘the war on terror’ has perhaps become one of the most utilised headline terms 
that are without meaning, as has the phrase ‘winning hearts and minds’. These 
powerful metaphors can be framed within an ideological doctrine that sets the 
accepted political boundaries for an unsuspecting and unquestioning audience.  
 
Having considered such variations within the study of language, the researcher 
concluded that discourse analysis was the most appropriate vehicle to achieve 
this aim. 
 
This is particularly the case given the researcher’s interest in the work of Van 
Djik (1983) and the development of a social cognitive model. This moves the 
focus away from text and in the direction of discourse analysis, of how the 
operations of news programmes, and the understanding of news, fit within 
socio-psychological phenomena. Thus news is constructed through 
mechanisms of production which then define how the news is consumed. This 
conveyor belt of creating a news item from the headline, to the images and 
content, and to its meaning and understanding, is in Van Djik’s view an 
integrated framework in which values define how a story is set and interpreted.  
 
The adoption of this method also aids clearer understanding and acceptance 
that assumptions can be made about a range of issues, including race and 
identity, people, society, culture and so forth, as language is often related to the 
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issue of power and how that is constructed within society. It is important to 
ensure that such assumptions relate to the data and literature, to validate and 
provide reasoning. Discourse is thus an integral part of how roles and situations 
are played out in the wider world, particularly in the media, where information 
and news are framed to tell a story; consequently Fairclough refers to such 
discourse as ‘spoken or written language use’ (1995, p.2). 
 
As a further enhancement of such discourse, visual imagery, such as 
photography, film, video, diagrams and gestures, utilised in conveying a 
meaning or message are analysed as part of this study. Using this broad 
sweep, the researcher took the liberty of extending this wider definition, to 
include new forms of technologies such as the internet, and cellular 
communication such as text messaging and video downloads. These forms of 
social media dialogues are essential in modern society, particularly within youth 
culture which has its own set of parameters and abbreviated signalling 
techniques that are redefining cultural and social identities created by the 
‘smartphone generation’. Within media discourse more specifically, Fairclough 
(ibid.) speaks of ‘communicative events’ when a specific television programme 
or newspaper editorial promotes a forthright opinion, sets the agenda and/or 
influences the wider public. These processes are all considered within the body 
of this work, in particular, in the context of the issues emerging from the 
analysis of the data.  
 
The related issues of religious and cultural identity cannot be avoided given 
their interdependence in this study and how correlations exist with race and 
identity. In that realm, the researcher wishes to assess, in particular, how the 
media reinforces stereotypes and images to highlight difference and the ‘other’ 
in society, within the parameters of biological and cultural racism (Hall, 2001; 
Said 1977; Downing and Husband, 2005).  
 
As part of that paradigm, whereby race, religion and culture are inter-related in 
this investigation, critical analysis of the media is a relevant and vital 
methodological component in this research. This analysis is related to the 
Pakistani diaspora’s identity in the different existing generations. This 
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examination of ethnicity, race and the role of the media includes an assessment 
of how language is utilised within the media to construct positive and opposing 
views in order to alienate some and promote others. As a related consequence, 
words have important meanings presented jointly with precise imagery for 
audiences to make instant connections. For instance, the words ‘terrorist’, 
‘suicide bomber’ and ‘Muslim’ will symbolise a distinct meaning for the average 
viewer if they are used alongside the showing of an image of the remains of an 
destroyed building or repeated footage of the 9/11 attacks. This is explored in 
Chapter 2, ‘Transnationalism, media, identity and hybridity’, on the review of 
literature on this subject as a whole.  
 
Other assumptions also require further exploration. For instance, it is often 
taken for granted that the reporter is an independent witness to events and 
reports such as an objective observer, without any personal emotion, 
ambivalence, prejudice, or attachment to personal values and moral value base, 
whether religious, cultural, political or other. This is in itself quite a task and, as 
argued by the personal account of Robert Darnton in his 1975 article, 'Writing 
news and telling stories' (Darnton, 1975), it is a misleading expectation. Darnton 
in this revealing testimony speaks of the pressures on the reporter, and 
closeness of the principal actors – the reporter and the source, in the quest for 
news. Close relationships are developed and nurtured as a consequence that 
will be considered mutually beneficial, as exemplified in the lobby network of the 
British press and Number Ten, Downing Street and as exposed by the Leveson 
Inquiry (2012). Lines are often blurred in this relationship: the one seeking 
information is often contributing to the construction of the story itself. The 
researcher will cite examples within the body of this work and discuss its 
relevance to the developed perceptions of cohort members who contributed to 
this research. 
 
 
3.1 Conceptual framework and theory 
 
The investigation of this evolving nature of identity feeds into a conceptual 
framework that seeks to provide a rationale for this diasporic development and 
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to offer wider insight and explanation related to different trends and 
relationships. In order to achieve the optimum level of analysis from the data, 
and to shape the hypothesis, the approach in this work is based on the 
principles of grounded theory that allow the data to be used by the researcher to 
construct a possible and valid conceptual framework. It is important not to fix on 
a specific theoretical structure as this investigation is unique in how it seeks to 
clarify to what degree the media influences the defining of status and inclusion 
within a territorial space. 
 
Grounded theory is described as ‘the discovery of theory from data 
systematically obtained and analysed in social research’ (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967, p.1); and alternatively, as ‘theoretical constructs derived from qualitative 
analysis of data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.1). This is the hypothesis-
generating process employed in the research. 
 
Although contrary views of this process exist, as highlighted by Thomas and 
James (2006), it remains a valid theoretical basis of research. The investigation 
set out by May (1997), for instance, illustrates its usefulness as does work done 
by Butler and Stokes in 1969 where more manual workers vote Labour than 
Conservative, in which May observes: 
 
‘It is not a theory or explanation of the pattern of behaviour observed, but 
a statement of observation on voting behaviour collected by asking 
people.’ (May, 1997, p.31) 
 
Similarly, any research taking place into a complex and multi-faceted 
community needs to adopt a methodological process that acknowledges the 
validity of the data at the time for interpretation and analysis. The researcher 
considers grounded theory as providing that overarching framework within 
which the various data strands were explored. It provided the elasticity of 
analysis that allowed the exploration of new ideas and themes encompassing a 
dual relationship between East and West and issues of identity interplayed with 
culture and sense of religious belonging set within contemporary British society.  
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The researcher used the Strauss and Corbin (1998) school of grounded theory 
that allows for a much more valuable analysis of the data to generate the 
relevant hypothesis. A caveat is to note the fragmentation of the Strauss and 
Glaser schools of thought that have become more adversarial than 
complementary or supportive. The researcher focused on the most appropriate 
literature in this subject area, which related to work undertaken by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998).  
 
Theory has been defined as: 
 
‘A set of well-developed concepts related through statements of 
relationships, which together constitute an integrated framework that can 
be used to explain or predict phenomena.’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
p.15) 
 
There were of course a number of stages involved in this investigation, which 
required not only capturing the data, but also analysing it, and repeating this 
over a period until the information was exhausted and conclusions reached.  
 
After the initial period, the data was captured from the focus groups and one-to-
one meetings within the two areas. The first step was comparative analysis of 
the data that aided the creation of a theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The 
tape recordings were transcribed onto the computer word for word, so as not to 
miss any comment and nuance from the respondents. Their comments were 
then colour coded, according to the main themes and issues emerging, with 
headings developed and recorded. The comparisons were broken down and 
filtered into a number of sets and properties. This included using basic 
parameters such as age and gender, for instance, between the two cohort 
groups that allowed some comparison.  
 
Another area examined was the context of religion and culture, although there 
was some linkage in these two variables.  
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This initial attempt at analysing the contributions helped in the early stages of 
formulating a line of enquiry that was a precursor to theorising, and sits within 
the wider framework of conceptual ordering (Strauss and Corbin, 1997 p.19-25). 
The key themes raised with this first batch of data analysis informed an on-
going process of interaction and dialogue with the research participants through 
the continuation of focus groups and on- to-one interviews. Inevitably, there 
were minor tensions in this technique, as some participants felt it to be time 
consuming and repetitive while others found it frustrating. However, the 
continual involvement of, and explanation of the rationale for the use of this 
method to, the cohort members ensured continued and enthusiastic 
cooperation. This was also a sign of the trust gained and confidence of the 
participants in contributing to the study.  
 
 
3.2 Practicality of data collection  
 
With respect to the process of data collection itself, the researcher was 
conscious of the sensitivity and political nature of the research question as well 
as its topical nature during the fieldwork. There was initial skepticism and 
distrust to overcome among members of the community during the 
commencement of the fieldwork, specifically from some of the Pakistani 
diaspora. The use of community influencers was one option used, as these can 
facilitate wider links with second- and third-generation British-born Pakistanis.  
 
However, this had some limitations, as some of the most excluded group of 
young people did not prefer this approach and did not welcome the intervention 
of older members of the community or, in some cases, the intervention of those 
working with young people on the behalf of public funded organizations, such as 
the local authority, which they mistrusted. Some were confused as to whether 
this study was a creation of government initiatives such as ‘community 
cohesion', the ‘Respect’ agenda and ‘Prevent’ (violent extremism), all of which 
were viewed by respondents as counterproductive in developing trust for 
independent research such as this.  
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A range of approaches were then considered to engage proactively with the 
relevant group of people in the most appropriate manner. The use of networks 
and personal introductions was therefore essential in the first instance. This 
approach developed trust and a level of credibility that would not have been 
achieved through formal processes such as letter writing, cold calling or using 
what were referred to by some young people in the study as ‘so-called 
community leaders’; these were seen as often more senior and potentially out of 
touch with younger members of the community.  
 
Some respondents even considered such people as potential agents of public 
organizations, given direct funding links and political patronage built over many 
decades to serve the interests of specific political groups, as highlighted by 
Malik (1995) in his investigation on some minority leaders’ links to political 
patronage and securing of electoral success. Clearly, some of the diaspora felt 
that this approach was now outdated and did not reflect the changing political 
and social consciousness of the British-born diaspora, keen to advance on their 
merits.  
 
The implications of this selection procedure were to ensure better 
representation of the Pakistani diaspora, free from any form of gate-keeping by 
people who were considered, by some of the diaspora, as unrepresentative: 
that might have tainted the data collection, as specific individuals may have 
been recruited via community leaders with little experience and/or knowledge of 
current concerns and issues facing the wider Pakistani diaspora.  
 
An element of personal reflectivity was also introduced into the arena at this 
point. The researcher comes from the Pakistani diaspora and can provide a 
level of empirical data to enhance the research in a wider context. There was, 
as part of the data collection process, a shared cultural and religious 
understanding which provided a unique and affirming perspective of how 
respondents felt within a social, cultural and political environment surrounded by 
discourses on religion, race and citizenship. This personal reflectivity also 
required a level of objectivity, so as not to influence the data analysis with any 
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potential for bias. The researcher was aware of this possibility and took it into 
consideration throughout the analytical process.  
 
The essential element of this approach was not only to validate the data but 
also to enhance the interpretations from a specific cultural and religious point of 
view. In that sense, it placed the researcher, of the same ethnicity, at an 
advantage. It provided greater clarity to the meanings derived from the key 
themes arising from the fieldwork, as well as making greater sense of culturally 
appropriate observations and experimentation within the cohort group 
discussions. These experimentations were in the form of specific cultural 
prompts that allowed much open comment from the interviewees, whilst 
reinforcing a deeper sense of trust between the researcher and principal 
subjects of the investigation. 
 
Another phase of engagement was through the use of modern forms of 
communication and technologies, mainly text messaging, to support the building 
of relationships once an introduction had been made. From this confidence- 
building measure, one-to-one interviews were set up and conducted with 
individuals from the two geographical areas, namely Luton and Oxford. Both 
males and females were interviewed. Where this was not appropriate culturally, 
in respect to gender sensitivity, a research assistant was recruited, inducted 
and trained to facilitate the one-to-one interviews and women-only focus 
groups. As stated, this was more relevant to women within the Pukhtoon 
community, given the traditional nature of purdah as custom and practice. The 
female assistant was recruited from within the relevant community and helped 
build trust, developing an easy rapport with the interviewees. Furthermore, 
engagement by word of mouth was a crucial factor in this regard and worked 
well.  
 
There was another consideration given to the recruitment of an assistant to 
support the data-collection process. Having the ability to understand the mother 
tongue of cohort group members was important. The study was fortunate to 
recruit an individual who understood both the Pukhtoon and Punjabi languages 
and could therefore appreciate the nuances within the discussions, when 
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participants used specific Punjabi or Pukhtoon terminology to emphasise a 
cultural point. Both sets of interviewees used specific cultural terminology when 
referring to their consumption of cultural and transnational media, including the 
internet. Their remarks could be better analysed by the principal researcher with 
the help of the linguistically able research assistant. The key element that was 
recorded within this specific process was the use of fusion language, a mix of 
Punjabi or Pukhto with English, as well as inserted Urdu grammar, mostly 
acquired from the viewing of Bollywood movies.  
 
 
 3.3 Interview process and ethics 
 
A series of semi-structured interviews schedules were used for the one-to-one 
sessions. The approach was made as flexible as possible in order to elicit the 
most useful data related to mass media consumption and its potential impact on 
the formation of the respondents’ identity. This semi-structured approach was 
important, as too rigid an approach might have been seen as too bureaucratic 
and time-consuming. This is also important in respect to the use of grounded 
theory, as the use of this particular mechanism of enquiry allowed for a much 
more efficient use of limited time with participants, within a framework that 
allowed more freedom to articulate issues and concerns and thereby create a 
more engaging debate.  
 
The efficient use of time was a key issue in managing the two sites, the number 
of respondents, gender and cultural issues and the wider processes associated 
with the use of grounded theory. The intention was not to allow the quality of the 
discussion to suffer because of time constraints that the researcher had placed 
on the data-collection period. Furthermore, it also eased the process of 
transcribing interviews and discussions at relevant and frequent intervals, as 
required by adopting the theoretical and practical implementation of grounded 
theory techniques and approach.  
 
Interview data was then analysed and used as a basis for some initial work 
related to what has been referred to as a precursor to developing a theory, 
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although this systematic stage of fieldwork and analysis took some considerable 
time (6-9 months) within the longer six-year timescale of the project.  
 
Some of the key ideas and concepts arising from this initial exploration of data 
assisted in the development of a second semi-structured set of questions or key 
discussion points to be used as prompts for a second round of focus groups.  
 
The nature of the focus group membership is also relevant to mention within 
this section. There were up to six people in each group in two areas of Oxford 
and Luton. The groups surveyed were facilitated by the lead researcher and by 
the research assistant where necessary for cultural and gender purposes. Prior 
to running these sessions, the lead researcher and the female research 
assistant met and held supervisory training discussions, to assess the most 
appropriate strategies in conducting the planned focus groups. This ensured 
that the right techniques were available in the skills set with the assembled 
respondents and were in line with the methodological aspects of the use of 
grounded theory.  
 
In addition, the method of inquiry was explained to all participants in order to 
ensure that they were fully aware of and engaged in the work, so as to elicit 
appropriate responses in the data gathering. It was important to facilitate and 
engage in the most appropriate and professional way possible, not only to 
minimise any potential for conflict, but also to remain within ethical boundaries.  
 
In fact, the way in which the data was to be captured and the whole 
methodology of recruiting and working with cohort group members in the 
fieldwork phase of this research had been presented to the Bradford 
University’s Committee for Ethics in Research in the first instance. Permission 
was then granted to move forward with the designed approach with risks 
assessed and mitigated accordingly. For instance, the focus groups were 
conducted along gender lines with separate male and female groups in 
operation. There were a number of factors for this reasoning, chief amongst 
which was the need to maintain cultural and social boundaries between the 
sexes, so as not to break cultural taboos or disrespect values or norms, 
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expected as part of the unwritten contract between the investigator and the 
cohort members. This was to be interpreted not as any form of barrier between 
the participants, or as unilaterally enforcing a certain religious or cultural 
orthodoxy, but as a practical and appropriate situational response in order to 
gain the trust of respondents and ensure the robustness of the data gathered. 
 
The alternative would have caused great offence to both male and female 
cohort group members, created mistrust and animosity between the lead 
researcher and interviewees, and delayed the research, if not taken the 
fieldwork immensely off track. In relation to this point, having separate focus 
groups enhanced the respondents’ ability to take part without feeling intimidated 
by the opposite sex, or feeling uncomfortable or uneasy, as it observed cultural 
norms they viewed as important in Pakistani society and Islamic doctrine.  
 
On reflection after this period of data collection based on empirical evidence, 
this point was as important for the males as for the females, in the experience of 
the researcher. The females said that they would have felt embarrassed in 
speaking in the presence of the men and would not have participated. For the 
men they, too, would have felt constrained and embarrassed in speaking in 
front of the women, as they later confessed. This would have placed a severe 
constraint on the data being collected. It is also questionable whether 
information arising from mixed cohort groups would have been useful, accurate 
or even purposeful, or have led to necessary or beneficial analysis from which 
to construct any relevant and reliable first base theory. The separate and 
gender-relevant focus groups ensured that respondents, from whatever 
background, felt able to articulate their concerns in a forum conducive to open 
and honest dialogue, allowing the free flow of thought and expression relevant 
to their own experiences and feelings about the impact of the mass media on 
their sense of belonging.  
 
In addition, for the benefit of the researcher and for accuracy, and for other 
practical considerations, an electronic recording device was used to record the 
interviews, unless a focus group or individuals explicitly refused such an 
intrusion. At the start of each interview and/or focus group discussion, 
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participants were asked for permission for the tape-recording device to be used. 
Informed consent was sought to ensure that individuals were aware of the 
format of the research process and agreed to take part in the investigation on 
that basis. There was some initial hesitation, of course, and some concern 
about the use of a machine to record comments made in private. Given the 
concerns expressed, this was taken into serious consideration and respondents 
were continually reassured over the use of the device. The rationale for its use 
having been explained, that is, to ease the transcribing process and ensure that 
all views were captured, all of the respondents agreed with this request. Strict 
confidentiality was observed at all times; age, ethnicity and gender were 
recorded, but not names; recordings and transcripts were secured in a locked 
drawer with the lead researcher retaining sole access and use of the data. 
 
For the researcher, what was useful and important about these negotiations 
were the real insecurities felt by respondents. This was not clear at the outset, 
but became apparent through the discourse in focus groups and one-to-ones as 
the field work progressed. Many respondents remained unsure about the 
intentions of the researcher, the research per se, and of whether there might be 
repercussions from them taking part. Even in this context, it seemed that the 
framing of their identities by society at large and by the media mattered to these 
participants. These thought processes were echoes of the anxiety many felt 
about their sense of belonging in Britain, a central thread that emerged in this 
study. Even before the main thrust of the data collection had commenced, a 
shadow of perceptions hung over the heads of some of the participants. It 
became more crucial, if not vital, for the researcher to install confidence in the 
interviewees, confidence not only in his credentials but in the importance and 
value of their contribution to the research question. If did not occur within a 
short time frame, the researcher feared a large dropout rate of respondents in 
both localities, resulting in an adverse impact on this crucial part of the 
investigation. Fortunately, trust was established and, as stated previously, the 
sample diaspora responded well to the time commitment required.  
 
The questions put to participants were also adapted and readapted following 
focus group sessions, as further pointers in the data were required to clarify 
94 
 
issues raised by participants, and to further probe some of the responses, again 
in line with the principles of grounded theory methodology. 
 
This ensured that the data was as rich and appropriate as possible to 
interrogate with more detailed analysis from the conversations that took place in 
focus groups where members often spoke candidly, without fear of any adverse 
comeback that could have led to a tarnished experience of this research journey 
and disallowed any further involvement. The participants’ ongoing commitment 
to this grounded theory process of gaining data through different stages was 
essential to keep the investigation alive. Without their active participation, the 
whole theoretical basis of this work would have stalled, at best, and at worst it 
would have ceased. This was clearly another risk to the whole study, but one 
that was sufficiently mitigated in the view of the lead researcher. 
 
In fact, the element of caution in preparing the research was an appraisal of 
what interviewees would have considered as merits in taking part in the group 
or individual research sessions; whether the sessions would be considered to 
be abstract or without any relevance in the daily lives and life experiences of the 
participants, within the context of media consumption. It would have been of 
great concern to the researcher if the principal actors within the investigation 
had no investment or genuine interest in the subject-matter. This was 
considered as potentially the biggest risk within the methodological framework, 
not only in terms of making sense of the data captured but also the possibility 
that the nucleus of the facts might have been limited and not substantive 
enough to allow the formation of any meaningful theory or to allow any form of 
hypothesis to emerge. 
 
The researcher highlighted this as a key area of concern and one that required 
careful selection of respondents to take part in the research. The one to one 
discussions held with individuals at the inception of the recruitment process 
aided this and allowed screening of respondents genuinely interested in taking 
part. The continual development of the relationship between researcher and 
respondents further enhanced trust and interest in the body of research that 
reassured both sides of the research project.  
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 In the event, if such an eventuality had occurred there would have been an 
early indication of it and it could have been catered for, through repeating the 
process of engagement and ensuring there were enough reliable respondents 
available to form the key components in the research infrastructure. But the fact 
would have remained, that the pool might have been tainted significantly, by the 
close-knit Pukhtoon community of Oxford specifically, rendering this element of 
the investigation redundant and pointless to pursue. Fortunately, this was not to 
be the case and the entire process was achieved with the full support of both 
cohort groups.  
 
 
3.4 Cohort structure 
 
As stated previously, the two sites that were selected as the primary areas for 
data collection and are referred to in this document are Oxford and Luton. They 
were selected partly for their history of migration representing the two cultural 
groups within the Pakistani diaspora in Britain specific to this research. They are 
unique in representing two separate traditional and cultural strands of the British 
Pakistani diaspora, in two contrasting cities, each with its own distinct 
characteristics and environments. The cohorts of people included and involved 
in this investigation were from diverse backgrounds, economically, socially, 
politically and culturally, a diversity that formed the backbone of this research 
question.  
 
Those selected were recognised as part of a specific population with cultural 
traits forming key components of their ethnicity and language, and religion an 
additional component of the make-up of these subject communities. Through 
active footwork in both cities, a core group of participants was set up to engage 
fully with in this process, despite their having some of the doubts raised earlier.  
 
The sampling and testing out of members of the Punjabi and Pukhtoon sub-
populations, although time-consuming, was at the same time invigorating in that 
the methods of enquiry were shaped with the help of people best suited for the 
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purpose. The criteria used were simple: an invitation to participate was 
extended to British-born citizens of Pakistani origin, either Pukhtoon or Punjabi. 
For the latter group, definition was widened in allowing participants from Azad 
Kashmir who defined themselves as Punjabi and/or Kashmiri. In addition, 
potential participants had to have an interest and be active in consuming mass 
media and be willing to take part in the grounded theory approach that required 
sufficient time commitment and concentration. This was achieved, to the relief 
of the principal researcher, quite easily during the interview that was part of the 
initial recruitment process and reinforced once the fieldwork went live. The use 
of existing contacts in the communities in Luton and Oxford allowed 
introductions to be cascaded to their friends and relatives who then met with the 
researcher.  
 
Because of the commitment asked of participants, the sample sizes were 
modest, and this is reflected in the two groups themselves, which then fed into 
the focus groups and, in turn, into the one-to-one interviews.  
 
This chosen pathway helped maintain the rigour and discipline required of a 
methodology as complex as grounded theory. At the same time, it remained 
exciting and demanding as a series of actions that elaborated upon the key 
questions used in the data collection process.  
 
It also enabled a broad age-range of participants to be involved in the research, 
and an overall balanced representation based on age and gender within the 
cultural group of interest, whether Pukhtoon or Punjabi, that resulted in a 
reliable and rich data set. Therefore, as well as the numbers of participants 
being realistic given the time available and travel required between the 
locations., they reflected realistically assumption the contacts that were made in 
the two sites and those who were willing to take part in focus groups and one-
to-one interviews. There were some who dropped out and these numbers are 
accounted for by natural self-removal of some of the respondents during the 
repeated, if not the early, stages of the research. However, the number was 
limited. The following tables set out the numbers of respondents and the 
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process type for the data collection, and include age range by location and 
gender. 
 
Table 3.1 Total number of interviewees in Luton and Oxford 
 
Location  Group Sex No. Type      
Luton  Punjabi Males 15 3 focus groups with 5 
participants each. Followed by 
one-to-one interviews with 5 
respondents in total. 
 
Females 15  
Oxford Pukhtoon Males 15 3 focus groups with 5 
participants each. Followed by 
one-to-one interviews with 5 
respondents in total. 
 
Females 15  
Total number of participants: 60 people of the Pakistani diaspora 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Age range and gender by location 
 
Location  Age range Male Female 
Luton  18-19 3 2 
20-24 7 6 
25-29 3 5 
30-34 2 2 
 Total 15 15 
Oxford 18-19 3 1 
20-24 8 6 
25-29 3 6 
30-34 1 2 
 Total 15 15 
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The data collection phase also included a focus on what was meant by personal 
identity, with each candidate being asked to state their own ethnicity and race, 
as they personally perceived it to be. Although ethnicity was set in broad terms 
for the two specific interest groups and categorised as two sub-sets of the wider 
Pakistani population, there was also an interest and focus on the part of the 
researcher on the way individuals view themselves. Additionally, distinctions 
and nuances within and between the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities of 
course emerged and were recorded. For instance, as regards the language 
used by each group, Pukhtoons were more likely to interact in Pukhto with their 
Pukhtoon counterparts, whilst the Punjabis interacted more in English. Further, 
Islamic terminology, such as ‘inshallah’ (god willing), was used more by the 
Pukhtoon than by the Punjabi cohort. The researcher also observed amongst 
the Pukhtoon a stronger sense of community bond than that observed among 
the Punjabi. For example, some Pukhtoons attended the ‘one-to-one interviews’ 
in groups rather than as individuals, in order to offer support and 
encouragement to each other; this was not observed in the Punjabi cohorts 
apart from one or two exceptions.  
 
This area of self-identification or self-affirmation was important in building up a 
more comprehensive picture of the diaspora, in particular, how they viewed their 
own relationship with the notion of multiple identities and sense of belonging. 
What was observed challenged some assumptions that the researcher may 
have had at the outset of the study. The researcher recognised during this 
phase that such feelings of personal identity within the two separate cohorts 
were recognisable but not alike. Inevitably they were not consistent with the 
feelings, aspirations and motivations of the generation that came before them.  
 
When, at the initial point of data collection, the respondents were asked to self-
define their own ethnicity, they were invited to do so as they best preferred, 
rather than being offered one selected or presupposed for them by the 
researcher or study question. A questionnaire was developed and given to each 
participant. It was anonymous and sought to gain an insight into the diversity of 
self-identification. In that way, exact personal ethnicity was not determined by 
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assumptions and loose terminology, which may exist in the literature, but from 
participants themselves. This self-identification was then aligned to the literature 
and data analysis itself.  
 
A concerted effort was also made to ensure equal representation of men and 
women in this study, given the cultural issues raised earlier. This was centrally 
important as it not only made the data collection balanced, but also gave it 
validity in encompassing both gender sets from the subject communities.  
 
There is a further point to be made in this regard, which relates directly to 
differences of opinion based on the sex of the contributor within the two male 
and female cohorts. The difference in how these two groups related to one 
another but also to their own specific gender identity group is another dimension 
of interest within masculine and feminine diasporic identity, itself part of their 
wider hybridity. The difference assisted in illuminating, if not breaking down, 
some of the wider generic and often stereotypical views held of Asian and 
Pakistani (Islamic) women in particular, within society and Western media.  
 
Additionally, the gender breakdown ensured parity of male and female 
representation, promoting a sense of equity in the process itself. The only 
remaining reservation initially held by the researcher was set within the 
backdrop of cultural sanction as to the limitations or strength of Pakistani female 
diaspora involvement. This could have limited the gender-specific data input, 
and been emphasised as a key risk factor. However, in the end there was as 
much involvement from females as from males, an outcome aided by the 
decision to use a female and culturally specific research assistant, fluent in 
Pukhto and Punjabi, who was available to take part and travel to and within the 
two cities of choice.  
 
Even concern, during the planning stage, of possible fluctuating commitment on 
the part of the women due to the dilemmas of family life and childcare having a 
possible adverse impact in the fieldwork did not materialise to any large extent. 
There was no requirement for crèche facilities to be available or for more time 
for consultation with women being built into the programme as it developed. At 
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the time when the fieldwork was beginning, with the programme of engagement 
and involvement of respondents from both sexes, these issues were assessed 
as emerging. Yet the assumptions made were not borne out by the reality on 
the day and following weeks. Both males and females involved in the data 
collection became familiar with the work and methods of investigation during the 
data collection phase and did not require any drastic or urgent support, such as 
emergency childcare provision or meeting the demands of a career, or family 
issues.  
 
The number of respondents selected was also flexible and dependent on the 
strength of the data gained. As part of the grounded theory approach, it could 
have been increased depending on the concepts and early hypotheses 
generated by the data. As stated previously, this process of working in cycles 
ensured that the information gained and analysed developed organically, had 
validity and purpose, whilst maintaining relevance to the grounded theory 
literature.  
 
On a note of caution, it was always difficult to quantify the number of 
participants for this research study that would be necessary in order to consider 
the validity of this system of enquiry. In the end, there was adequate 
representation to form a strong nucleus of individuals, which provided the 
appropriate momentum of interest and involvement throughout the period of 
data collection. Even the initial guarded caution of members of the Pakistani 
diaspora either unwilling to contribute or not finding the subject matter of 
interest, did not persist. From the initial meeting, many had an existing interest 
in this issue and had many thoughts on this subject that allowed them to 
articulate and explore their inner concerns.  
 
An initial concern that there might be a lack of interaction or debate in the early 
stages of data collection was mitigated by the respondents themselves. This 
made the task of the researcher simpler and less antagonistic and distrusting. 
This further positive outcome was of advantage to, and an endorsement of, the 
overall approach and outweighed the numerous risks assumed and anticipated 
at the planning stage.  
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There was, in the mind of the researcher, a continual need to maintain the trust 
and confidence of the cohort group members, male and female. This was 
integral to the success of the investigation as well as to the integrity of the 
principal researcher. Any potential for conflict in the discussions, or minimising 
of the narratives of the individual participants, could lead to respondents exiting 
from the research due to mistrust. Confidence grew within the cohort groups, 
and in the principal researcher, the more the respondents opened up to 
elucidate their concerns and amplify their comments. Evidence of this also 
arose in the focus groups, as discussion became more animated and 
exuberant. Participants showed themselves willing to be prompted on elements 
of personal media consumption they felt others would consider as amusing. In 
one such forum, a Pukhtoon male, for instance, spoke of his deep interest in 
watching old British Ealing comedies of Alec Guinness; another confessed to a 
liking for Australian soaps. These were a sign of the confidence of the 
respondents to engage with the research question and offer further insight into 
their range of media consumption, including specific personal interests that 
defined their own individual identity. 
 
 
3.5 The process of analysis  
 
Once a first stage theory was conceptualised, it was tested out amongst the 
participants. The analytical procedure and findings were also shared with the 
interviewees to affirm their validity and verification. Once these discussions had 
taken place, the first step concepts were then broadened out and articulated 
further to give more meaning. This also had the benefit of maintaining the 
procedure of analysis within the cyclical programme set out by grounded theory 
methodology as recommended within the literature. The open coding process 
identified multiple codes that were also multi-layered. It was the role of the 
researcher to make sense of these layers and illustrate the range of codes 
available and acceptable, and to acknowledge similarities and differences. In 
the case of the Pakistani diaspora, codes included belonging, culture, religion, 
discrimination and others relating to sense of multiple or singular identity. These 
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themes were the codes utilised that then related to sub-codes such as Punjabi 
or Pukhtoon culture, or practising Muslim or not. There was recognition at this 
stage of the many codes generated which expanded into larger themes, or 
codes. It was valuable to capture all of these and convert them into more 
tangible and useful results. This nearly became a complex mosaic of 
information needing editing and further categorisation, the obvious role and 
function of the principal researcher. However, this did not happen, as there 
were many similarities between the two cohort research groups, thus making 
the task slightly simpler in practice.  
 
A classification system (the codes) was set up to draw out the themes 
emphasised repeatedly within the two ethnic cohort groups or by individuals. 
The elucidation of these themes contained detailed discourses. Mainly 
descriptive in nature, they often related to a personal or group story.  
 
The ordering of this information was purposefully hierarchical and assisted the 
researcher in assigning more relevance to some of the analysis, while allowing 
reclassification or dismissal of other dimensions that were not seen as valid or 
relevant. This then facilitated semi-formal discussions with the participants to 
shape the primary data analysis.  
 
Another feature of the initial data analysis was to assess what comparisons 
could be made between the two groups, Pukhtoon and Punjabi, involved in the 
investigation. In some cases, there was little description or detail within certain 
comments, a mere fact being reported or mentioned in passing. Other 
descriptions coming from the analysis were more vivid and thorough. This 
information was then collated and classified further, according to importance 
and credibility. It was also appropriate to apply relevant ethnographic 
experiences that enabled the subsequent stages of theorising supporting the 
development of a much wider database of information than that categorised in 
codes. It allowed for a different perspective to be sourced, enhanced the data-
capturing process itself and allowed the researcher to better understand the 
group dynamics.  
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Ethnography is very useful in this respect, as Robson (1993) states. It allows 
the ethnographer to study the rules and traditions of a group and aims to create 
a theory of how this group interacts. This is explained further in the next section 
providing more detail of its importance within the context of emic and etic 
approaches. In addition, personal reflections of ethnographic experiences are 
therefore referred to in the summary sections of chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as 
in the conclusion in chapter 7. 
 
A manual data log was created that recorded words and phrases, cultural 
norms and sayings that assisted in linking key concepts and ideas that seemed 
to link across the two cultural groups: for instance, religious and/or cultural 
sayings familiar to both cohort groups that enhanced internal and group cultural 
understandings. Variations within the data picked up by this process allowed 
further interrogation of the statistical evidence generated. 
 
A number of elements of the theories were then developed, following a second 
stage of analysis and discussion with participating groups. The theory was 
further refined in one-to-one interviews conducted with male and female 
members of the forums. Again, similarities and disparity were filtered and coded 
appropriately, which assisted in developing theorising codes or, as stated 
before, was a precursor to hypothesising. The researcher applied these codes 
further to define a broader emerging hypothesis that was then enhanced, if not 
verified, by one-to-one interviews and feedback sessions with respondents. It 
was crucial to assess during this stage whether respondents were not fatigued 
or feeling over-researched. Over-participation might have resulted in members 
losing interest and the methodology being compromised by a lack of proper and 
effective representation. This was not the case, as respondents remained keen 
to contribute at all stages of the data collection and analysis process.  
 
The hypothesis-generating stage was therefore an active process involving the 
respondents, who had given so much time to the research and were therefore 
offered the additional benefit of a sense of ownership in the final phase of the 
investigation. An emerging hypothesis was articulated by the researcher and 
debated by the members of the two groups in focus groups and one-to-one 
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interviews where possible. During this continuation of the data collection and 
analysis process, further comparisons were made between the two diasporic 
cultural groups. These juxtapositions offered further insight into whether the 
hypothesising was accurate and relevant to the findings of the research. 
 
For the proposed suppositions to work, the codes were grouped together with 
the other sets of data to develop concepts. In essence, for any hypotheses to 
hold validity it should meet certain requirements. The ideas espoused within this 
research should link into the data. The key themes drawn out from the analysis 
should be reflected in the hypothesis that is the outcome for this work. It is 
necessary to ensure that the reference group – a representative number of 
volunteer participants – spans the interviewed clusters and ethnicity (Pukhtoon 
and Punjabi, and cultural differentials). The outcome itself has to satisfy the 
precondition that it is comprehensible to lay people.  
 
The general premise developed by the researcher is generic enough to meet a 
range of dimensions and situations. The construction makes the hypothesis 
relevant to the wider diaspora communities and its articulation is therefore not a 
meaningless abstract devoid of any real-life meaning in the day-to-day world. A 
final criterion the researcher believes has been met in adapting this specific 
method to aid the enquiry is the real belief that the person utilising the 
hypothesis is not only empowered by the approach but also derives some 
positive experience or solution from it.  
 
The flexibility of the concepts and the ideas developed here has allowed the 
element of direction to be a central plank for success. The researcher would 
assert that, given the level of concerns of the diaspora with the media’s 
identification of them as ‘the Other’, the summation proposed is a solution-
focused one with relevance to the lives of those who played such a crucial part 
as respondents in this study. The theory also gives much greater validity and 
justification for the use of grounded theory as an analytical and hypothesis- 
generating tool. Its innate value is its beneficiary role in ‘analysis of how a 
problem is resolved or processed by participants in a particular problem area’. 
(Miller and Brewer 2003, p.133). The theory has achieved its overall objective of 
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responding directly to the question in hand but also facilitating a supportive 
framework in which group members and others of the diaspora can believe in a 
sense of achievement through their active participation in the data-collection 
phase.  
 
 
3.6 The value of ethnography 
  
As stated above, the addition of ethnography was a useful contributor in the 
analysis of the data arising from the two cohort groups. The most important 
element was that the researcher had the same cultural, racial and religious 
demographics as the respondents. In that regard, the responses are better 
understood in the wider context of respondents being a minority community and 
how they are potentially perceived. Ethnography relates well to the grounded 
theory approach in how the data (via the cyclical process) tells a story. For the 
researcher, the approach is not tainted with an existing structured hypothesis 
that the data is expected to relate to. It allows the data to take its own journey 
through the fieldwork and narratives of the respondents. At the same time, the 
researcher can observe, as well as participate in, exchanges based on 
community of interest.  
 
However, a weakness of ethnography in adding to theory as well as seeking 
and analysing new research data, arises when personal ideas are not checked 
(Hillyard, 2010). It has been argued that, at worst, statements made with this 
approach can be constructed, even ‘manufactured’, to highlight a particular 
social reality, thus making it redundant (Brewer, 2000). The framing of data is a 
serious matter. Comparisons are even made, according to Brewer (ibid.), 
between the ethnographic approach and the work of journalists, even writers of 
novels. However, these are extreme views that express the unreliability of and 
antagonism towards ethnographic research. Any research methodology 
adopted by an external or internal investigator can be subject to criticisms 
regarding impartiality, or subjectivity and personal influence. In this context, it is 
important that the methodology is open to scrutiny by others to ensure its 
validity and the integrity of the data and subsequent analysis. The researcher 
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feels that the use of both grounded theory and ethnography within the context of 
an emic approach has met this requirement for this specific study.  
 
This type of ‘insider’ (emic) research is seen as important for studies of ethnic 
minorities by our own communities (Foster, 1994, p.130). It brings with it a 
different set of perspectives and knowledge of that same community that 
enhances the data collection and analysis during the fieldwork. Generally, all 
research has a bias related to the researcher’s  own values and belief systems. 
Like journalists, in the context of this study, as expressed by Darnton (1975) 
(referred to above), researchers interpret what they encounter (Stevenson, 
1990; Matlay, 2005; Beyers et al., 2009). The racial and cultural bias of 
researchers (Banks, 1995) is also an area that can impinge on objectivity, a 
discourse much amplified within educational researchers and referred to as 
‘epistemological racism’ (Scheurich and Young, 1997, p.4). These debates on 
either side will continue to take place and the researcher does not wish to 
expand that discussion, except to cite its existence and importance, and to 
exemplify a racial divide in who undertakes such approaches and how is the 
research data is analysed within the context of personal, political, social and 
cultural experiences and realities. Indeed, Scheurich and Young (ibid.) have 
argued that the lack of understanding as to why ‘race’ is important is in itself a 
critical factor in epistemologies From the point of view of mainstream 
researchers, why should it matter, is it perhaps not an issue, and can it not be 
ignored (ibid.)? From such a point of view it  would follow that the use of an etic 
(‘ousider’) ethnographic approach would negate any form of bias albeit the 
method may be subject to white academic racism, as argued by Scheurich 
(2002), which also relates to findings on the impact of institutional racism 
(MacPherson, 1999).  
 
The emic approach allowed the researcher to move away from a more 
Eurocentric approach, as stated, to one that was more in tune with the 
participants. It helped the data to evolve with the analysis and therefore 
supported the grounded theory approach. It allowed the respondents to speak 
of their experiences as a minority group without any assumptions or theoretical 
frameworks installed at the start of the process. It aligned closely with the 
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grounded theory approach in its use of the data and its continual analysis to 
draw conclusions. It gave voice to the concerns, anxieties and perceptions of an 
excluded group of people who feel marginalised by society. In that respect, as 
Foster (1994) states, ‘voice is a multifaceted concept’ (132). Its contribution in 
the form of narratives and life histories provides much more meaning to the 
ethnographic approach than any etic process. This research study addressed 
two cohort groups that were more open to an emic approach that created a safe 
space to talk openly and feel that the researcher not only empathised with their 
concerns, but understood the context in which they articulated them. The 
element of trust was crucial to this research’s success, through an insider 
approach that allowed not only cultural understanding but also compassion in 
the way conversations were constructed, conducted and recorded.  
 
There remains debate on the values of these two approaches (Headland, 1990; 
Helfrich, 1999), and as to whether the insider can seek the key data that is 
required without personal conflicts of interest and interpretation. However, the 
external method of using an existing structure of explanation would limit the 
nuances and realism of the experiences, context and data in the fieldwork. 
These are issues the researcher had to think through and debate when 
assessing the main methodological approach at the initial planning stage of the 
research question itself. The approach adopted, therefore, seeks to mitigate 
these concerns at an early stage and ensure the data was accurate and 
meaningful throughout.  
 
Ethically, in working with specific vulnerable groups, it is also necessary to 
ensure that the respondents are not influenced, coached or even directed 
through specific prompts, to make certain statements. In the frame of this study, 
issues of trust were be paramount, given the suspicion of outsiders, of people 
not belonging to the respondents’ immediate proximity, unknown or not related 
by kin or cultural network.  
 
There is of course a juxtaposition, in undertaking research with vulnerable 
groups, between ensuring their voice is heard but not producing any 
improvement in their concerns. For instance, research with lesbian and gay 
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communities accessing healthcare is valuable to determine how services do not 
meet their needs, but this may not result in health provision getting any better 
(James and Platzer, 1999).  
 
The power dynamic is also in favour of the researcher, who can hold sway over 
respondents, highlighting how the research will improve their lives, when in fact 
it may not. This may be especially true in research undertaken in developing 
countries (Scheyvens et al., 2003) or with specific marginalised communities, 
such as women, children or refugees. In essence, concerns of exploitation are 
important in assessing research with such groups as it could be that middle-
class researchers cannot relate to the subject constituents and deemed an 
outsider (Bridges, 2002). This anthropological approach is addressed in the 
previous chapter relating to the work of Hutnyk (2006). In addition, some 
minorities have been concerned about being over-researched and defined in a 
Western community context (Jan-Khan, 2003). Such ethical considerations 
need to be reviewed during each element of the investigation, ensuring 
participants not only provide informed consent but also are informed of their 
right to leave the research study at any time. The cyclical process adopted 
allows such a mechanism to exist.  
 
These considerations were made explicit to all respondents during the initial 
interview and involvement in this study, in order not only to ensure good ethical 
practice but also to maintain the confidence of all participants.  
 
The researcher viewed the ethics of adopting an emic or etic process very 
seriously.  This was not only to ensure the lack of bias but of ensuring no 
adverse  psychological impact was placed on respondents.  As part of the group 
and one to one discussions, respondents were asked of how issues impacted 
upon them.  This included discussion their bad experiences encountering 
prejudice as well as talking about anti-Muslim hate and racism.   Concerns were 
not raised by respondents.   The researcher; having  worked for many years 
professionally in the health and mental health field,  did not observe any signs 
of anxiety or distress during group discussions and personal interviews.  
Respondents would have been referred to support services if this had indeed 
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arisen, with the researcher clear of his ethical responsibilities towards all those 
taking part in the study.  It was important that such participants who perhaps 
saw themselves as marginalised or disenfranchised, has the required support. 
  
 
3.7 Data collection locations 
  
As discussed above, the two locations of Luton and Oxford formed the basis for 
selecting individuals that were the essential element in acquiring the required 
set of opinions for this investigation. The further rationale for selecting Oxford 
and Luton as the primary sources for fieldwork and data collection was twofold. 
First, the principal researcher had familiarity with both locations and the make-
up of their local Pakistani communities, residing in one and having close family 
in the other. A second rationale relates to the first, in that the choice made the 
two locations accessible for the recruiting of respondents to take part in the 
research question. Also, the two places selected are in the South-East and 
Eastern regions of England, far removed from the sprawling cities often cited for 
their extended industralised links and history of mass primary migration of 
Pakistani communities over many decades, such as Birmingham, Bradford and 
Manchester.  
 
The borough of Luton is a city with a history of Pakistani migration and 
settlement, attracted by an industrial complex and, like Oxford, based around 
car manufacturing. Similarly, the Punjabi and Pukhtoon communities have 
selected these places as home as a result of internal migration from the North 
of England, escaping Bradford, or Burnley, for more aspiring southern cities and 
higher incomes at a time of economic decline in their primary settled places: 
ironically, a form of internal diaspora within a north–south divide.  
 
The following sections provide a brief introduction to these places to give better 
context to the research question and data analysis. These synopses, although 
in parts quite different, do have similarities within social, cultural and religious 
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realms, as well as shared patterns of economic disadvantage and exclusion 
from mainstream society, within wider social classifications.  
 
3.8 The Luton cohort  
 
The strength of the minority ethnic base has allowed the already well-
established and long-serving Pakistani members to be an essential part of the 
social and political life of Luton, now forming nearly 10% of the total population 
of the city, and in some electoral wards representing over 50% of the 
population. 
 
Punjab, home of the great majority of the Pakistani immigrant population, is the 
second-largest province of Pakistan with 56% of the total population living in 
that province with its capital Lahore, a cultural and political hub. The province is 
bordered by Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and Jammu and Kashmir, India) 
to the north-east, the Indian states of Punjab and Rajasthan to the east, the 
Pakistani provinces of Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to the 
south and west, and the Islamabad capital territory to the north. This geography 
results in both similarities and differences with the Oxford cohort (see below). 
 
In Luton, the areas known as Dallow, Biscot and Saints are wards with a high 
Pakistani population and represent the urban centre of Luton, stretching from 
the city centre to the highly commercialised Asian business and community 
sector known as Bury Park. Manzoor (2007), in an autobiographical depiction, 
narrates his family’s experiences in Bury Park and some of the life of the 
Pakistani community. He highlights the cultural and community aspects as 
observed through his father’s contact with the Pakistani population and work at 
the Vauxhall car plant. Although the author is somewhat detached from the 
traditional Pakistani way of life, the publication illustrates the strong sense of 
communal fraternity that existed in the city and the reliance placed on better 
educated individuals to support other Pakistani migrants adapting to life in 
Britain.  
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It is a centuries-old tale of the migrant and of dislocation from home, to seek 
one’s fortune outside the place of birth. Dispersal from the homeland to another 
land is where the modern diaspora emerges. The early settlers came not en 
masse but in stages, the men usually being the first wave of workers to arrive, 
forming their own distinct brethren and societies that replicated the allegiances 
and honour systems of back home and shared experiences through collective 
living. This growing cultural group gave much inspiration to individual enterprise 
in a way similar to any dispersed migrant society miles away from their natural 
base, through the creation of outlets supplying cultural foods, religiously 
sanctioned meat and the much-needed spices to maintain an Eastern diet. This 
pattern emerged throughout Britain where Pakistani groups settled and began 
to form a strong nucleus of an existence that paralleled the life of districts of 
Pakistan. These were not the elite and educated city dwellers of their parent 
country, but labourers from rural societies, as discussed by Kabbani (1987) in 
her work on transnational populations of the Orient.  
 
As a result of this postwar demographic change, Luton has a diverse ethnic mix, 
with a significant population of Asian descent, mainly Pakistani (9.8% of the 
population, 17,012), Bangladeshi (4.3%), and Indian (4.2%). The 2005 Office of 
National Statistics figures revealed the town had a total white population of 68% 
(of which white British amounted to 61.3%), with an Asian population of 19.3% 
(Luton Borough Council, 2006). The largest minority religious group was Muslim 
at 14.3% with smaller Hindu (2.7%), Sikh (0.8%) and other religious groups. 
Regionally, within the East of England the Pakistani population is comparatively 
small at 38,790, compared to the South-East (58,520). In updated figures there 
is a decline in the white population (71.9% to 65.4%), while there is an increase 
in the Pakistani population (18.3% to 20.6%) (Luton Borough Council, 2011b). 
At the time of writing, the official 2011 census data brings the Asian population 
in Luton to nearly 19%, of which the Pakistani group make up the vast majority 
of that population (ONS, 2014). More recent projections sourced from the local 
authority indicate a significant increase from the existing 24,200 to 34,500 by 
2030, indicating an increase of 43% (Luton Borough Council, 2012). This 
emphasises both the youthful nature of the population and the high fertility rates 
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within the Pakistani and Bangladeshi sub-populations. Table 3.3 illustrates the 
breakdown by age. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Pakistani population of Luton by age from 2010 to 2030 
  
Ethnicity/age range 2010 2020 2030 
Pakistani 0-4 years 3,600  3,050  3,800  
Pakistani 5-15years 5,900  7,500  6,600  
Pakistani 16-64 
years 
13,650  17,150  21,950  
Source: Luton Borough Council, 2012a. 
 
Historically, the borough saw the rise of the migrant population in the 1950s and 
1960s, with the Pakistani community, making it one of the first minor cities in 
which Pakistanis made their home. Compared with the northern towns and 
cities, Luton offered a different attraction, being not far from London and home 
to a major industrial base. The car manufacturing industry, like the industrial 
cities in the North, was perhaps a key factor in enticing the early immigrant 
workers from the Indian sub-continent. It was a venue of transitory settlement 
purely for monetary wealth with no intention of a longer commitment at that 
time. Again, as in many of the large cities of the time, the largest Pakistani 
network to settle in Luton is predominantly from the Punjab region of Pakistan, 
as well as from Azad Kashmir, from outlying villages and from the city of Mirpur.  
 
Economic and social disadvantage is well recorded within the district, with 
official figures highlighting that under half of all Pakistani adults in Luton have 
qualification (OCSI Survey, 2007), and a lack of access to employment, 
currently standing at 67%, well below the 78% figure for the region as a whole. 
Additionally, the annual population and Labour Force Survey (ONS, 2008) 
reveals a deteriorating picture since 2002. The minority ethnic population is 
considered to be over-represented among job seeker allowance (JSA) 
claimants, at 47.2%, nearly half of the claimants, within the East of England, 
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whilst it makes up less than a third of Luton's population (OCSI, 2007). 
Significantly, two wards with a majority representation of Pakistanis are 
emphasised as having considerably higher levels of unemployment (see table 
below). Dallow has a higher level of long-term unemployed than any other part 
of Luton (Luton Borough Council, 2012a). The youth unemployment rate is also 
of concern.  
  
Within the working population of 16–74 years of age, 63% are employed; this 
figure includes students, the self-employed and those who are in part-time 
employment, 11% are retired, 8% look after the family or take care of the home 
and 7% are unemployed, according to the Office of National Statistics (2012). 
The landscape has changed from one dominated by engineering and 
manufacturing to one dominated by the service sector, as evident in the 
Pakistani community in a change from 24-hour working in car plants making 
Luton vans, to 24-hour working within the taxi ranks.  
 
This is compounded by poor figures for achievement, indicated with attainment 
figures for Pakistanis being below the national average (measured at 5 GCSE's 
or more at grade C or above) and lower than any other local authority area 
within the regional boundaries (Luton Borough Council, 2011a). Given the size 
of the Pakistani community, there is also an adverse impact on healthcare, with 
Pakistanis considered to experience much worse health than other 
communities, including specific ailments such as diabetes, cardio vascular 
disease, and low uptake of screening for cancers (Luton Borough Council, 
2011a). These echo national figures referred to in a later chapter.  
 
It is self-evident that the group that is the subject of this study is growing within 
the borough and will continue to do so, based on forecast projections. In 
common with other cities with large minority groupings and in particular, where 
peoples of Pakistani origin have made their home, they will form a strong and 
sizeable force of that local society. Furthermore, the social element in respect to 
a growing youth and ageing Pakistani section of the population will require 
addressing either through employment or through social support and access to 
existing public services.  
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As referred to earlier, the principal researcher, through family contacts, was 
able to harness interviewees to take part in the discussions throughout the data-
collection and analysis processes, so vital to the success of this work.  
 
This existing family network in the city of Luton was useful in ensuring that a 
wider spread of individuals were accessed as part of the process of assessment 
and recruitment of respondents for inclusion in the investigation. It gave further 
credibility to the research, as the facilitators had vouched for the authenticity of 
the work as well as satisfying any concerns that the project involved interloping 
or false intentions.  
 
There were, of course, safeguards in respect to conflicts of interest, such as 
knowing some of the participants and their families. These were dealt with by 
ensuring a strict level of confidentiality for the group and in particular for the 
individual discussions, and for the comments made in the fieldwork. This, the 
researcher believed, outweighed any potential barriers. These issues were 
reflected in both sites in this work. 
 
 
3.9 The Oxford location  
 
In contrast to Luton, Oxford is a city 60 miles west of London with a population 
of just under 165,000, with 151,000 living within the district boundary, although 
2009 figures show a drop in this size to 149,300 (Oxford City Council, 2008). 
Black and minority ethnic communities make up 19.6% of the total population 
with Asians being the largest group within that section. Further breakdowns 
indicate that Pakistani residents account for 2.4% (3,600) of this small diverse 
ethnic mix. There is a higher number within the 0-15 age range (3.8%) than in 
the 16-64 band (2.4%) emphasising the further development of the future 
Pakistani diaspora. There has been an increase in this specific population over 
time resulting in it being the largest within the black and minority ethnic data set 
for Oxford (Oxfordshire Data Observatory, 2010). This is clearly evident in the 
2011 census, which indicates the growth of the black and minority ethnic 
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population to 22%, the largest group being Pakistani at 4,825 people accounting 
for nearly 5% of the population in the city, representing an increase in size 
(Oxford City Council, 2013). However, there are no breakdowns for diversity 
within diversity in terms of Punjabi and Pukhtoon groups.  
This small Pakistani resident population is contained within the wider Oxford city 
boundaries, rather than, as in many other conurbations, within a specific 
geographical entity often characterised by the highest indices of multiple 
deprivation. In Oxford, unlike Luton, although there are pockets of deprivation 
(Oxfordshire Director of Public Health, 2013) largely contained within a number 
of housing estates on the outskirts of the city, they are far removed from the 
internationally renowned colleges and visiting tourists. Oxford is not an inner 
city locality in the same sense as some boroughs of London or northern cities.  
 
In respect to the specific community of interest, the Pukhtoon is a minority 
within a minority, and may be referred to with the definition of Garner and 
Bhattacharyya (2011), in their assessment of smaller minorities within a range 
of cities, as a less segregated ethnic group that reflects the term of ‘best 
distribution’ (i.e. concentrated in less deprived areas, as a whole (ibid., p.14).  
 
They fit within that mould of dispersal given their relatively low numbers and are 
resident in many parts of the city, with a main presence in the area known as 
Cowley This may have some historical significance given its proximity to the car 
factory (now BMW), a workplace for many newly arrived migrants.  
 
Thus, the Cowley Road and surrounding areas are symbolic of the wider 
diversity of Oxford reflected also in part through its international student 
numbers and in part to the plethora of minority and mainstream businesses, 
mosques, churches and other premises belonging to those of a mosaic of 
multiculturalism. There is also a presence within housing estates such as 
Blackbird Leys and Rose Hill, more so in the latter than the former. Statistically, 
the low numbers of Pakistanis and the sub-category Pukhtoons make detailed 
analysis of this group difficult. What information there is reflects the wider 
economic and social inequalities that these minorities are commonly associated 
with in the national picture. This is also evident within the health domain and 
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indicates the perpetuation of the inverse care law where ‘the availability of good 
medical care tends to vary inversely with the need for it in the population 
served’. (Hart, 1971, p.405; Oxford City Council, 2011; Oxfordshire Director of 
Public Health, 2013; Ahmed, 2006). 
 
Economic activity is based on the traditional pattern of self-employed trading in 
the retail and grocery sector, dominated by fast-food outlets and halal meat 
shops. There is limited employment within the public sector of health and 
academia that is significant in the city. The most favoured, flexible and lucrative 
vocation remains chauffeuring or taxi driving. In Oxford there is Pukhtoon 
entrepreneurial dominance in this area, signified by the growth and success of 
the Pukhtoon-owned Royal Cars private hire business.  
 
As a society, again as in the Pakistani communities in Luton, there is a 
transnational connection to Azad Kashmir and the wider Punjab, although this is 
not as dominant and all-consuming as in many other conurbations. The 
unassuming Pukhtoon has been a feature of this migration from the North-West 
areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, home to a range of tribal agencies and 
peoples with a heritage of proud Islamic tradition and independence, as 
indicated by the name change from the North West Province to Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa.  
 
The modern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is spread over 74,521 sq km that conveys a 
contour of immense changes in the landscape. It has a population of over 22 
million people, from ethnically diverse backgrounds. (There is an overlap with 
bordering regions of Afghanistan with ethnic peoples that relate genetically, 
politically and socially). Khyber Pakhtunkhwa comprises of three major 
administrative parts. The first, with the great majority of the people, are ‘settled 
areas’, are mainly city areas which are traditional yet cosmopolitan in outlook, 
although religious orthodoxy prevails, particularly in the smaller towns and 
villages. The second part, the PATA (Provincially Administered Tribal Areas) 
has a population of 831,000. It includes the state of Amb, now submerged in the 
Tarbela Dam reservoir. (A somewhat similar predicament was faced by those 
living within Azad Kashmir in relation to the building and extension of the 
117 
 
Mangla Dam.) The social and emotional upheaval caused by the development 
of the dam was reflected in Azad Kashmir with the building and extension of the 
Mangla Dam there. The displacement in these two regions of Pakistan induced 
many local residents to consider a working life in Britain, so that areas of the 
Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa became a source of unskilled labour for 
British manufacturing industry. 
 
The third part, the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), is spread over 
27,220 sq km with a citizenry of 3,764,000. It comprises seven tribal agencies 
and six frontier regions. These areas are often seen to be a law unto 
themselves and in recent years have been subject to external insurrection by 
the Taliban and other extremist elements fighting not only the West but the 
Pakistani army. These three areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa signify the complex 
mosaic of cultural, political and social hierarchies that exist within this region.  
 
Oxford was not subject to mass immigration from the sub-continent in the early 
years as were northern cities and London. Instead, a handful of families arrived 
to make the city their home as recounted by Shaw (1994). However, at a micro 
level that did mirror the community hierarchies amongst newly arrived migrants 
seen in the larger cities. There was one who spoke English and interpreted for 
others and offered them advice and voluntary form-filling, reflected by Manzoor 
(2007) in his autobiography. These individuals were essential anchors for these 
emerging communities in the Western world.  
 
Another and more recent addition to the Pukhtoon population has been the 
arrival of families moving from the North of England to the South. As mentioned 
previously, the primary immigration to early hubs such as Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham soon translated into a secondary internal migration to cities that were 
seen to be less economically disadvantaged or less subject to what was 
perceived, as a result of the impact of drugs and crime, as the declining moral 
standards of these initial anchors,. The existing and small embryonic kin roots 
were now being exploited by relatives who felt displaced by distance and a lack 
of attachment to their sense of family, extended or otherwise. These Pukhtoon 
citizens were seeking not only better conditions for their children and for 
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themselves but also a sense of social and economic harmony, an ironic 
reflection of the rationale for the Pukhtoon pioneers. In Oxford their numbers, as 
stated, are not officially recorded. For the purposes of this investigation, the 
researcher has been able to estimate that nearly 50% of the Pukhtoon 
community living in Oxford have experienced this shift from what has been 
recorded officially as the economically declining North to the more prosperous 
South (Giles and Neville, 2013). 
 
Additionally, as Pukhtoon is not considered a separate category within the 
census classifications nor in local population projections, nor as a sub-set within 
the official 'Asian' classification, the researcher had to conduct alternative 
fieldwork to determine the size of this group. As part of the Pukhtoon audit, a 
numerical census was conducted that highlighted over 500 people of Pukhtoon 
heritage, using a self-defining term and assessed numbers through the existing 
networks, which enumerated the number of families present in Oxford and then 
each family member, to support this research. This was possible because of the 
close social network of the Pukhtoon community and the inter-relationships that 
extend to financial, personal and moral support of one another, reinforced by 
the Pukhtoon language, or Pukhto, religion and clan loyalty.  
 
There are of course the more recent arrivals of refugees from Afghanistan, 
fleeing their conflict-ridden homeland, who may add to this community, but in all 
consideration, they would exist as a separate entity, not as part of the Pakistani 
diaspora, having no familial ties and only connected through a common lexicon 
and shared ancestry, in all but name. Their presence may increase the 
demography of this particular group but not by any significant amount, and for 
that reason were ruled out from this research study. 
 
The relationship of the Pukhtoon group to the wider Pakistani and Muslim 
fraternity does not preclude it from the issues that enforce a sense of exclusion 
and inequity within the wider public arena that was reflected in Luton. Given the 
relatively small numbers, there is a danger of a lack of representation of their 
distinct needs within the public sphere, which can perpetuate the myth of the 
Other. As will be illustrated in a later chapter, the Pukhtoon is viewed 
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unfavourably by many of the Punjabi population, which reinforces a prejudiced 
and cultural stereotype based on regional affiliations ingrained within the larger 
and more dominant Punjabi society. It is similar to how some of the English 
view the Irish, if not the Scottish or Welsh citizen.  
 
There is a real sense of exclusion within exclusion for the Pukhtoon group, often 
viewed as an assimilated and integrated member of the wider Pakistani body 
politic and diaspora alike. These issues became more evident during the 
research and reflect the prevailing discourse within larger discussions related to 
belonging and attachment of individual or group identity.  
 
Table 3.4 Pakistani population of Oxford and percentage of total population 
2001 census 2,625 1.8% 
2006 estimates  3,000 2.0% 
2011 census  4,825 3.5% 
Source Oxford City Council (2006, 2013) 
 
Figure 3.1 Proportion of people with Pakistani ethnicity, Oxford 2001  
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Source: Oxford City Council (2013) 
 
A most useful mitigating factor was the presence of the lead researcher within 
the community of Oxford. This allowed existing relationships and networks with 
the resident Pukhtoon population to be exploited and contacts created with the 
younger Pukhtoon generation, facilitated by local elders. Given the small nature 
of the total Pukhtoon community in Oxford, this was useful as otherwise it would 
have been immensely difficult for the principal researcher to act independently 
and could have jeopardised the research and its wider aims.  
 
Additionally, the younger members of the Pukhtoon community were cautious of 
not only an outsider interloping within their networks but wary also of anyone 
seeking responses to questions of media consumption and identity. As was 
elaborated upon within the analysis, there was much mistrust created by 
specific government initiatives that responded to Islamic extremism, which had 
an adverse impact on the perceptions of many young Muslim men.  
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3.10 Summary 
 
It was clear that, within the methodological framework, grounded theory was the 
most appropriate vehicle to pursue this enquiry. It offered the best use of the 
data to refine the key questions, via the focus groups and one-to-one 
interviews, with the respondents who are the subject of this investigation. By 
developing a hypothesis from the data, the researcher has ensured a 
robustness of the fieldwork and validity of the views of the interviewees, who 
shaped and reshaped the final conclusions.  
 
There is always concern if measures adopted do not come to fruition. However, 
a pragmatic approach was embraced without being over-cautious or so 
pessimistic as to place a cloud over the whole data-collection technique. This 
would have been unfortunate and counter-productive to achieving the key 
objectives of this academic exploration. Such problems did not arise, and the 
fieldwork was rewarding in itself. Grounded theory therefore responded directly 
to the concerns of the cohort group members as well as providing a coherent 
framework formed from the analysis.  
 
The addition of ethnography has complimented this approach, taking into 
consideration its merits, value and concerns in working with vulnerable groups. 
Accordingly, the ethical dimensions have also been addressed within these 
pages and the approach taken has proven to be effective in maintaining the 
confidence and reliability of cohort members to remain involved, through honest 
and open articulation of the key questions of the research. Furthermore, it 
proved to be an empowering process for many and has offered much more 
insight into their developing and future evolution of identity in respect to media 
consumption. Such outcomes have reinforced the methodological approach as 
a valuable and well thought-out process that mitigated any potential risks and 
responded to ethical considerations.  
 
With respect to the two locations, they offered great scope in attracting the right 
respondents based on their specific cultural background as members of the 
Pakistani diaspora. The sites, although economically and socially different, 
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contained the relevant community make-up and had a similarity in terms of 
chronology of migration and settlement. Both places were easily accessible and 
saved time, cost of travelling, and other additional expenses. The existing 
contacts supported greater community facilitation and avoided unnecessary 
obstacles that were not within the researcher’s control, such as the prevailing 
social and political environment. They offered the most realistic and pragmatic 
options for collecting data as robustly and accurately as possible, without much 
hindrance and delay. It needs to be stressed that the areas selected, if not the 
segment of the communities themselves, were novel and provided direct 
comparisons within the analysis phase of this research. It is inevitable that 
some correlations were made; however, it was also evident that differences 
emerged from these two groups, providing an important sample upon which to 
build up a relevant and probable hypothesis that has some merit.  
 
Central to that hypothesis were the expressions and voices of the cohort 
members provided throughout this study. The researcher saw the nurturing 
impact of the respondents’ involvement in the data collection phase. Their 
attitude evolved from initial apprehension about taking part, due to concerns of 
media and societal depictions and assumptions about them as citizens, to a 
better understanding of reasserting themselves. As they progressed, they 
understood more the role of the media and relationships with the wider global 
economic, social and political landscapes. They began to question and 
interrogate not only the media they consumed but also themselves, in how it 
impacted on who and what they were and where they lived. It raised a 
consciousness amongst them that many previously felt did not exist or about 
which they had been in denial or in a form of deep sleep. They began to realise 
that their use of new and social media was indeed a useful and practical 
approach to asserting their own sense of hybrid identity – British Muslim 
Pakistan, British Muslim Pukhtoon – or other amalgamation they felt defined 
them as individuals but within a collective. In the cohort groups, they became 
aware that they were not alone in these thoughts of alienation and insecurity. 
Through shared experiences, the gained strength to promote and explore their 
identity via the World Wide Web and make links with similar diasporas in other 
parts of the world. This was a start from moving away from their perceptions of 
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victimhood to one of active citizen in a globalised new media, technologically 
advanced and connected world. In other words, to a perception of themselves 
as the smartphone generation of the diaspora.  Rather than take information 
from the media for granted, they would question, interrogate and source 
additional facts, before they consider the reality of what they consume; from 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon media.  This may be essential in how they 
consume media and relate it to their evolving identities in the future.  
 
To conclude this methodology section, the researcher considered the key goals 
necessary to ensure a robust and systematic process for analysis that could 
receive a positive evaluation. By selecting the relevant research design and 
instruments for examination and determination, this aspiration was achieved in 
the broadest sense and had some utility of purpose.  
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Chapter 4  
 
The impact of Islamophobia  
 
The role Islamaphobia has played within this discourse is an important feature 
of the analysis, both of the literature and the data gathered from the cohort 
groups. It is a central thread as it relates to the sample diaspora through the 
data collection and analysis of statements. It is these powerful contributions that 
have singly and collectively formed strong perceptions of discrimination towards 
the Pakistani British-born Muslim that is explored further here. 
 
A number of key elements form this sense of anti-Muslim feeling that 
proliferates into wider animosity and negative judgement of this minority, from 
many sections of the majority indigenous-origin community. These lines of 
expression relate strongly to a recurring theme in this thesis, that of having a 
sense of security and belonging. It reinforces and reflects the literature on 
transnational and hybrid identity of the transmigrant, referred to by Engbersen 
(2007). These strong feelings of the diaspora also fit into the paradigm of 
Orientalism stated by Said (1978) and, within that, the emphasis of adverse 
media representation of the Muslim as the ‘Other’, echoed by Poole (2002; 
Poole and Richardson, 2006) in her research of the British media’s articulation 
of the Muslim in Britain. This topic is addressed further later in this chapter.  
 
What the analysis reveals is that within many of the discussions with cohort 
members in private and within the space of this research, there is a sense of 
continued anxiety over their presence in Britain. This has been translated into 
what the researcher can only describe as the returning diaspora. Some 
respondents expressed the wish, in the one-to-one interviews and focus groups, 
to buy property, acquire land or other assets, or modernise existing residences 
built by their parents, in Pakistan. In addition, some spoke of taking up dual 
citizenship. What is articulated by some of the respondents, as reported in this 
chapter, signifies the insecurity and anxiety of current British Muslim life. This 
sentiment is particularly present among the male respondents, while for many 
females Britain remains as home and the most important place for raising their 
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children, providing them with a good education and ensuring a better future for 
their families. There is also, as will be explained later, a class difference in how 
belonging is reflected by the diaspora. Those who feel they have been denied 
vocational ambition in Britain are the keenest to seek an alternative life in 
Pakistan. This appears, for the researcher, to be an instant response to a 
complex problem, a passive affirmation of the discrimination they face without 
proactively challenging perceived inequalities and injustices.  
 
The focus of this chapter therefore is to undertake a causative analysis focus on 
employment and relations with the police as two examples of where the 
diaspora feel strongly that Islamophobia has had an impact and fed into a wider 
sense insecurity. The former relates to the lack of opportunity, with subjective 
analysis from indigenous-origin work colleagues in mainstream employment. 
Even the alternative of self-employment does not safeguard individuals from 
anti-Muslim sentiment, as will be illustrated through a specific trade (taxi driving) 
favoured by male respondents in this study.  
 
Relationships with the police also create immense feelings and displeasure that 
for many reinforce their depiction of the ‘Other’ in their own country through the 
abuse of power and specific legislation. However, both employment and 
relations with police fit within the wider context of media representations that 
relate to the fear of Islam, its militancy and its followers, corresponding to the 
‘war on terror’, the continual subtext that impacts on this diaspora. It is 
evidenced in what is referred to in this chapter as the perception by the majority 
population of an ‘acceptance of extremism’. It creates further animosity towards 
them because they – the diaspora – are not seen as speaking out against 
‘Islamic militancy’ and are therefore viewed by non-Muslims as potential traitors 
in their midst.  
 
This is continually emphasised, in the view of the diaspora, as the increasing 
visualisation of British Muslims, regardless of their ethnic disposition, as one 
homogenous grouping opposed to the values of Western society, representing 
a potential internal threat to the security of the nation. This, in turn, perpetuates 
the discrimination and Islamophobia felt by the respondents that exacerbates 
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their sense of a lack of territorial security and personal safety as citizens.  
  
At the outset, the researcher believes it useful and important to define the term 
Islamophobia before considering the issue of wider discrimination and 
safeguards within the British legal context.  
 
The Runnymede Trust has since 1968 promoted a sense of civic friendship and 
shared identity, and is one of the most prominent and well respected 
independent bodies working on issues of race. Its Commission on Islamophobia 
was at the vanguard of researching and defining the idea of anti-Muslim feeling 
in Britain, if not the West as a whole. A consultation paper released in 1996 
outlined some of the key concerns and concepts related to the strong “feelings 
of prejudice and discrimination felt by Muslims in everyday life” (Runnymede 
Trust, 1997, p.2). The initial announcement and public discussions were in 
themselves much of a focus for the media. The Commission trained a spotlight 
onto an element of discrimination that was moving away from racial prejudice to 
the beginnings and acknowledgment of cultural racism, whereby religion and 
culture (rather than origin or colour) constituted the most important signifiers of 
racialisation as recorded by Asad (1990), quoted by Silverman and Yuval-Davis 
(1999, p.8).  
 
The Runnymede Trust report produced a year later articulated wider issues and 
concerns of Muslims related to their religious and cultural identity, which, the 
majority of their fellow British citizens saw as a threat to their own liberal value 
base. Although not a publicly funded inquiry, such as MacPherson (Home 
Office, 1999), which defined institutional racism, the Runnymede report did 
carry the gravitas of a reputable assessment, analysis and recommendation by 
the body conducting the investigation. Like Macpherson, therefore, it allowed a 
specific minority community to have validated specific perceptions and feelings 
of animosity against them, and to have them recognised as part of the 
discrimination and bigotry they encountered in everyday British society. Such 
findings have echoes in Lea’s (2000) analysis of the impact of indirect 
discrimination that used Macpherson’s definition of institutional racism as a 
basis of enquiry. 
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Since then, Islamophobia has been widely recognised. It has also been railed 
against and reviled as a catch-all challenge to liberal thought and free speech 
(Poole, 2002). The term has global reach and implications, as evident from the 
work on Islamophobia in America by Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008), for 
instance, within the media and public domain. They refer to the concept as 
‘social anxiety towards Islam and Muslim cultures that is largely unexamined by, 
yet deeply ingrained in, Americans’ (p.5). Furthermore, within the wider body of 
psychological conditions that arise from terrible and damaging experiences, 
Islamophobia differs in that, ‘this phobia results for most, from distant social 
experiences that mainstream American [and other] culture has perpetuated in 
popular memory, which are in turn buttressed by a similar understanding of 
current events’ (ibid., p.5). This sense of, what can only be described as 
mainstream cognitive dissonance has therefore filtered into daily interactions 
between Muslims and non-Muslims that, as stated above, include media 
representation, visualisation, framing and suspicion of the outsider through 
stereotyping and prejudices against the Orient.  
 
The importance of these definitions is that the concept of Islamophobia is an 
international phenomenon that has grown rapidly within current international 
political discourse, and that it has implications for people of transnational 
identities. The Pakistani diaspora is one such group and therefore the wider 
global ramifications and repercussions of Islamophobia are present in the 
British context.  
 
The strong sense of cultural racism that seems to be ever present in society is 
leading to a much deeper feeling of separation, alienation and of discomfort, 
that are evidenced by the data and analysis of the sample of the diaspora in this 
study. This reflects the literature of Poole (2002), Ramadan (2006), Modood 
(2010), and Samad (2013). It relates to a strong sense of racialisation and 
cultural demonisation that is often evident of racial minorities, as referred in the 
literature by hooks (1995) and Dabashi (2008).  
  
Current discourses on the clash of civilisations, based on cultural and religious 
128 
 
fault lines and superiority, are also entrenched in historical depictions of the 
‘Other’ and, in particular in the West, of what is seen as the backward and 
inferior Muslim. This is evident in, for example, the writings of Matthews (1926), 
who refers, much earlier, to a clash of civilisations of the inferior Arab and the 
superior Western traveller. It is these legacies of racialisation that continue 
within new means of communication, such as global media, that are intricately 
linked to power and capital. This is reflected upon by the respondents as 
present in the worldwide quest for mineral resources. In an international sense, 
it reflects Sardar’s (1999) description of neo-Orientalism at play against specific 
non-compliant nations, supported by mass media as a vehicle to promulgate 
and visually enhance this message. At a more local level, it then translates into 
what Al-Azm (1981) has referred to as ‘ideological superstructures with an 
apparatus of complicated assumptions’ (p.5) that feed into daily anti-Muslim 
feelings in the mass of the population that then perpetuate what is reflected by 
Ramadan (2006) as Islamic racism. 
 
In analysing the research data, these issues are significant. Even though the 
two cities in this study retain separate characteristics, the participants echo 
similar sentiments about the complexity and dichotomy of their lives in an often 
hostile landscape.  
 
For instance, in Luton, robust inner city dynamics have created a strong right-
wing political backlash personified by the creation and emergence in that city of 
the English Defence League (EDL). The EDL is openly Islamophobic, seeking 
to counter what it views as the Islamisation of British cities (Az & Mo 
Productions, 2012). This has had a profound impact on the cohort groups within 
Luton and caused much unease within the Muslim community that will be 
discussed later. Oxford, on the other hand, does not have this overtly anti-
Muslim atmosphere, but retains a less volatile political temperament familiar to 
its much smaller but widely diverse Muslim population. However, cohort group 
members shared similar experiences bonded by culture and transnational 
identity as a consequence of their daily perceptions of anti-Muslim sentiment, 
translated into much wider discrimination, resulting in a need for constant 
assessment and reassessment of their status in Britain. This experience reflects 
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what Poole has described as the ‘race reporting and religious representation’ 
(2002, p.28) that is so damaging to the diaspora. It is articulated in this 
comment made in the focus group discussions that took place on this issue: 
 
‘Someone will talk about Islam or say something and it might be racist, 
then they try to defend it by saying, “Sorry mate I’m not English too”, to 
justify their comments. Then they will start to make stupid amends by 
saying “But you speak proper English and do not wear a turban like the 
Taliban”. You end up getting vexed [angry].’  
young Pakistani male, Luton. 
 
In addition there was increasing alarm among the sample diaspora at the 
grouping of the diverse range of Muslims with differing nationalities and spiritual 
beliefs as one homogenous global brand. The media has contributed to this 
practice of discrimination, as reflected by Sardar (2006) and Poole (ibid., p.21), 
as the continual focus on communities viewed as challenging, which then 
engenders negative views and stereotyping that, in turn, regularise attitudes of 
the majority against the minority. This was not been lost on the diaspora 
contributing to this study as commented upon below: 
 
‘Inside it makes me feel that, especially as Muslims, I don’t think the 
media understands the religion if you are a Muslim. Islam, the way we 
are portrayed in the media is completely wrong, especially on the BBC. I 
think the way they pick and choose their words is very bad, especially 
from the current politicians. I think instead of bringing people together in 
this country it’s causing more divides. I can’t remember this happening 
ten years ago. This I would say is more or less in the last eight years, 
before that no problems. That is not just my feeling, that is the feeling 
with quite a few Muslims, whether they be Pakistani, Somalis, Chinese, 
African, they all feel very similar, in that we are marginalised and in a 
way labelled.’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
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‘You know the media is being biased, why? You’re watching, you don’t 
actually click on they’re doing it, do you understand? It’s so powerful the 
way they put the message across, you will be, like, or alright, so this is 
happening, alright, and then you will go somewhere else and someone 
else will be saying something different, then you start thinking, hold on, 
one news source is saying something so you start looking into it, then 
you finally realise there are four news sources saying the same thing and 
there is one on one side like with BBC and Sky and they’re on one side 
saying something different. You realise they are being biased. That is 
how powerful the media is, even we’re saying they’re biased, sometimes 
we be watching we won’t be realise they be biased. It’s the way the 
media is to us, to be honest.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
‘Well, everyone seems to think with the media, even if it’s not right. They 
tend to send a signal out there, yeah. It’s Muslims who are like this, and 
then you are looking at yourself as one individual person, but they are 
looking at you as one community, as Muslims, all Muslims are terrorists 
according to them.’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
In such circumstances, many of those interviewed felt their membership of 
mainstream society was continually eroded by subjective framing, based on 
their religious and cultural identity, rather than their status as British citizens. 
For many, a strong correlation was made between what was viewed in the 
media and what was reflected back at them through work and in daily 
interactions. This was summed up in this comment typical of the view held by 
many of the respondents interviewed: 
 
 ‘Most of the racists and anti-Muslims, they believe everything they see 
or read, I mean they don’t even question whether it is true or not.’ 
 
Punjabi female, Luton. 
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There was a consensus amongst the interviewees in both sites and across 
genders, about what was perceived as the real ignorance of many of the 
indigenous-origin communities concerning Islam. Many participants concluded, 
after much debate, that this was typical of many populations in Europe whose 
interpretations of Islam were viewed through the mass media. The daily 
coverage provided in news channels and newspapers was not favourable 
towards Islam as a whole or for Muslim communities in Western countries. This 
was despite the existence of legal measures that tackle elements of 
discrimination, making it unlawful. 
 
 
4.1 Discrimination and legislation  
 
It is important, therefore, to review more closely how the present legal 
frameworks relate to this diaspora’s perceptions and, for example, to the wider 
issues of tackling discrimination within employment. This also relates to the 
issue of minority rights as set out by Kymlicka (1995) and in chapters 1 and 2 
above, in what the researcher has described as neo-societal culture and the 
importance of legal safeguards for minority communities.  
 
Discrimination is defined by the United Nations as less favourable treatment of 
persons (UN, 2001). This treatment can limit the rights of an individual or 
groups to opportunities, often due to attributed rather than actual 
characteristics. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2001) 
recognises that discrimination develops when groups of people encounter 
strangers, or rather it involves being presented as the ‘Other’. 
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union adopted in 2000 
stipulates that any discrimination based on grounds such as sex, race, colour, 
ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or 
any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, 
age or sexual orientation, shall be prohibited (EU, 2000, article 21).  
 
In Britain, discrimination, direct and indirect terms, is defined within the Equality 
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Act 2010 (HMSO, 2010) as occurring where an individual is treated less 
favourably, either overtly or in subtle forms that often exist through custom and 
practice. These may be based on traditions that include attending the pub after 
work or buying gifts at Christmas, for instance.  
 
Early race legislation was placed on the statute book as a response to racial 
discrimination against black and minority ethnic immigrants in housing and 
services. Thirty years later, the murder of a black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, 
in London led to an amendment to the Race Relations Act, following a landmark 
public inquiry (Home Office, 1999) that defined institutional racism as a barrier 
to advancement and access to employment and equal treatment in public 
services. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000) was a central piece of 
primary legislation that enshrined a level of minority rights in public service 
provision. It gave the then Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) strong powers 
of investigation and to make a statutory order to take action to tackle racial 
discrimination. The creation of the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC), followed by the Equality Act of 2010, dissolved the CRE and its powers 
into a new single equality regulatory body.  
 
Although this section is not a detailed critique of the changes in equality 
legislation or the reconstitution of bodies enforcing the Acts, many have 
criticised the lack of performance of the EHRC in addressing race equality in 
practice and principle (Hepple, 2010). There is a belief, as outlined by Hepple 
(2010), that there has been constant political undermining of that body, which 
has led to a sustained deterioration in confidence in it among the communities 
themselves. This is signified in the diaspora by their lack of confidence in legal 
redress for their experiences and perceptions of discrimination. Most 
importantly, concerns relate to how cultural racism, most significantly 
Islamophobia can be challenged.  
 
However, recent attempts to amend legislation to reflect hostility to Islam and 
Muslims have been opposed, for instance the blasphemy legislation or tackling 
anti-Muslim hatred. For many, such changes are anathema to British liberal 
values, as is argued by some in the arts and entertainment community led by 
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the comedian, Rowan Atkinson in 2004 (BBC News, 2004b), reinforced by the 
media (Poole, 2002). Current discrimination legislation would seem not to 
protect Muslims from Islamophobia, placing them at a risk of anti-Muslim 
sentiments from the media and press generally. The current equality legislation, 
including the public duties on religion, would seem to address this anomaly in 
that the Equality Act (2010) has religion as a protected characteristic and within 
that covers Islam and a requirement not to discriminate against Muslims. 
However, the Act only refers to the provision of goods and services, not speech 
or expression. As one respondent put it: 
 
 ‘We can have laws to protect other religions but for Muslims it becomes 
 about freedom of speech, this is so hypocritical.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
  
These laws do not fulfil a need to quell wider issues of anti-Muslim sentiments 
expressed specifically within the realm of mass media. Even with the Leveson 
Inquiry (2012) challenging media intrusion, there is little emphasis placed on 
Muslim concerns. These issues would seem only to exacerbate wider elements 
of inequality that have an adverse impact on the Pakistani diaspora itself, 
leading to visible forms of prejudice as discussed below.  
 
 
4.2 Employment discrimination  
 
Inevitably, these feelings of the participants in the research fed into a wider and 
deep-rooted anxiety that many felt manifested itself through extended forms of 
discrimination. The role this played in employment was seen by many as a 
worrying trend that was becoming much sharper given the economic downturn. 
It was perceived in a lack of opportunities for the Pakistani male that also 
signified a higher rate of unemployment within this group than for their 
indigenous-origin and some other ethnic counterparts. This is recorded by 
official Cabinet Office figures in 2010 and by analysis conducted by Simpson et 
al. (2006). Inevitably, as Poole (2002) has argued, this leads to further exclusion 
from society and deeper disempowerment, which the researcher would argue is 
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echoed in the diaspora, through compounded exclusion and discrimination. The 
danger is that these perceptions become self-fulfilling prophecies that limit the 
ability to move beyond the exclusions and are manifest in an internalised 
anxiety that then further exacerbates individual concerns and lack of esteem. 
 
Most recent evidence reinforces this concern (All Party Parliamentary Group on 
Race and Community, 2012). In particular, this emphasised discrimination 
against Muslim women seeking employment. Black, Pakistani and Bangladeshi-
heritage women faced higher levels of discrimination than their male 
counterparts. In some examples, Muslim women even changed their 
appearance in order to conform and obtain employment, and one witness 
changed her Muslim-sounding name to the same end. In the present study, 
men too have provided similar biographies, many believing that their Islamic 
name associates them with images of terrorism and negative stereotyping of 
Muslims in the wider social and political arena. Given the relatively high 
Pakistani presence in the young generation emphasised in the statistical 
demography of Britain, this is alarming for the future.  
 
In the cohort groups, there was a powerful range of contributions made on this 
subject that again signified concern about future employability. The discussions 
in the research also led many participants to reflect on the experiences of their 
parents on arrival into Britain and the racism they often spoke of encountering in 
society. 
 
 ‘My dad always told me about incidents where they were not respected   
 at work and white managers in the mills spoke to them in a racist way   
 like “curry man” or something else rude, when they could not pronounce   
 their names.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
For numerous members of the diaspora of working age, employment is an 
important daily interaction between individuals in society. Apart from providing 
monetary value, it can also give mental stimulation and create a sense of 
fulfilment within a daily structure that promotes individual wellbeing and wider 
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economic inclusion. This has been highlighted within national strategic thinking, 
as emphasised in the work of Lord Layard (2013) assessing the economic cost 
of unemployment weighed against prevalence of depression and anxiety. It 
provides much credible evidence concerning the relationship between good 
mental health and work.  
 
Although there is not much significant unemployment data available for specific 
ethnic groups, overall data for black and minority ethnic unemployment is 
recorded at 18.2%, higher than the national average for Caucasians (Perton, 
2012). Discrimination in relation to employment has an impact on an individual’s 
health and wellbeing. It could be argued, therefore, given the epidemiology of 
mental health issues, that the diaspora would have a higher incidence of poor 
mental health. This is significantly reflected within Patel and Heginbotham 
(2007) amongst others.  
 
For the respondents, in their personal assessments and testimonials about 
employment, there was a clear and continual association between consumption 
of the media and how they perceived they were viewed in the external world. 
This manifested itself in what can only be described as internalised anxiety, 
usually invisible to the public eye but that became visible in this study and these 
exchanges as one recorded here: 
 
 ‘It gets you down. You fill in so many applications and don’t even   
 get one interview. I mean it really stresses you out when you think   
 it’s because of your name.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
The participants revealed practice that was discriminatory even within relevant 
legislation, which is intended to provide equality of opportunity for all. Yet in this 
case, the individual’s Muslim characteristic and persona were subjected to 
specific subjective examination, explored as part of these formal and objective 
processes. Most participants recounting their experiences in this study 
concluded that this situation arose because of media depictions of Muslims. 
Irrelevant connections were made with the name of the Prophet, on occasions 
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much covered in the press, as exemplified in the Danish cartoon incident in 
2005. This direct correlation made has been supported in the work of 
Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) in linking Islamophobia and the role of the 
media in negative representations during this specific episode. It is also 
reflected within the work of Downing and Husband (2005) signifying the 
representation of the ‘Other’ within racial framing that also reinforces negative 
realities of Muslims in wider society.  
 
It is important to recognise that having a working career was vital to the 
diaspora, as became evident within the dialogues in this section. Many of the 
respondents, around 60%, felt that fitting into wider society and achieving 
acceptance would come through the workplace with interactions between them 
and the indigenous--origin communities, even though this meant encountering 
animosity towards them from some fellow workers. This mirrors recent work by 
Nandi and Platt (2013) on Muslim identity in Britain that outlines how Muslims 
are perceived negatively by fellow employees. The issue was seen by many 
participants as an increasing challenge in itself for those already in work: there 
was also a feeling of strong resentment concerning how they were viewed by 
some of their, predominantly white, colleagues. A graduate professional working 
for a government agency stated: 
 
 ‘You think these are supposed to be educated people you work with, but   
 they come out with some idiotic things, like, “Do you hate white people or 
 the West?” or they ask you about how some Muslims treat women to try   
 to catch you out.’ 
Pukhtoon male Oxford  
 
These issues inform the pursuit of and need for self-employment and the setting 
up of small businesses that are monocultural and serve the local community. 
This is an option preferred to working for a potentially discriminating employer 
as perceived by the cohort groups. However, this approach can by default 
easily reinforce further alienation and separateness, if not disenfranchisement 
from mainstream economic, social and political life. This has partly been 
reflected by Chang (2010) in his work on Asian Americans in urban settings in 
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the United States. The Luton interviewees spoke of this as the realism of the 
city, an attitude paralleled, on a smaller scale, by the respondents in Oxford.  
 
These sentiments highlight the tensions that exist between communities within 
a diverse demographic base, as in many disadvantaged cities. The campaigns 
of the EDL reinforce this view with the vilification of Islam, which is of great 
concern to the diaspora. Such tension is demonstrated in newspapers such as 
the Daily Mail (Levy, 2010) in the use of emotive language in the reporting of 
Muslims in Luton, for instance. 
 
The EDL was of particular concern to the Luton cohort group members, who felt 
their presence more strongly than the Oxford participants did. This was not 
surprising, given the rise of the organisation within that city and the anti-Muslim 
activity consequently and frequently displayed to local residents. Many 
participants spoke of constantly being vigilant in public, given the air of concern 
and animosity created by the EDL in the town. They felt that there was much 
sympathy for the extreme viewpoints of this body that consequently impacted 
on their employment and other prospects in the city. They also viewed as 
hypocritical the media who personified Muslim extremism as the only threat to 
social order in Britain. Although the males were more vociferous in this segment 
of the debate, in these discussions there was not much discrepancy between 
the sexes, with both men and women raising concerns of an equal nature. They 
include the following: 
 
 ‘You really get nervous when out with your kids and in a white area 
 because you think they may be EDL supporters, especially if you are 
 wearing a hijab.’ 
Punjabi woman, Luton 
 
 ‘You don’t want to be walking home late at night because some drunk  
 guys might abuse you in the city centre. Some of my friends have been 
 called racist names and they were sure they were EDL.’ 
Pakistani male, Luton  
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Some of the women in Luton spoke of their concerns about being visible 
through wearing the hijab at work and did not know if work colleagues were 
sympathisers of the EDL, particularly when anti-Muslim comments were made 
amongst indigenous-origin colleagues. One spoke of how demonstrations by 
the EDL in the city also made her children anxious, with one child asking 
repeatedly why they hated Muslims so much. The women, as mothers, 
collectively felt the anxiety of their families, and their children specifically, in 
daily interactions with the predominately white community at school and in 
public spaces, particularly after the murder of the British soldier Lee Rigby in 
Woolwich (BBC News, 2013) and previous incidents recorded by the Institute 
for Race Relation (Fekete, 2011a). Attacks on mosques and other acts showed 
how Lee Rigby’s death was exploited by far right extremist parties such as the 
British National Party and English Defence League (Walker, Taylor and 
Siddiqui, 2013). The researcher would offer caution as the term ‘white’ covers a 
large and diverse British population and that perceptions of fear amongst cohort 
members need to be set in context of the situation.  There are of course a 
minority of people from the indigenous community who subscribe to the views of 
extremist parties and groups.  
 
This was echoed in this comment: 
 
 ‘It really frightened me when that soldier got murdered and then those   
 groups started demonstrating and even attacking mosques. I was scared 
 to go out because someone might swear at me in the street.’ 
Pakistani woman, Luton  
 
The female respondents gave much insight into their perceptions and feelings 
of living in a city such as Luton with these tensions constantly in the background 
Their accounts correlate with the findings of the British Social Attitudes Survey 
(Clements, 2011) about attitudes towards Muslims, which that give rise to 
further apprehension within the diaspora concerning their present and future 
role and presence in Britain. This issue of acceptance is clearly linked to a 
sense of belonging by respondents in both Oxford and Luton that was apparent 
in the data collection and subsequent analysis. It reflects the work of Engbersen 
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(2007) in similarities with his work on the Turkish diaspora in Germany, where a 
strong sense of security translates into a stronger sense of belonging. It is this 
essential need for validation that is important to the Pakistani diaspora; in many 
of their eyes, it gives them the sense of a legitimacy of presence. There is a 
strong fear that media depictions of Muslims, by contract, reinforce a sense of 
illegitimacy of belonging and being British.  
 
Time and time again, for this sample diaspora, issues of racism and 
Islamophobia are seen as inspired by the media. This is also illustrated by 
findings from sources such as the Muslim Council of Britain (2014) and 
expanded upon by Kundani (2014). It is the continual extension of being seen 
as the ‘Other’ that then reinforces a constant negotiating of identity and 
belonging, despite their status of being British-born.  
 
Within these experiences, among female participants there were also those who 
spoke of being more liberated and Westernised in their outlook, signifying a 
more modernist and free minded independent spirit, compared with their fellow 
Muslim women. As recorded earlier in the findings of the Runnymede Trust and 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Race and Community (2012), the choice of 
Western or Eastern clothing played a role in depicting this sense of fashion-
conscious British Muslim women and aided their low visibility in wider society.  
 
Female participants spoke of their pragmatic approach to conformity in the 
adoption of Eastern or Western traditions of dress being utilised for employment 
prospects, indicated in these statements: 
 
 ‘This might sound silly, but I try not to look Muslim and just wear trousers   
 and a smart top to work. I even Westernise my name at work so people   
 don’t think I am Muslim, otherwise it will be a pain working there.’ 
Pakistani female, Luton  
 
 ‘I am very Westernised at work just to get on with people. It saves all the   
 Hassle, really.’ 
Pakistani female, Luton  
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This mirrored the findings of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Race and 
Community hearings (2012). However, some female participants concluded 
that, after much experimenting and experience, they still felt subject to the 
prejudice that was inevitably associated with their names and identity. This 
continually reinforced the widely held view of Luton cohort members that the city 
itself was full of prejudice. 
 
As a consequence, London as an employment hub was therefore more 
appealing, given the open diversity reflected within the majority of workplaces, 
compared with continued marginalisation due to the lack of opportunities 
afforded within the mainstream labour market in their home city.  
 
Experience of direct encounters with anti-Muslim feeling in an area of 
employment is explored further below in respect to a specific group of the 
respondents, taxi drivers in Oxford. 
 
 
4.3 Views of direct discrimination   
 
The cohort group members felt that direct and indirect forms of malicious 
behaviour that presently go unchallenged required addressing. Such behaviour 
was viewed as continually feeding into media scapegoating of British Pakistani 
Muslims for the elements of extremism in Islam. This personification of the 
prevailing media imagery and press discourse in the West echoes the work of 
Bourdieu (1977), Conte (2001) and Dabashi (2008) amongst others, who speak 
of the powerful constructs that result as a consequence of this imagery. The 
primary fact remains within this analysis, that through the personification of the 
global war on terror, many of the diaspora highlight feelings of insecurity and an 
avenue to eradicate discrimination. The visual symbolism of Islam, such as the 
wearing of traditional clothes and having a beard, are subject to constant 
animosity. One respondent relayed his experience of visiting a market town 
near Oxford. He was visible by his beard, which he assumed to be the reason 
for someone shouting out the word ‘terrorist’ as he walked by. He naturally felt 
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that media depictions had played a role in this open display of hatred and 
bigotry. Others spoke of being ignored in stores in shopping centres after the 
attacks in New York and London, specifically. As they cited personal examples 
they believed were the realities of their daily lives, many felt that such direct and 
indirect forms of discrimination were experienced by Muslims of the diaspora 
generally.  
 
Probing this further, some perceived an anti-Muslim threat in the expressions 
and behaviour of local indigenous-origin people they had met and what they felt 
was characteristic of their behaviour towards them in public, such as the way 
they were being stared at, or spoken to in a certain shop. Some of these non-
verbal communications may be interpreted in a number of ways. However, 
given the context at the time, it would seem more than plausible that genuine 
hostility towards was being expressed towards this group, given their 
observance of traditional cultural norms, especially highly visible clothing which 
they felt would protect their modesty and support Islamic observance, as 
numerous women did.  
 
A reluctance to report or speak up was not limited to the male respondents. It 
was equally felt by some of the Pukhtoon women, who spoke of isolating 
themselves at home due to the indirect prejudice felt when out shopping. Many 
had thought Oxford to be safer, given its international reputation and student 
make-up from around the world, yet there was still unease, as this comment 
illustrates: 
 
 ‘There are parts of Oxford I would not go to as you can tell I might be   
 sworn at, I see it in their eyes when I get the bus home and you get really 
 dirty looks from some of the people who live on the estates.’ 
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
The comment referred to above were also attributable to a wider group of the 
Pukhtoon inhabitants. Men were particularly incensed by their treatment, but 
more so by the attitude displayed towards their spouses, mothers and sisters as 
they undertook a simple role such as shopping in a supermarket. There was 
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much more sensitivity within this group of males about how the women were 
treated, which also signified a sense of responsibility in protecting the family 
from any criticism or ill-feeling. This may also denote the strong sense of 
traditional values of the Pukhtoon in regard to gender roles within their 
communities and more conservative observance of cultural, if not Islamic, 
customs and norms. 
 
For the Punjabi community in the Luton cohort, there were similar experiences 
although with a different intensity, given the rise of the EDL and given the much 
larger Pakistani population base in the city. These were explored earlier in order 
to provide some focus on the reality of life, but it is significant to note the level of 
direct and indirect discrimination and stereotyping faced by contributors in this 
research study. It is also interesting to note the passive nature of participants 
who, on many occasions, silently accepted the level of hostility displayed in the 
comments recorded.  
 
In respect to gender variations, there were no major discrepancies in the 
opinion formed by the two sexes. There was unanimity within the sexes with 
regard to news reports they viewed on the main terrestrial channels or Sky 
News. Women, like the men, felt strongly that British media provided a 
misleading representation of the Pakistani Muslim population through imagery 
and depiction of what they often described as the fundamentalist element within 
the community, and so smearing the wider diaspora community. 
 
As one respondent stated, 
 
“The impact creates a frustration in me. I don’t have much faith in the 
media. Some of the information I believe is hearsay, media not the same 
as before, creates more misunderstanding amongst people about us 
Pakistanis.’ 
 Punjabi male, Luton 
 
Some felt this prevailing attitude explained some of the animosity levelled 
against them both in the public arena and in much of the commentary in society, 
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often displayed in newspaper articles and wider press.  
 
In a similar way to the men, some women concluded that their passive 
presence within this society might encourage the dominant community to feel 
that they accepted the militancy of their faith: 
 
 ‘In Luton you feel it more sometimes when, say, a soldier is killed in 
Afghanistan who may be from here and the newspaper and local news 
carries a picture of him and of their family. I think people then look at us 
and hate us, really. They think that we are part of that same group of 
people in Afghanistan because they see people with beards or women in 
non-Western clothes.’ 
Punjabi woman, Luton 
 
Whether these self-assessed perceptions showed a heightened state of 
sensitivity due to the prevailing climate, was a question asked of the groups, in 
order to understand how these opinions were arrived at. Both sexes elaborated 
upon their feelings by connecting images and news stories and language used 
in the media reporting during tense periods in society, such as in the London 
bombings, and even during government warnings of an imminent threat. On 
these occasions and periods of insecurity, they felt the need to reassess their 
Pakistani inheritance and British Muslim identity. This indicates that such media 
reporting and subsequent societal views stated had a dire impact on this group.  
 
It was interesting to note in these discussions that there seemed to be no formal 
outlet for this sense of overwhelming discrimination that respondents described. 
Their silence and placid acceptance of such unfavourable treatment was a 
reflection of the deep malaise within this group. It was significant that there was 
no assertive response or challenge to this prejudice. However, it may be that 
this was more that they did not wish to exacerbate the situation by complaining 
or seeking remedy through legal structures, which they may consider as time-
consuming and not necessarily fruitful. It was also an important reflection of the 
lack of confidence in what they describe as the ‘system’ – public institutions, 
particularly the police, that also, as they viewed it, reinforce negative social and 
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political constructions of their presence in British society.  
 
The researcher believes that these issues of visibility were directly related to 
their cultural and religious identification and proximity to cities with large ethnic 
and specifically Muslim communities. However, although one would assume a 
higher prevalence and incidence in Luton, there were profound examples in 
Oxford, where the Pukhtoon, a minority within a minority, felt victim to direct 
prejudice. As mentioned earlier, the private car hire industry is one with a high 
proportion of Pakistani men working as self-employed drivers. The case of the 
Pukhtoon in Oxford was highlighted in the following short case study of the 
impact of cultural racism that many drivers come across on a day-to-day basis 
in their work.  
 
As an occupation, car hire driving allows members of the diaspora to meet as 
customers many indigenous-origin people from all walks of life. This is 
particularly the case when most customers seem to be inebriated following 
nights out and are more talkative and willing to engage in honest, albeit stilted, 
conversation with their drivers. The same may be the case with hackney 
carriage drivers in Luton. However, they did not form a significant part of the 
cohort group in that city involved in the fieldwork during the data collection 
period of the research. To the driver respondents in Oxford, the experience at 
work offered a barometer of feeling towards Muslims in Britain generally. It also 
gave them the opportunity to witness, at first hand, the prevailing debates 
related to topical news items that aired in mainstream media. The following 
collection of statements highlights the respondents’ wider concerns and 
represents only a small number of contributions made by cohort members. The 
statements also signify the unease of the respondents during these exchanges 
that could have profound repercussions on their income and their chosen 
employment. They manifest the level of direct discrimination felt by some 
respondents and are therefore valuable to record in this manner. 
 
Respondent 1 
 
‘Some of the customers when they come into our cars [taxis] they don’t 
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think we are Pakistani or Asian as our skin is much less dark than say 
some of the other Pakistanis you see in Oxford. They then start talking to 
you about those “Pakis” and start saying that Muslims are against white 
people and don’t deserve to get jobs in this country. I just sit there silently 
not wanting to argue with a passenger, you don’t know what might 
happen. I would say something if it was really bad, I wouldn’t stand for 
that.’  
 
Respondent 2 
 
‘I’m a taxi driver. Like say, for instance, someone gets in the car and then 
ask how you are this and that, think I’m English because I’m quite light 
skinned, they’d be going on about the Muslims, doing this and terrorists 
are doing this and that and you tell them, “Oh, I’m actually like Asian from 
Pakistan”, and so on, they start talking to you differently and stuff like 
that, the first thing they say is, “Oh we not racist we've got plenty of black 
friends…” ’  
 
It is clear from these exchanges that members of the British white community in 
these scenarios misjudged the person to whom they were relating their own 
viewpoints.  
 
Many of the respondents in these situations felt disadvantaged in not being able 
to respond adequately to these stereotypes and false representations. Some 
focus group members spoke of not only their sense of vulnerability in these 
situations, but of the need for passive discipline to avoid any potential for 
conflict with a customer that would result in a complaint to the taxi licensing 
authorities, and a potential loss of their private hire licence. Many felt this to be 
a double-edged sword that not only subjected them to personal forms of cultural 
racism from clients, but also the potential for institutional discrimination from the 
local regulator, who would most likely side with the complainants. This would 
only add to the anxiety these respondents would feel on a daily basis in these 
situations, which are not only complex but also potentially violent. There were, 
of course, more openly hostile statements made by patrons within such 
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confined spaces that on occasions created much unease.  
 
Respondent 3 
 
 ‘I have had customers that say, “What is your motive in this country?”’  
 I said, “What you mean?” 
“You’re a Pakistani?” 
“Yeah, but I’m a British Pakistani. I was born in this country, this is my 
country as well.” 
“Oh, no, what is your motive here, why are you here?”  
You know these kind of questions, you don’t even know what to say, you 
don’t know how to answer them, you just think, “What shall I say to you”, 
‘cos if you get someone come on the racist vibe particularly in my job, 
then you have to be careful.’  
 
It also became apparent in the focus group discussions that those working in 
this field, who had to face such harmful and prejudicial comments, would not 
report these incidents to the police or anyone else. They felt no one would 
believe them against a white person making such statements who, if presented 
with these allegations, would deny them. In this scenario, many felt they knew 
who would be believed. The researcher pursued further this line of investigation 
and the responses revealed a lack of trust in the police which will be addressed 
in the next section of this chapter. It provides some relevance to the statistical 
evidence provided in Chapter 2 that highlighted the over-representation of 
people of colour within the criminal justice system as a whole. 
 
 
4.4 The police and discrimination  
 
In essence, the personal familiarity of members of Britain’s ethnic minorities 
with the police service does not endear the agents of law and order to them, nor 
does it encourage then to seek solace in the law itself. Past experiences 
reinforce a sense of mistrust in what they see as yet another agency of state, 
principally associated with their sense of injustice. This is clearly reflected in the 
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Macpherson report (Home Office, 1999) and within the literature in Quinton et 
al. (2000), McQuail (2005), Sharp and Atherton (2007), which defines the close 
relationships between state, law enforcement and the media. Again, the 
Leveson Inquiry (2012) provides further insight into this mosaic of relationships 
that seem to be interdependent and in need of further focus. The experiences 
with the police also directly link into the literature related to the ‘war on terror’ 
and anti-terror legislation, which have resulted in the anxiety based on daily 
experiences and interactions with law enforcement. It is yet another essential 
element of the perceptions of wider discrimination felt by the diaspora as 
analysed through this investigation and need further explaining as a 
consequence.  
 
The ever-increasing rise in the Muslim population in custodial establishments 
signified in the work of the prison inspectorate (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 
2013) is useful to reference here. It bears out the concerns expressed by 
participants in the research about overzealous policing and use of stop and 
search under terrorism and other powers, as studied by the IRR (Fekete, 
2011b). Again this has to be set within the wider context of current policy 
frameworks and strategic thinking on anti-terrorism, community cohesion and 
curbing radicalisation which, collectively, have had implications and a profound 
impact on cohort members. This is exemplified by the following statement of 
how respondents see media reporting of crime overall: 
 
 ‘When a white person commits a crime, they don’t say he is white  or 
 Christian, but when it’s someone of colour, they say black and or Muslim, 
 just to highlight the person – you read it and see it all  the time”.’ 
 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
The statistical insight provided by the numbers of Asian people stopped and 
searched under these powers is revealing, particularly during times of high 
tension, because of heightened security, perceived threat or actual incident, 
reinforced by media speculation and interest. One such episode was the case 
of the ‘shoe bomber’, a nickname coined by the British press for Richard Reid, 
later sentenced in 2002 in the United States for attempting to blow up a jet 
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airliner with bombs hidden in his shoes (Elliott, 2002), which triggered a national 
state of high alert for possible copycat attacks.  
 
As stated earlier, it is this framing of specific racial minorities by mass media in 
this context that has been explored by Downing and Husband (2005), Conte, 
(2001, 2007), Goodman and Goodman (2006) and Korhan (2006) amongst 
others. Racialisation of Muslims has also followed in this trajectory of media 
representation, with the personification of the so-called ‘Islamic terrorist’. This 
has led to the increasing surveillance of Muslim youth and, in cities with large 
Pakistani communities, of groups of the Pakistani diaspora, as witnessed in 
Birmingham and reported in the Guardian newspaper (Lewis, 2010).  
 
The findings from the data analysis relate persistently with these narratives of 
the role of law enforcement in perpetuating a level of discrimination, as 
experienced by respondents and the wider diaspora. They also align to 
concerns of racial profiling. Many of the cohort group members felt the police 
were targeting them specifically for stop and search and being asked where 
they were intending to go to in the city. These perceived racially motivated stops 
were deemed also to be aggressive and intrusive. A constant related concern 
was how respondents felt about people from the majority community not being 
targeted based on their skin colour, an issue that caused much resentment.  
 
Individual experiences from both Luton and Oxford respondents were familiar to 
others in the cohort groups in both cities, emphasising a high degree of 
frustration amongst both communities. If one person was providing testimony of 
their experience, others in the focus groups would nod in agreement and 
unsolicited comments of “that’s awful, they shouldn't do that " would follow from 
others in the discussions who instantly empathised with fellow respondents. 
Each individual had their own story in this regard, whilst those who did not 
nevertheless knew of friends or family members who had gone through much of 
the same embarrassing exposure to what they considered as unwarranted 
prejudice against the Muslim. The prominence of this theme was evident in the 
one-to-one interviews where, once again, many felt their rights had been 
abused in order to promote an image of the police within the public mind of 
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being assertive in the face of faceless and hidden terrorist threats.  
 
Some of the respondents, relating to this specific issue in the research, argued 
that their experiences reflected numerous encounters with the police, not just 
one or two, where they were subject to degrading treatment in their eyes, in full 
gaze of predominantly white bystanders. Many felt that this was done on 
purpose to shame people of colour, in particular Muslims, with some feeling this 
approach was to make Muslims look inferior in front of the majority population. 
They concluded that they were only being stopped because of their race and 
culture and not because the police had a genuine reason to detain them in 
public places.  
 
There were also incidents where many felt persecuted by these powers when 
travelling in major cities such as London for work with other colleagues who 
were not identified as a person of colour. These specific incidents were not only 
highlighted as embarrassing but a flagrant violation of what they considered 
were their human rights, which often affected their professional credibility. 
 
One interviewee, a Pukhtoon male, recorded this experience during a work 
situation when travelling with Caucasian colleagues and being stopped by the 
police at a major railway station. He felt humiliated in front of his colleagues and 
felt the police officer was behaving inappropriately in stopping a ‘Muslim in a 
suit’ to make a point of it. He surmised that the police had not learnt from the 
Stephen Lawrence inquiry and that its recommendations had no profound 
impact on the police. He commented further in a one to one interview: 
 
“I felt so mad, it was so humiliating the way they ask you in front of other people 
to open your bag and ask you to take things out. I can see why some in our 
community hate the Police so much. I think he liked doing this it seemed to give 
him a kick asking a professional brown faced person like me in a suit. They are 
so full of themselves even after the beating they got over Stephen Lawrence” 
Pukhtoon male Oxford  
 
The alarming conclusions reached by interviewees who speak of such 
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interactions, is that they are considered as potential terrorists without an 
alternative rationale that might be plausible in these scenarios. Again, this plays 
into the heightened sensitivity of these cohort members that was indicative of 
the pressures they felt they were under at the time within the prevailing political 
and social context. Many of the respondents had spoken privately of the 
potential impact on their mental well-being precipitated by the level of pressure 
they felt upon them, in what they often described as the multi layers of 
oppression. Indeed, the testimonies of some of those participating in this work 
showed some indication of strain that they felt was a consequence of their 
experiences of discrimination related to their faith. 
 
The researcher cannot oversimplify or understate the status and strength of 
these remarks during a themed discussion that was promoted by cohort 
members in their own right. In one incident, a contributing taxi driver spoke of 
an example, where a police officer asked a private hire operator of Bangladeshi 
origin, ‘Where did you get the colour of your skin from?’ This specific anecdote 
had become a part of Oxford taxi folklore and symptomatic of the problems in 
trusting the police.  
 
In general, this was more of a preoccupation of the male members of the 
research groups than of the females, who had limited contact with law 
enforcement agencies and therefore did not reflect any obvious experiences, 
except in expressing concern over the issue, as it related to their spouses or 
male siblings, who had shared their fears.  
 
It would seem evident from these exchanges that there still seems a resistant 
culture of institutionalised racism within this high-profile public body. This is 
evidenced by ongoing investigations into the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) 
and a long-standing culture of racism within its ranks. A Guardian article 
(Mulholland, 2012) brought attention to 51 complaints of racism against the 
force in two months; this only contributes to the mistrust in minority ethnic 
communities. Additionally, more recent allegations have surfaced of the MPS 
infiltrating the Stephen Lawrence campaign members and finding evidence of 
political extremism within the work of the organisers. (Channel 4, 2014). 
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The racial and cultural profiling of individuals and groups is of much public 
concern, as articulated by Kundani (2014), for instance, as well as within this 
sample diaspora, group who personified the police as a partial agent-
provocateur. The expression provided in this short section relates to the work of 
Fekete (2006), which draws on the significance of racial profiling and its 
relationship to the ‘war on terror ‘as a political doctrine that has impacted on 
Muslims in Britain. For the researcher, the role of the police is also significant as 
it increased the low morale and anxiety of these communities during such 
episodes, which are continually disempowering and embarrassing under the 
public gaze.  
 
 
4.5 ‘Accepting of extremism’  
 
As a consequence of media influences, there existed in the minds of many of 
the respondents, a correlation between not speaking out against, and therefore 
in some way being seen as accepting extremism within their midst. It seemed to 
be exacerbated, in their view, by the political establishment, as this comment 
illustrates: 
 
 ‘The media work with the British and American governments to 
 promote an ideological message that puts Islam and Muslims as  the 
 enemy within, It then uses the Union Jack to promote a nationalist 
 message, uniting British people behind a threat of their own making. You 
 feel like you just don’t belong here’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
Society thus expects a more vociferous condemnation of what were perceived 
as Muslim-inspired extremism and terrorism.  
 
It could be regarded as a form of passive extremism through denial and failure 
to recognise its real impact. This is consequently seen as tacit agreement for 
the actions of those that perpetuate violence, whether at home or abroad. It 
corresponds with views held, for instance, by Patrick Basham on CBS News 
online, who exemplifies debate that openly questions the loyalty of British 
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Muslims. As he concludes one article, he remarks on where individuals of the 
diaspora show their allegiance, namely to other Muslims around the world.  
 
‘The UK embraced taxpayer-subsidised multiculturalism and has paid a 
very dear price, indeed. The result – cultural apartheid – has encouraged 
a significant number of Muslims to exhibit more loyalty to fellow Muslims 
outside of the UK than to their fellow Britons.’ (Basham, 2006) 
 
Such a view reinforces the belief in the homogeneity of the Muslim faith that 
reflects Poole’s (2002) study into media depiction of Islam as a monolithic 
structure that is mono-cultural rather than diverse in the make-up of its over 1 
billion followers. It is this prevailing view that continues the media myths that 
perpetuate the Islamaphobic discourse within the public sphere, a discourse 
that is mirrored in the views of the diaspora in the cohorts. 
 
Again, it was this thought process, so pervasive within the public media sphere 
that concerned cohort group’s members, as expressed in the debates in this 
investigation. They felt it apparent that such contributions in mainstream media 
were framed to achieve a clear divide between those of Muslim faith and 
majority society, that to all intents and purposes sought to affirm, if not reinforce, 
a differentiated status amongst these two groups of British citizenry. Many 
regarded it as further evidence of the cultural racialisation of the narrative that 
further fuelled scepticism that the media was being objective in reporting 
Muslims and Islam accurately or fairly. An added fear amongst the diaspora 
was that this critical and often forensic examination and suspicion of their right 
to belong had infected the main body-politic of the public sphere, which 
predominantly supported views held by Basham and countless others such as 
Haras Rafiq referred to in the Daily Mail (Black, 2007). The same concern is 
perhaps best characterised by Said’s (1997) reflections on the use of this 
‘cultural apparatus’ examined in his chapter focussing on media production (see 
Chapter 5). As stated there it is a process utilised by the mass media to frame 
these communities within this radicalised model of representation referred to by 
Poole (2002), Halliday (2006) amongst others.  
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Associated with this apprehension among participants were subsidiary concerns 
related to how Muslims are viewed by other minorities within their localities, who 
might share the mainstream viewpoint, given the vast coverage of militant Islam 
and attacks against Western targets. This was particularly an acute area for the 
two both cohorts given the ideology of the English Defence League, to target 
Islam rather than any other faith and cultural groups. In addition, it also played 
into the perceived lack of support for British soldiers fighting in Afghanistan that 
added to the self-fulfilling prophecy of disloyalty to the British state. In this 
context, the proximity and relevance of Afghanistan signified, for many Muslims 
of the sample diaspora, the personification of peoples connected to that region, 
Pakistanis in particular, as potential terrorists or sympathisers of such 
individuals. One respondent stated: 
 
 “Pakistan is always seen as terrorist central in the media, even in films   
            and dramas now. If you tell them at work you are going on holiday to       
 Pakistan they think you’re off to a training camp” 
Pakistani male Luton  
 
 Yet, despite their efforts to promote a specific Muslim threat, right-wing bodies 
perpetuated racist hate to all communities of colour and faith, as perpetrators 
could not differentiate between Sikh, Hindu or Muslim as distinct minorities, as 
reported by the Institute for Race Relations (IRR, 2005). 
 
All this added to what many participants assessed as a continuation of the 
media deceit, as articulated by one female member of the focus group: 
 
 ‘They keep playing the same images of Muslims, bombings, the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan killing innocent people and then they say we 
support them because we have some link because of our ancestry, it’s 
just lies and more lies.’  
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
This has also clearly been borne out by comments made by politicians and 
opinion formers criticising Muslim communities as well as, at some level, 
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Muslim leadership for not publicly speaking out against the fanatics amongst 
their midst. As this respondent stated: 
 
‘Politicians were perpetuating the anti-Muslim and anti-cultural messages 
that we were not playing our part as British citizens, by supporting the 
terrorism, not their wars [Iraq].’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
Such remarks were made by many including Tony Blair and advocated by some 
leader writers such as the political editor of the New Statesman, Mehdi Hasan 
(Hasan, 2011b). The onus has been on the Muslim population of Britain to 
actively distance itself from a perceived threat from those with whom they share 
a cultural and religious association. This caused much resentment amongst 
cohort group members, who assumed this to be a decisive test of their 
allegiance to Britain, if not Western values, that has been a preoccupation of the 
media and of the establishment. There were some in the groups who spoke of 
how many had spoken out but were often ignored as the media did not want to 
promote this element of the news story. They felt that no matter the frequency 
of their condemnations, they would be continually ignored and viewed in a less 
favourable light. This is also documented in the work of Gottschalk and 
Greenberg (2008) in their study of Muslim groups’ response to September 11. 
Despite proactively issuing press releases and comments opposing extremism 
and violence as anti-Islamic, American Muslim organisations have often been 
ignored by mainstream media outlets, who continually condemn their silence on 
Muslim violence.  
 
For the members of the diaspora taking part in this study, the major significant 
event in London related to terrorism placed them in a much-disliked spotlight for 
the media, politicians and wider society. The Luton cohort group members 
acutely felt this given the significance of the town as a staging post for the 
London suicide bombers. This period was seen to be the single most volatile 
moment for the diaspora in both cities, and brought home to many the dire 
relationship between their identity and that of the perpetrators of the London 
bombings, adding to their anxiety, as this comment highlights: 
155 
 
 
‘After the London bombings, we as Muslims were asked to condemn the 
terrorist, which we all did like everyone else in our minds and hearts but 
we had to show our anger out in the open, it was like telling us that if we 
didn’t we were in favour of what those people did in London’  
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
Another member of the group gave an example that preyed on many minds that 
corresponded with a widely held view of the duplicity of the values and 
freedoms politicians and media at large expressed in their statements:  
 
‘If anyone expressed an opinion that was not totally condemning the 
bombers or trying to rationalise the attacks, we were seen just as guilty 
as these people because we were seen as sympathisers even if we said 
that what they did was wrong. We were not allowed to have any other 
opinions, or even have a debate on the subject. So much for freedom of 
speech; it is totally different when Western people attack the prophet; 
total double standard.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
Another respondent commented:  
 
‘I was in London on the day when the bombings happened. It was awful 
and my heart went out to the families. We were all in this together as 
British people, but we were not made to feel like that, we’re always seen 
as separate.’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
For the researcher, this was evidence of a strong British identity that highlighted 
the abhorrence of the attacks on what many considered as their towns and 
cities, feeling as repulsed as any other citizen. This view was not often recorded 
within the wider mass media narratives on the subject or reporting and created 
a need for self-justification by some members of the diaspora interviewed and 
assessed through empirical data sources.  
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There was inner reflection on these issues by members of the diaspora who 
discussed this issue at length within the focus groups and that also indicated 
strength of feeling on this matter. Many in the discussions felt that during the 
height of the terrorist attacks by Irish republicans; Northern Irish Catholic’s 
supporting the Republican cause specifically, were not asked to engage in a 
process of self-blame or publically reminded to declare allegiance to Britain. 
Like the Muslim the Catholic population is not homogenous and similarly to 
followers of Islam, these ’terrorists’ who practiced Catholicism were small in 
relation to the global community of faith. This guilt by association was seen as 
hypocritical and demeaning to the Muslim community at large. Such parallels 
were not only important for the diaspora to make but essential in rationalising 
the differentials made between various monolithic faiths of the world. The 
conclusion was that the standard set for Islam was, in their minds, arbitrary and 
predisposed towards growing antagonism.  
 
The Pukhtoon members also felt a distinct sensitivity in this relationship that 
was separate to the main thrust of the arguments attested above. They found 
much solace in their long-established heritage with both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan that reinforced a positive and dynamic transnational element to their 
personal identity. However, they felt that this might also be a potential source of 
suspicion placed on them, as assumptions might be made of their association 
with the tribal regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan and therefore a close 
relationship with the Taliban and wider extremism. Although there was no 
factual basis for this fear, it was, however, felt by many of the Pukhtoon 
respondents who offered this concern within the study. There was a genuine 
fear of being viewed as potential suicide bombers with an overriding hatred for 
British values and norms, so defined by the popular press.  
  
Many felt that there were good reasons why individuals should not speak out on 
these issues, including possible misinterpretation and distortion of views. On the 
one hand, this could be viewed as sign of further insecurity in their status as 
legitimate and equal citizens, but on the other it could be viewed as a pragmatic 
approach to dealing with this discourse in wider society. The consensus 
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amongst the interviewees remained to keep quiet and to keep their heads down 
and focus on their daily lives. In making statements of any kind, they felt these 
would be ignored and misrepresented by the media regardless. They did not 
wish to further fuel and or perpetuate this negative discourse which they felt 
was orchestrated and managed by the media.  
 
There was strong support for these types of reflections made by individuals in 
the focus group discussions which reinforced an existing and strong view of not 
going public during a heightened sense of Islamophobia engulfing the country. 
Many held the view that to do so would feed into the wider media stereotypes of 
extremists within the cities of Britain and would therefore create further 
animosity towards them and their families. For many of the respondents, around 
80% of the sample interviewed, there was a clear demarcation point in how they 
viewed themselves and how they felt others personified them or indeed see 
them, on a daily basis. Again, the issue of remaining silent, even obedient, as 
characterised by one interviewee, was therefore mandated by a fear of further 
persecution and alienation from society. This subsequently fed into strong 
perceptions of the levels of discrimination felt by the sample diaspora as well as 
feelings of an increase in media attention that they viewed as media hype and 
frenzy that would inevitably prolong and exacerbate the existing adverse 
debates surrounding Muslims in Britain.  
 
Respondents articulated this in their own words: 
 
‘When they see, you know, this happened with the Muslim and this 
Muslim did that, and Mohammed something did this and Mohammed, 
that’s all they’re pushing. The reason I used to read  the Daily Mirror 
and Daily Express and I just thought you know  what, I mean, there’s too 
much persecution of Muslims in here,  just like as if that’s all they want 
to do to sell their newspapers, so  it’s not, they don’t provide you with a 
true picture.’ 
 Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
This was quite clear in the data analysis and in the wider reflections made by 
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the diaspora within that process, which related back to the literature on this 
subject, and highlighted that a heightened defence mechanism was in play. It 
also signified a separation of conformity from that of their parents and those 
elders they regard as outdated representatives reinforcing institutional and 
societal discrimination that further perpetuates anti-Muslim feeling, without 
adequately or responsibly representing them. They also considered the actions 
of some elders as reinforcing stereotypes through poor command of English 
and representing the colonial past of subservience to the ‘white man’ – a phrase 
used by some cohort members. This fed into wider generational differences 
between these two groups based on age and experience of modern British 
living and growing up.  
 
 
4.6 Generational reflections of the diaspora  
 
As mentioned, a concern for the diaspora was suspicion of certain actors in the 
midst of their own Pakistani population, who accommodated the needs of the 
political decision-makers, contrary to the interests of their own communities. 
They referred often to the role of so-called community leaders who they 
considered to be self-selected and self-serving, who considered themselves as 
ambassadors of local organisations influencing the local minority ethnic 
population. For the diaspora in the research, there was a view that there was a 
fine line between facilitating the consultation or interaction of the organisation 
and being an interloper who had no understanding of the needs of the emerging 
generations. This was especially the case when they considered most of these 
representatives to be older members of the community who provided deference 
to the institutions they worked with, and were unable to verbalise the concerns 
of the diaspora, due to their limitations in speaking English. Some of the 
respondents, around 20%, described them as ‘poodles jumping up and down’ 
whilst others feared that they were ‘keeping an eye on us for the police or MI5’. 
This latter view was quite common within the context of the government 
‘Prevent’ strategy. It signified the level of suspicion felt by a section of the 
diaspora sample interviewed in this research of members of their own 
communities. In further discussion, some of the sample group spoke of seeing 
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such individuals in regular contact with the police and this had raised concerns. 
 
These doubts about the trustworthiness of individuals in their local populations 
caused much resentment amongst the cohort group members, who felt no 
justification in some of the elders of the Pakistani community validating their 
presence in Britain. For the younger generation, this added to their concerns of 
sacrificing their own group loyalty in order to conform to dominant culture. For 
some of the participants, this represented a colonial vestige of the Raj, when 
the White Man was the dominant political colonial power and no equality existed 
between those in power and those colonised. In other words, people of colour 
were subjugated by the British through the use of force and political patronage, 
as depicted in films such as Gandhi (1982) or novels such as Forster’s A 
Passage to India (1924).  
 
Some respondents commented as follows on this issue: 
 
 ‘Our community leaders are not interested in our community, just   
 self-interest. They still look up to the white politicians and officials   
 as if they were back in India before partition.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 ‘It’s a bit racist to me when they [politicians, police officers] go to   
 our elders for advice about us, trying to keep us in control and not   
 speaking out. It’s same as the British empire when we were told   
 what to do by the British. I think some in our community still live   
 like that.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
 ‘Some of them still bow down to the white man and say “yes sir”.’ 
 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
Another intense feeling shared by both cohorts was how outdated and 
illegitimate these representations on their behalf were. As self-appointed 
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leaders of the community, it was felt that they were undemocratic and only 
interested in obtaining an OBE or MBE. One member of the group ironically 
concluded how British soldiers fight for democracy and freedom abroad but in 
British minority communities the politicians are happy to listen to unelected 
people who damaged, in their view, their standing, if not interests. This has 
been recorded by Malik (1995), who highlights the close working relationships 
between politicians and community leaders to harness electoral success that 
then creates interdependency to the detriment of the wider community. There 
was a danger that such misrepresentations would not only polarise the 
Pakistani community but also send a confused signal to the outside world of 
tensions and internal strife between the old guard and emerging and assertive 
generations.  
 
It is these elements described above collectively, if not individually for some, 
that have caused much reassessing of their place as citizens in Britain. This 
anxiety of place relates to personal experiences that also correspond to group 
perceptions and feelings within the cohorts. It is these multiple layers of 
discrimination perceived by many of the sample diaspora that, for the 
researcher, perpetuate their own myths of returning to the ‘homeland’ Pakistan, 
and to their ancestry. As one respondent commented: 
 
 ‘At least in Pakistan you can be a Muslim without people abusing   
 you and the media attacking you all the time.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
In many respects this is how they have been illustrated by the media and 
society at large, as pointed out by Poole (2002), Hutnyk (2006) and  McLoughlin 
et al. (2014), in what Alexander (2006, p.265) has referred to as ‘essentialising 
religio-cultural identities’. The emphasis on this has led to a strong sense of 
Islamaphobia and discrimination echoing in the narratives in this chapter. There 
is within these voices a strong wish to escape from this anxiety and ultimate 
fear of rejection, repatriation by another name that has filtered down through 
their parents’ experiences of arrival and living in Britain. Their solution is a 
return to ancestral lands and what Kymlicka (1995) has referred to as societal 
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culture. It is here that the researcher feels that a romanticised relationship with 
their heritage has been created. This sample of the diaspora, as Kabbani’s 
(1987) title suggests, has created its own ‘myths of the Orient’, reinforced by 
their media consumption as well as their need for security.  
 
 Allied to this, the researcher would argue, is a sense that no one is speaking up 
for them. Yet they are too afraid, disillusioned and/or apathetic to speak up for 
themselves, or even articulate their need for stronger minority rights, feeling so 
disempowered by media representations and wider society’s acceptance of 
these. Inevitably, it is a process where their self-esteem has been gradually 
eroded, resulting in a sense of victimhood that may lead to wider alienation from 
mainstream society.   
 
Within that frame is an additional element of class distinction that separates 
them from others who reflect an alternative discourse of belonging, based on 
their social mobility and fulfilled aspirations.  
 
 
4.7 Class distinctions  
 
It was the case therefore, that a smaller number of two or three individuals, 
more socially mobile and in many ways more economically advantaged, did not 
share this pessimistic even, myopic, viewpoint. This group differed in its opinion 
of media stereotypes and the impact on their own sense of awareness as British 
Muslims of Pakistani origin. According to the 2001 census in Britain, 13.8% of 
the total population were deemed to be in managerial positions, whilst overall in 
London and the outer regions of the capital, 45% were defined as middle class, 
indicating an increasing trend in this regard in what is considered as the more 
prosperous South (ONS, 2008). 
 
Those within these sets can be deemed to have a middle-class predisposition, 
based on income, education and professional status. They may have a more 
confident and assured belief in being British without being immersed in a state 
of self-doubt or uncertainty in balancing their dual heritage and religious faith 
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within a modern Western context. This additional level of security and esteem 
may be acquired through education and networks that are not exclusively 
related to family or same cultural and religious group relations and identities. 
These individuals can easily move between societies and have an assertive 
outlook that has to some extents deculturalised and even neutralised their 
allegiance to the values and of their parents, in favour of those of liberal 
Western societies. This is reflected in the work of Manzoor (2007) and Moll 
(2007) signifying the interest in niche Asian magazines as an expression of a 
modernized identity, whilst Ramadan (2006) and similar writers seek a post-
modernist Islamic identity. 
 
The minority voice within this discourse has often spoken of the need to support 
the country of birth whilst acknowledging a religious obligation to tackle 
extremism that harms the reputation and standing of the wider Muslim 
populations in Britain and globally. There is no deviation from this belief that is 
based on their legal right as British citizens, affirmed in law. They do not see 
themselves as having any different entitlements to rights and responsibilities 
enjoyed by indigenous-origin communities. In fact, some insisted that as 
taxpayers they contributed towards the welfare system that included many non-
working white residents as well as members of their own community. Their 
sense of self-assured secularism characterised in this statement:  
 
‘We have nothing to be afraid of as we are truly British and these 
extremists are using the name of Islam to harm all of us. We need to 
make sure that we don’t support these kinds of people who are bad for 
our communities and make us all look bad, these religious fanatics who 
do not represent Islam or us.’ 
 Punjabi male, Luton 
 
In many respects, this division based on class places the Pakistani diaspora in 
two significantly opposing arenas that are also indicative of the level of inclusion 
or exclusion felt in wider mainstream society. Those most articulate and more 
socially mobile within a Western liberal context feel the cultural domination of 
their faith to be an unnecessary adjunct to their lives, although they retain the 
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religious traditions and principles within a purely private domain without much 
symbolism, in the functioning of their daily lives.  
 
Furthermore, among this group of participants, articulation of their faith remains 
discreet and not subject to inquiry by any other person, thus personifying the 
character of their Islamic faith. As stated before, there is also a stronger 
affirmation of citizenship and belonging to Britain, which transcends any notion 
of transnational escapism to the homeland. For this small group of middle-class 
respondents there is no desire to permanently leave Britain and seek a 
romanticised sense of sanctuary abroad, especially Pakistan, for which they 
hold no idealist view as a place of future migration or major investment. This is 
clearly borne out of their sense of not belonging and yearning for a place they 
feel secure in.  Again it is this juxtaposition of the two worlds they feel they 
belong to.  
 
Instead, Pakistan is part of a past familial legacy that is not in tune with their 
current sense of presence in a global world. This is contrary to those not 
belonging to this social stratum, as discussed above, who seem nailed to the 
premise, if not fear, of rejection by a British society perceived to be against 
them, anti-Muslim, racist and anti-Pakistani. They reflect those who feel that 
media stereotyping has played a role in determining their presence in Britain as 
well as being party to continual assessment by majority communities as part of 
the internalised threat.  
 
These are the forgotten groups of people of the diaspora within the Punjabi and 
Pukhtoon communities who already feel rejected, marginalised and without a 
stake in society. Although their experiences of Pakistan are limited to family 
holidays and a sense of self-importance acquired by their wealth compared with 
kin in Pakistan, they maintain ambitions of making Pakistan a secondary home, 
a place of sanctuary and potential refuge from their perceived sense of 
alienation from British society. The researcher believes that this self-defined 
insurance is based on a false pretence of feeling secure in Pakistan rather than 
challenging, or amending, their current perceptions of adverse life in Britain.  
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In many ways, this belief in living in Pakistan and the insecurity of present living 
in Britain has created a vacuum between two cultures in their transnational 
identity, a no man’s land that resembles the ‘transmigrant’ state, as articulated 
by Engbersen (2007). It has led to a sense of insecurity of being British and 
Muslim rather than British and Pakistani that is at the heart of this concern. The 
rise in terrorist activity and use of political Islam across the globe has, in the 
main, significantly added to this perception of the unacceptable ‘Other’ within 
the thoughts of some of the diaspora, particularly those marginalised and 
dislocated from mainstream society. It has clear echoes with Husband’s (1996a) 
description of the multiple layers of exclusion and prejudice that tainted the 
Pakistani community set within a transnational and outdated paradox. It is 
essentially this third space that is so reminiscent of Bhabha’s (1994) work on 
identity and belonging that is echoed within these narratives.  
 
As a Punjabi female respondent stated: 
 
 ‘We are British and proud but Pakistani Muslim British, but there’s still   
 racism against us and we are not made to feel this is home. At least  
 being Pakistani too gives you another option to travel to Pakistan and  
 have family there.’ 
Punjabi woman, Luton  
 
Once again, the role of the media has added to this mindset, placing 
discussions of identity in the spotlight by reinforcing perceptions of the type of 
Muslim that is present in Britain. Linked to this discourse is the perception 
among the sample diaspora of the British Pakistani and his or her familiarly with 
militant Islam set within an Eastern context with images of fundamentalist and 
extremist architects of hate, depicted at war with the more tolerant and innocent 
West. This enduring script line has played to millions globally as well as within 
British society. These caricatures are then played out in the daily interactions 
with minorities deemed similar. It is testament to how strong and powerful these 
messages are that have led to the majority of the diaspora, in this study, voicing 
their concern and experiences. They also disturb the notions of community 
cohesion that has determined recent social policy towards minority populations 
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that continually feed into the debate on identity and belonging. For these cohort 
groups, therefore, there is a complexity within this challenge of identification that 
is set within the prism of the media with its cultural, racial and religious 
characteristics. This is now also combined with an emerging class division, 
needing further clarification and elucidation, into something more tangible and 
meaningful for each participant.  
 
 
4.8 Summary  
 
The impact of Islamophobia is profound as a central theme of anti-Muslim 
feeling as perceived by the respondents throughout the investigation. It relates 
to the core elements of identity and belonging, set within a wider global context 
of the ‘war on terror’ and tackling extremism, that now receives 24 hour rolling 
media coverage. However, these all become confused within the minds of the 
majority of people in the West as principles of Islam and its followers, which 
translate into day-to-day hostility, ambivalence and self-defining of the ‘Other’. 
The media therefore plays a crucial role in that classification of this British 
citizen of Pakistani origin becoming the outsider at home. It is profoundly 
impacted upon by the media consumption of the sample Pakistani diaspora and 
society at large, who shape their views of the world accordingly.  
 
The resulting impact of Islamophobia on the sample diaspora is articulated in 
these pages. The anti-Muslim feeling has become a daily preoccupation for the 
diaspora in this study that also extends into employment of whatever form. It 
then perpetuates other forms of discrimination and prejudice as seen by the 
example in stop and search and law enforcement agencies that reinforce a 
sense of alienation captured by Fekete (2006). 
 
It also relates much to the work of Kundani (2014) at the Institute of Race 
Relations (IRR) and Poole’s (ibid.) research for instance, which highlights the 
significance of the level of concern about Muslims in Britain in general and via 
the media in particular as evident in the New Statesman debate of February 
2010 (New Statesman, 2010). Perceptions amongst the diaspora are thus 
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reinforced by continuing exclusion within the labour market that is then 
underpinned by other disadvantage. This is referred to and underscored by the 
work of Abbas (2002) and Archer and Yamashita (2002) related to educational 
achievement, which is enhanced by the work of Blanchflower (2010) 
highlighting the over-representation of Muslim youth among the unemployed. 
This marginalisation is perhaps indicative of the many personal and bleak 
assessments contained within the data analysis that have marked and tainted 
the aspirations of participants in the research. The negative media 
representations of this diaspora that they, the diaspora, also consume on a daily 
basis provide further anxiety and exclusion.  
 
Furthermore, the concerns of the participants are increased by the resulting 
framing, within the media, of the mono-typical Muslim militant stereotype. This is 
analysed by Downing and Husband (2005), who speak of how such media 
representations play into the ideology of discrimination, of which participants 
spoke freely.  
 
It is inevitable therefore that the constant deconstruction and reconstruction of 
this discourse has been a preoccupation of many of the diaspora in this study. 
This has signified their response to what they believe is an ongoing prejudice 
that mirrors the perceptions of Said (1997), who reiterates the Orientalist nature 
of this mainstreamed debate played out daily within the British media. It is also 
a quest for equal citizenship and rights, echoed in the work of Kymlicka (1995) 
that is essential for a sense of security as Engbersen (ibid.) has acknowledged 
for the Turkish equivalents in Germany. It is the associated representations with 
terror, so damaging to this community of interest, that participants have alluded 
to in this discourse. An alleged lack of assertive repudiation is seen as denial at 
best and complicity at worse with the element of Islamic militancy so familiar on 
television screens. This is not only evident on a national basis but is caught up 
in the international and complex media diplomacy at work, referred to by Gilboa 
(2001). There is not only a quest for new resources but, reminiscent of the Cold 
War and reflected within the administrations of George W. Bush and Tony Blair, 
a perpetuation of neo-conservative values that accordingly have led to a new 
form of neo-Orientalism that Sardar (1999) has articulated are represented 
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within mass media and in literature representing the East as alien, backward 
and anti-Western.  
 
These ideas and processes have collectively and individually reinforced the 
wider clash of civilisations that, in turn, has catapulted Islamophobia into the 
international sphere. The outcome has been a severe and detrimental impact 
on Muslim communities and populations in predominantly Western countries. It 
has contributed to their sense of a lack of worth and pf dislocation from 
mainstream European and British society that has a detrimental impact on 
community cohesion and multiculturalism at the same time.  
 
It has also led to the continual development of the transnational search for 
meaning of his or her multiple identities for the British-born Muslim of Pakistani 
origin, who is continually seeking responses to these dilemmas and constraints 
as a result of fears of future discrimination and animosity. For those who feel 
most excluded, it is a genetic disposition that perpetuates at its extreme, their 
expulsion from their country of birth. Instead of challenging this misconception 
there is a desire to lay the foundations for a return to the ‘homeland’. It signifies 
the real insecurity of belonging of their parents despite their legal status as 
citizens. It is a pessimistic constraint on aspiration and assertiveness that 
requires change. Optimistically, the new media may allow such an opportunity 
for personal and group growth that encourages a stronger sense of British 
Muslim identity that also accommodates cultural signifiers and modern religious 
meaning into one robust state of mind and presence; as it does for the more 
affluent middle-class Pakistani diaspora. 
 
Such perceptions correspond to the work of Guo-Ming and Chang (2010) 
whereby narratives setting out perceptions of discrimination relate the global 
impact of the ‘war on terror’ to individuals’ local experiences. Accordingly, 
globalisation has allowed ease of transnational communication which in turn 
has allowed the nurturing of a cultural identity that enhances their faith and 
nationality as primary identifiers – British and Muslim in this context. Social and 
new media provides an opportunity for self-branding and creating profiles that 
are relevant to hybrid identity, as reflected in the work of Ellison (2013). In 
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addition, the narratives expressed the view that identity was modified and 
‘Westernised’ as a response to discrimination in seeking employment. Profiles 
on public-facing personal sites (LinkedIn, MySpace) could be modified to reflect 
this to provide a more mainstream image to potential employers, as Ellison 
(ibid.) reflects. Social and new media helped reframe images of the diaspora to 
the external world as a pragmatic and resourceful approach to tackling 
animosity towards them. In addition, the internet supported the search for 
cultural references and transnational diasporic networks, as well as aiding in 
rebutting negative images of cultures and communities that Karim (2010) points 
out. There is an element of this within the Pakistani diaspora taking part in this 
study and as observed by the researcher throughout the investigation in 
dialogues with the participants. Social media may well be the vehicle with which 
to articulate concerns about racism and Islamaphobia that include police 
injustice and perceptions of criminality, so evident in the work of Watkins (2014) 
in the use of ‘Black Twitter’ to challenge overzealous police actions against 
black communities in America. There is much opportunity to afford such socially 
excluded groups as the Pakistani diaspora in this study an opportunity for a 
voice to challenge what they perceive as injustice and unfairness. This is 
reflected in the wider social media research analysed by the Pew Research 
Centre (2015).  
 
In adding these personal reflections within the context of ethnographic 
experiences, the researcher could relate to these perceptions. The ‘insider’ 
value that is expressed by Foster (1994) provides much in the use of the emic 
approach as part of the wider methodology of enquiry. The researcher could 
relate to the experiences of discrimination and the increase in feelings of a 
growing sense of Islamaphobia. As this research progressed, the researcher felt 
more aware of the media depiction of Islam, in both in the written press and 
radio and television. He became more aware that he was often tuning out 
negative messages of Islam and the diaspora when these appeared in the mass 
media. The researcher personally describes this as a process of ‘switching off 
and switching on’, whereby he would turn off the radio on hearing what he 
perceived as biased news items, then switching on again once the news item 
had passed. Like the respondents, he too was becoming sensitised to the 
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media reporting of Islam and so-called ‘war on terror’. He could appreciate the 
hurt and anger felt of longitudinal elements of life in Britain: schooling, 
employment and going abroad. Culturally there was much empathy in feelings 
of resentment at being singled out in stop and searches, particularly at the 
airport when travelling in numbers to Pakistan. In this specific area of analysing 
the impact of discrimination on the diaspora in their daily encounters and lives, 
the researcher, in a way, could feel their pain, and questions over belonging, 
acceptance and measures of integration. It follows that the feeling of being a 
‘transmigrant’ (Engbersen, 2007) within a modern age is a feeling he could 
identify with. Additionally, he felt a strong sense of British identity, coupled with 
a faith and culture that needed to be asserted. It was, for the researcher, a case 
of evolving self-management of the contradictions of diasporic living in Britain 
as a result of media consumption but also media illustration.  
 
Such ethnographic experiences and use of the emic method also reinforced the 
validity of the data, allowing a more enhanced analysis of the narratives and 
contributions of the respondents. The fact that the researcher felt conscious of 
these elements and issues, and the impact of discrimination on his own 
personal journey, ensured that objectivity remained paramount. This chapter 
also is also testament to the strong character of the diaspora in dealing with 
multiple discrimination, both overt and subtle, and not becoming too 
antagonistic towards those who perpetuated feelings of insecurity and rejection.  
 
In a final summation on the themes of this chapter, the researcher seeks to 
align these key issues with Kymlicka’s (1995) framework of minority rights that 
has been expressed in previous chapters and in the opening section of this. 
They not only provide a fundamental cultural safety net for minority communities 
but also allow evolving hybridity that encapsulates aspects of majority and 
minority culture and values. Even Kymlicka’s critics acknowledge some of his 
rationale: 
  
 ‘He [Kymlicka] rightly notes that Western theorists too often forget  the 
 West's own historical development (and, I would add, current practices) 
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 when it is assumed that other cultures are inherently illiberal and 
 incapable of change.’  
(McDonald, 1996, p.303)  
 
Legal safeguards go some way to create a level playing field to encourage 
equality and inclusion. However, minority rights have gradually declined as a 
priority in political and social policy, replaced by the need to prevent extremism 
and promote British values (Kundnani, 2014). There is no clamour to offer Islam 
and its followers the same protection as that provided to other faiths on 
blasphemy. Cultural racism is more apparent than ever under the EDL banner 
heading of ‘stop the Islamicisation of Britain’ (Kassimeris and Jackson, 2015).  
 
The Race Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000 imposing a positive duty on 
promoting race quality created from outrage over the murder of Stephen 
Lawrence and the findings of the Macpherson Inquiry (1999), supplemented 
with new powers for the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), have both 
ceased, to be replaced by the Equality Act (2010) and Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, both of which are ineffective through political undermining 
(Hepple, 2010). In fact, New Labour also recreated the political language 
promoting ‘equality of opportunity and fairness of outcome’ (Beech, 2006, 
p.154) that inevitably relate to ‘priority and sufficiency conceptions of equality 
and not the strict egalitarian conception of equality’ (ibid., p.155). This New 
Labour concept was ironically made relevant for British Muslims and particularly 
to the diaspora by one of its own, offering ‘fairness not favours’ to ‘reconnect 
with British Muslims’ (Khan, 2008, front cover). This Fabian paper sets out the 
case for compatibility of British values and Islam and the virtues of the Single 
Equality Act (2010) as a positive step towards challenging religious (anti-
Muslim) discrimination. It also sets out a blueprint for a modernised British 
Muslim citizen of the diaspora (ibid.). 
 
Despite such political philosophy, however, for many of the diaspora of the first, 
second and even third generation, there is still a sense of insecurity brought 
from daily interactions with the majority culture so evident in this study. Their 
response has been to reinvent a neo-societal culture that allows them to assert 
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their diasporic identity within a unified cultural, linguistic and religious 
environment. In their narratives, there is a link between their heritage, whether 
Pukhtoon or Punjabi or Pakistani, and their present hybridity of Britishness. It 
corresponds to the work of Safran (1991), Eade (1997, 2007), Alam (2006) and, 
as has been noted above, to Alexander’s (2006) reference to ‘essentialising 
religio-cultural identities’ (p.265). Within that, the media, traditional and new 
media, have also reinforced the anti-Muslim, culturally racist narrative of the 
diaspora (Poole, 2002; Karim, 2010). In addition, the understanding of this neo-
societal culture is misinterpreted and distorted through outsider anthropological 
insights and liberal interpretation as being of deficit to what is deemed as British 
society. (Alam and Husband, 2006; Hutnyk, 2006; McLoughlin et al., 2014).  
 
 For the diaspora, it is bound up by fusion language, cultural modernity and 
ideas formed by being ‘made in Bradford’ (Alam, 2006) – or Luton, Oxford, 
Birmingham, London or Britain as a whole. In that regard, the respondents’ 
narratives are important to provide a realistic assessment of life and policy-
making in Britain. It is reminiscent of the words of a former bishop of Durham, 
who stated, ‘Statistics need to have faces and faces need to have voices, 
voices need listening to, that is what is lacking…’. 
(Jenkins, quoted in Foundation 2000, 1995) 
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Chapter 5  
Media production and identity  
  
The previous chapter focused on discrimination arising from the impact of 
Islamaphobia, which was a foundation for examining wider elements of 
prejudice felt by the respondents on a daily basis. Media production was seen 
as a factor contributing to how depiction of the Muslim mainly depicted as the 
‘Other’ was so prevalent within mainstream media.  
 
Participants in the research emphasised a perceived lack of impartiality of the 
media as part of a systematic process of promulgating a news agenda 
dominated by elites, business and political interests aided by professionalised 
news promoters, as reflected in the work of Dreier (1982), Chomsky (2005), 
Poole (2006), Dabashi (2008). The processes that are utilised in making news 
had a direct and profound bearing on the views of the respondents within the 
diaspora cohort groups and on their sense of a personal and group identity. In 
essence, the role of the media in Britain was a nucleus of concern amongst the 
cohort group members in the research. Their collective views place 
considerable emphasis on the role of strategic communications that operate 
behind the scenes and away from public eyes and scrutiny. It increased their 
need for alternative sources of accurate information and insight into global 
events. As stated by one respondent: 
 
 “you really don’t know who controls the media in the West and what lies 
 they tell you so we need to find it from other places, just so we know it’s 
 not truth and not made up for propaganda purposes” 
Punjabi male Luton  
 
This chapter therefore, seeks to make a number of links within the literature that 
relate to the perceptions of the respondents of how news is produced in the 
main and stories articulated in the public domain. This had an impact on the 
diaspora and their confidence in major broadcasters of the West that led to 
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specific responses and alternatives being developed that reinforce a 
transnational identity.  
 
The literature review in Chapter 2 to some extent provides an insight into the 
mechanisms of media production as they relate to the issues of identity and 
specifically to Islam in a world context. In many respects, the present chapter 
reinforces the view expressed by McQuail (2005) that media production is not 
necessarily an objective process in reporting information in the public domain. It 
makes a contribution to the body of work by articulating related issues raised by 
two specific groups of the Pakistani diaspora who, as a consequence of their 
experiences, had developed alternatives. These options reinforced their 
transnational identity and provided a positive counterbalance to the negative 
portrayals of their communities in the British and other Western media. 
 
The media is not necessarily the objective observer of events and conduit for a 
flow of impartial information, as is the received wisdom, is therefore highly 
relevant in this discussion. There are, of course, many powerful interests that 
relate to how media is produced for the benefit of specific interests and to its 
powerful role within the global socio-economic and political environment, and 
these are reflected in the work of Molotoch and Lester (1974), Tunstall (1970), 
Sigal (1974) and McQuail (2003).  
 
In these pages, to enhance the analysis further, the term ‘media production’ is 
used to mean “to publish or mediate between authors and original sources and 
the eventual audience or public” (McQuail, 2003, p.4), the end result allowing 
the facilitation of information to the public at large. ‘The media’ refers to the 
wider act of organisational roles and means by which to disseminate information 
or publication as the final outcome. The term ‘publication’ in this sense refers to 
output in its widest form, which includes print, audio and visual production and 
dissemination of information. ‘Media’ in the current world is a proliferation of 
outlets that produce information for the public en masse; it includes not only 
tradition television, radio and news papers but new social media such as Twitter 
and Facebook. They are all mechanisms for placing information to millions of 
communities across the world. 
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The researcher will, via data analysis, assess and draw links with capital in the 
first instance, followed by an examination of the role the media plays in 
reinforcing capitalist and Western hegemony through the construction of an 
external threat: communism on the past and Islam at present. The use of what 
Said (1997) defined as ‘cultural apparatus’ will be explored in the context of how 
Muslims and subsequently the diaspora, are framed and visualised within this 
structure, which includes race talk, associated lexicon, the role of journalists 
and Orientalist ideology. These will be further explored through the contributions 
of the Pakistani diaspora represented in this work and two specific case studies, 
in order to elucidate the perceptions of the diaspora based on real-life 
experiences, the empirical data in this study.  
 
The process of media production can have an impact on the editorial decision-
making process of news gathering, setting and broadcasting through the use of 
sophisticated and highly influential operators as argued by Sigal (1974). 
Additionally, professionalised public relations agencies and media relations 
events, press releases, press conferences and lunches with editors and 
journalists reinforce this process of assimilation and institutionalisation of news 
providers and gatherers, referred to by McQuail (2005). The perceptions of the 
diaspora are aligned with the articulation by Montgomery et al. (1989) of how 
the news media function to safeguard the interests of the media networks, 
which relates to the need for advertising revenue and core reasons of existence 
in a competitive corporate media community. It is an essential link with the role 
of capital within media production that is emphasised.  
 
This seamless and carefully engineered interconnection mainly motivated by 
profit is supported by corporate conformity in the mainstream media. Given that 
control of media production rests with a few major players, this has a significant 
input into the output of large business enterprises such as News International, 
Time Warner, and even the publically funded BBC. Their income and budgets 
are more robust and excessive than those many small countries and are often 
free of legal restrictions to cross borders in the information age, as reflected in 
the work of McQuail (2003) addressing issues of accountability.  
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The relationships between journalists, government and private-sector media are 
also a matter of concern, given how they breach any notion of impartiality in 
their interdependence, as assessed by Goodman and Goodman (2006) and 
Prince (2009). This was a theme repeatedly picked up in the narratives of 
members of the cohort groups, who significantly highlighted an understanding of 
these relationships, which reinforce strong perceptions of organised 
misinformation at play in relation to aspects of their faith and identity. As this 
quote exemplifies: 
 
‘The truth is that the Americans want to dominate the world with 
 business, and big media companies use their power to dictate to 
 the rest of the world. Muslims are rising up and defending 
 themselves. That is not what they really like.’  
Punjabi female, Luton 
 
An essential element of this relationship between mass media and powerful 
interests is also observed through the sophisticated art of 'spinning'. Former 
journalists work as heads of press relations for corporations, interest groups 
and governments to aid this relationship of mutuality (McQuail, 2005). This was 
exemplified by Alistair Campbell, principal ‘spin master’ for the Blair 
government, according to his own testimony (Campbell, 2007). The 
respondents in the research connected him to the development of the Iraq 
dossier which was a precursor to war. The dossier persuaded the public of the 
imminent destruction of the West by the weapons of mass destruction 
supposedly held by Saddam Hussein. Poole (2002) describes how the media 
played a significant part in the sequence of events, and their part in the 
‘reproduction of political power’ (p.3). Poole portrays the broader scene and the 
rules set out by the political elites at a time of coming war or potential conflict. 
 
The relationships between capital, media interests and governments have 
become much more public through the role of Andy Coulson, the former 
newspaper editor from News International as David Cameron’s press 
spokesperson. His subsequent resignation and trial for phone hacking (Wintour 
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and Davies, 2011) has served as a high-profile case study of this 
interdependence, close working and lack of objectivity of the media as a whole. 
The example has given clear reinforcement to the views expressed by 
respondents on this subject of close association between government policy 
and media portrayals of their communities, their heritage, their status and 
intentions as British Pakistani Muslims.  
 
There is no doubt about the level of expertise and contacts that former 
journalists and media specialists can bring to business and government in the 
framing of news items and stories that can influence or set the daily news 
agenda and promote their interests. Indeed, such corporate media advocates 
can drip-feed the media with relevant and ‘exclusive’ information to ensure 
maximum interest and coverage of a specific news story or message they wish 
to broadcast. This practice was also picked up by the respondents in many of 
the focus group interviews in assessing how stereotypes are utilised and frames 
created by the media that seek to promote the desired agenda. Respondents 
stated: 
 
 “when something awful happens against the West it’s breaking news and 
 it comes and goes all the time but if bombings in Muslim countries 
 happen, then its normal news or not mentioned at all” 
Punjabi male Luton  
 
 “They [media] feel really proud when they have a story about a terrorist 
 who they get an exclusive interview with, they like playing that again and 
 again saying it’s a Muslim bomber arrested by the Police in a raid”. 
Pukhtoon male Oxford  
 
The Leveson Inquiry (2012) provided better insight into these powerful 
relationships than was possible before, through strong case studies of close 
working relationships between the press and senior politicians in government 
(Guardian, 2012). 
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Correspondingly, media production and the thirst of twenty-four-hour news 
providers itself mean there is much more reliance on news agencies and 
professional public relations experts to create headlines that develop the stories 
deemed worthy of airing. The systemised and well-developed process of 
internal news production conferences, editorial meetings and scripted anchors 
reinforce specific, often Orientalist, messages as elaborated by Said (1997), 
where media output can be a form of social control for compliance with what is 
deemed as the national interest, as defined by the strongest pressure groups. 
These issues were not lost on the viewpoints of the diaspora, as illustrated by 
this comment:  
 
‘I think the majority of people from the young to the old are aware of how 
biased the media is and understand how powerful a tool it is, and the 
people do understand, people know how biased it is, people have an 
understanding, have an idea .... This kind of media is not the full picture.’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
Strong feelings were expressed by the cohort members that the media always 
provided a subjective analysis in how they gathered and edited information to 
create news stories. Such views, typical of the initial responses of participants 
recorded in focus group forums, did not change over time in the re-emerging 
data and analysis within the grounded theory methodology adopted. A common 
concern was often stated as: 
 
‘The BBC and Sky always are the worst in showing us Muslims as  bad 
British citizens and as terrorists around the World.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
‘How do the media know what these terrorist organisations are  really 
like when they don’t speak to them directly. It’s sometimes  just made 
up for television.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
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‘The news and television, they also show us as being radicals, calling us 
fundamentalists as if we British Muslims are going to  attack them. Just 
watch out if you’re called Mohammed in Luton,  then you might be a 
secret enemy.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
At the same time, this insight also revealed the role the media played in the 
lives of these contributors on a daily basis. They consistently and on each day 
viewed terrestrial media news they found of interest. By doing so, they 
assessed and linked negative media depictions of Muslims, nationally and 
internationally, to their own personal identities and experiences.  
 
It is significant to highlight that such deeply held views were fixed at a period of 
much upheaval and political turmoil during a partisan period defined by the 
Bush and Blair administrations that related to the ‘war on terror’ that so 
polarized world and opinion, as these comment signify: 
 
‘I felt really uncomfortable during the war in Iraq.  I didn’t want to  voice 
my opinion too much because you don’t know who is  listening. I mean, 
they didn’t listen to everyone marching against  the war, why would they 
listen to us Muslims here?’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
‘I had an Indian work colleague ask me why Muslims were always 
creating problems and trouble in the world. It’s the way he said it really 
that got to me, “Why do you lot always cause problems for us all? Some 
of us want to live here peaceful.” ’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
 
5.1 Islam equals communism  
 
The role of the neo-conservatives in emphasising the Islamic threat and the 
closeness of the American media to the Bush administration were a central 
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theme of the respondents’ discourse. The commentary of the respondents is 
mirrored in the study of the media by Goodman and Goodman (2006), which 
reflects the role big business played in perpetuating, via the media, the 
misinformation on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. In 
particular, these authors how the media was used to sell the Bush message on 
Iraq and the ‘war on terror’ whilst limiting the freedoms in America of anyone 
critical of that approach and of reporting not reflective of the American ‘reality’.  
 
This view was elucidated by many of the diaspora taking part in this study in 
what their perception of an orchestrated programme to equate Islam with 
terrorism. They cited how George Galloway, an advocate of the opposing view, 
was given little media attention and within the cohort groups was considered to 
have been sidelined by powerful media organisations, because he was not on-
message.  
 
 ‘They don’t like what people like Galloway has to say. He is [too] 
 clever for them, so they just ignore him, but he knows what he’s 
 talking about.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
The Pukhtoon cohort groups were of a stronger opinion on this issue. Their 
contributions included reflections on the invasion of Afghanistan after the 
September 11 attacks and they drew comparisons with the Soviet invasion in 
1979. It is these connections that have replaced communism with Islam as the 
new enemy depicted by the media in the West, a global threat to a Western way 
of life and liberal, democratic values, just as communism was at the height of 
the cold war.  
 
President Bush clearly outlined the heart of this philosophy in the 2006 National 
Security Strategy of the United States in which he stated: 
 
‘America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy of the 
United States required by the grave challenge we face – the rise of 
terrorism fuelled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully 
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revealed to the American people on September 11th,  2001.’ (quoted in 
Ostergard, 2006, p.44) 
 
This ideology, according to Ostergard (2006), is radical Islam, which he 
describes as the new hot war based on the cold war maxim of ‘them and us’. He 
argues that former cold war policy-makers were searching for what he 
describes as ‘the next enemy, or the next grand purpose’ (p.45) post 9/11. It is 
an echo of the words of James Woolsey, the former director of the CIA 
speaking at Chatham House, at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, in 
2003. Woolsey stated his view that the United States and the West are at war 
with ‘fascist Middle East governments and totalitarian Islamists” (Woolsey, 
2003). His comparison between what he describes as extreme Islam and the 
democracies of the West parallels the military and ideological wars with 
communism, such as the Korean War (1950-53), or misinformation to 
undermine Marxist-Leninist thought (Ostergard, ibid.). In the modern era, the 
Western mass media is an essential element within this construct, as captured 
in the work of Said (1997) and in the Orientalist discourse (ibid.,1978) that 
underlines this emerging political philosophy. Its emphasis was further made 
clear by Cohen (2001) in an article in the Wall Street Journal describing this 
new war as the Fourth World War, WWIII have been staged at the time of the 
cold war. The construct encapsulates a strong policy shift in Western foreign 
policy that entrenches Islam, its followers and their diverse cultures as all 
potentially enemies of Western states, framed within Huntingdon’s (1993) ‘clash 
of civilisations’ metaphor. Enhanced and proliferated by Anglo-Saxon media, 
this has become the prevailing discourse within many Western societies (Said, 
1997; Poole, 2006). It was followed by the call to arms leading to military 
interventions in Afghanistan and its personification in the media strapline of the 
‘war on terror’. It was precisely these parallels drawn between Islam and 
communism that were regarded as objectionable by the sample diaspora.  
  
For the Pukhtoon community in particular, the successful struggle of the 
Mujahedeen against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was a cause 
célèbre. It was, in their view, an example of Muslims asserting themselves 
against a major superpower and one they could particularly identify with 
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because of the Pukhtoon heritage spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As 
this comment illustrates: 
 
‘The Pukhtoons really gave those Russians a lesson in Afghanistan. At 
that time, the West was on their side and giving them guns and the lot. 
Now they want to show the Mujahedeen as bad as the Russians and 
what they believed.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
These participants recognised the role of media depiction and production in 
portrayal of that struggle that had the overt support of the West in fighting 
communism. The media played an essential part in leading criticism of the 
former Soviet Union within wider global public opinion. Hollywood’s depiction of 
a sole American hero taking on the Red Army in Afghanistan in the film Rambo 
reinforced the evil of the Russian campaign. What is familiar to the Pukhtoon 
respondents is the role of the largely Western media, which once depicted the 
Mujahedeen as heroes and now reverted to showing them as terrorists. The 
period epitomised, in their view, the emphasis placed on the ‘war on terror’ 
philosophy, inherent in the political doctrine of the administrations of George 
Bush and Tony Blair. For some of the diaspora, this was characterised as 
Western media’s on-going play on emotions aroused by of 9/11, aligned with 
the discourse of an impending Muslim threat, described by Goodman and 
Goodman (2005, p.6) as a policy of perpetuating fear. As a cohort member 
stated: 
 
‘When so many Muslims and others have died around the world in  wars 
and Western bombings in Iraq or even in Palestine, they keep on 
focussing on 9/11 as the only event that is important – as the only 
terrorist attack that has taken place in history.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
This has also been reflected in the work of Poole (2002) and Gottschalk and 
Greenberg (2006) in detailed analysis of media representations of Islam in 
Britain and America, 
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Additionally, the respondents echoed what Herman and Chomsky (1994) have 
described as the workings of a ‘propaganda model’ that perpetuates a capitalist 
ideology, strengthening disparity and inequality within wider society as a 
consequence. Yet the respondents went further in discussing how it denies and 
sidelines fairness as an end in itself, through its use of money to influence the 
media. According to the diaspora in this sample, the use of the new bogeyman 
of Islam was a re-packaged formula to be used in the quest for foreign 
resources and minerals by the West: oil in Iraq and Syria, for instance. 
 
Respondents also referred to the lack of information on the number of civilian 
casualties in Iraq as an example of propaganda to frame the media production 
of winning the ‘war on terror’, a war that personifies Islam as a new threat, as 
related by Said (1997) and Dabashi (2008), and is closely aligned to Western 
foreign policy (Drake and Metzl, 2001).  
 
The concern of the interviewees was with how media production continually and 
profoundly impacted on them as it placed them at risk from extremist elements 
and fellow citizens in their local communities. Such concerns have been 
reflected in the work of Poole (2002), where she speaks of how the internal 
seeks to remind people of the external threat (ibid., p.3) – in other words, how 
the Muslim and the diaspora are so closely associated with the fanatical and 
destructive elements of political Islam depicted by the media on a daily basis.  
A number of participants commented that: 
 
‘They think we are some kind of sleepers who will attack the  country, 
that’s what it makes you feel like sometimes.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
‘The media and the EDL want to show to other people who are not 
Muslim that we are here to cause problems and make trouble and they 
keep showing Muslims with guns and as terrorists. You think, “What are 
other people thinking of me when they see those pictures on TV?”’ 
Punjabi woman, Luton  
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That media production was also an instrument used by right-wing organisations 
in Britain such as the EDL was not lost on the respondents, particularly those in 
Luton. This process was referred to by some of the respondents as ‘their 
paranoia feeding into our paranoia’. It is summed up in this statement by an 
interviewee: 
 
‘Politicians and the mass media in the West were perpetuating the 
 myths about us and our religion. This shows all us Muslims as the 
enemy and against Britain.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
It is these images of bearded men shouting repeatedly ‘God is great’, 
accompanied at times with the carrying and discharge of heavy military 
equipment that is the standard footage of choice. Images of the carnage of 
September 11 in the attacks in New York are seldom forgotten within this 
discourse that characterises Islam and its followers as often feudal, militant and 
uncivilized, as noted by Said (1997) in his essays on media representations of 
Muslims. This was not lost on the respondents to this study, who offered a more 
personal viewpoint that reflects that of the wider diaspora and indeed the 
assessment made by Poole (2002). The impact on identity caused by the 
resulting sense of vulnerability is part of the experience of the evolving diaspora 
and recorded frequently within the narratives of participants.  
 
Media alignment to big business and hence capitalism was also a theme picked 
up by many respondents. For many, Western media promoted Western foreign 
policy, which many respondents felt was aligned to the Blair and Bush 
administrations. In particular, the quest for natural resources was frequently 
discussed in the cohort groups:  
 
 ‘It is about oil and wanting it from the Arab [Muslims] countries they  
 call terrorist and something the media always tells us, such as Iran.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
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           ‘It’s always about business at the end of the day. I mean, they’re 
  invading these countries to make money and get the oil and natural 
 resources in Afghanistan. Look at all those American companies  
 in there that are raking it in.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 ‘Corporations are bigger than some countries, they can control 
 governments I think. Look at Pakistan, it seems to be run by mobile 
 companies that is all that you see on TV over there on the ads. Iraq 
 [the invasion] is all about American companies making money. 
 That’s what Bush is all about, I think.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
The views of the participants in this respect echo sentiments expressed by 
writers such as Gandy (1982) and Dabashi (2008), who have referred to the 
strong role of capital in the control of public information, in order to protect the 
dominant cultural, social and political status quo. The rise of Islam is equated by 
the respondents as a legitimate threat to Western hegemony, given the rise of 
the faith within its own borders and in challenging the Christian basis of the 
dominant society. As a result, they argue, the use of the media to promote 
negative images and depictions of Islam as the only militant religion amongst 
the diversity of faiths is an active preoccupation of Western elites. It has had a 
direct adverse impact on the diaspora itself, as articulated in their contributions 
in this research, in particular on their sense of belonging in Britain. It also 
articulates the cultural apparatus that is so dominant within Anglo-Saxon media 
 
 
5.2 Cultural apparatus  
 
The term ‘cultural apparatus’ has been employed by Said (1997, p.47) to denote 
a method in which media production is created and remains the mode by which 
information is delivered to the mass public. It seeks to enforce, time and time 
again, key messages such as those described previously within the sphere of 
media production and the systemised manner in which news is formulated and 
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despatched. The researcher has adopted the term to use as a platform to 
explore further the impact of the media consumption of respondents on their 
perceptions of their identity. 
 
Islam and its followers are chiefly seen through audio and visual networks, and 
the dailies – either so-called redtops or the broadsheets. The former are known 
not just for their masthead colour, but also for their showbiz gossip, celebrity 
and political scandalising. There is more appeal to the mass of the populace in 
this approach focused on human interest stories than in-depth analysis or 
features on public affairs, and this distinguishes redtops from the substance and 
the column inches of the broadsheets (Palmer, 2000). All (magazines and 
cinema included) reinforce the imagery of the ‘Other’ and representations of 
hate directed from a foreign land. The images displayed are not set in isolation, 
they are accompanied with feelings that create emotions and stir strong 
sentiment within the viewer, reinforcing moral codes, values and assumptions, 
implicit within that short but powerful frame that also distinguishes between right 
and wrong for the beholder, as reflected upon by Said (ibid.).  
 
The realism of the planes colliding into the twin towers, accompanied by Osama 
Bin Laden’s beaming smile, are precisely such images that personify Islam in a 
way that allows those not familiar with the faith to claim it as the new enemy of 
the West. This has been assessed and analysed in the work of Conte (2001), 
which echoes the concerns of the respondents as referred to earlier and further 
in this chapter. The following is a sample statement made by a respondent: 
 
‘They always show a Muslim with a beard, wearing traditional clothes 
and always blowing things up, never peaceful, and then these people like 
Bin Laden are seen to represent our religion – it’s all propaganda.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
The significance of the literature is in how it resonates with the experience of 
diaspora participants, as illustrated by the research data and analysis of voices 
articulating concern, anxiety and even fear of the intentions of the British media. 
Participants in the research spoke of a number of specific issues which 
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heightened their sensitivity to how media production and those in control of 
media organisations defined the agenda. They related specific concerns over 
the approach of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Sky, in 
particular how trust was a major concern in how these two bodies operated and 
disseminated information.  
 
One particular incident amongst many stood out for the diaspora and caused 
much anxiety and exasperation within the participant community, during the 
time the interviews were being conducted. The events in Gaza in 2010 were 
fresh in the minds of the respondents as they were a topical news story at the 
time. As one interviewee commented: 
 
 “Gaza and Palestine was the only important issue for all us Muslims at 
 the time but as usual the media made it about terrorism by Palestinians”  
Punjabi male Luton  
 
The decision by both the BBC and Sky not to broadcast an appeal for aid by the 
Emergency Appeals Committee, a collective grouping of British charities and 
the Red Crescent, was felt by the vast majority of respondents to be an overtly 
political decision by these news outlets. It raised great emotion, frustration and 
anger amongst the cohort groups, who repeatedly spoke of a biased BBC and 
Sky, not interested in the truth in respect to the Muslims concerned in this case, 
with many feeling that these broadcasters had openly sided with the Israeli 
State. To many, it was yet another personification of ‘bad’ Islam, which added to 
the sense of an Islamophobia they viewed as increasingly present and growing 
in Britain. There was a strong feeling in both cohort groups of how controlling 
the two media organisations were, in not highlighting the suffering of the 
Palestinians; faced with the major superior force of the Israeli state.  
 
The controversy over the BBC and Sky’s decision not to broadcast the Gaza 
appeal was significant in the extent to which these providers lost credibility 
amongst the diaspora audience. It reinforced existing conspiracy theories and 
perceived pro-Israeli stance of these broadcasters, which were also perceived 
to be anti-Muslim in not highlighting the plight of the Palestinian Muslims. 
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Participants also recognised that people suffering in that region were portrayed 
as prolonging their own misery by supporting a government (Hamas) that was 
proactively campaigning against Israeli state actions. This corresponds with the 
view of Horsti (2007), who argues that such assessments end up blaming the 
victim for the oppression they endure. 
 
Respondents made similar comments as the following: 
 
 “Palestinians are the victims here but they (media) don’t show that do 
 they? It’s because they are Muslims and Muslims only do bad things, that 
 is what they want to show” 
Punjabi female Luton  
 
There were many other polemical comments that ranged from disgust to 
incredible disbelief over the actions of the BBC in particular, given its public 
broadcasting role and reputation for impartiality, which it considers as central to 
its philosophy and public service ethos. It also instilled in the diaspora in this 
study a much stronger affirmation not only of their faith but also of their personal 
identity and sense of allegiance. Many spoke of their close solidarity with the 
Palestinians’ struggle and feeling that the media response was part of the wider 
adverse portrayal of the impact of Islam in the world. Many felt very angry and 
saddened by the reaction of the main broadcasters at this time of need for the 
suffering Palestinians. Some respondents came up with their own term for the 
BBC as this statement highlights: 
 
 “so much for an independent BBC they keep going on about, it’s the 
 Biased Broadcasting Corporation just like it was the Blair Bush 
 Corporation during the Iraq war, just like Sky” 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
There was a lack of comprehension of the stance taken by the two 
broadcasters, given that others, such as ITV, did broadcast the appeal. It was 
not only seen as a dereliction of duty by many, but as a proactive case of 
censorship that many in the groups felt was not being challenged. Participants 
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felt that the commercial interests of the two media broadcasters might be a 
factor, also influence behind the scenes to encourage a lack of representation 
of the Palestinian viewpoint. There was much conjecture in this respect that 
echoed the continued discourse of anti-Muslim feelings being perpetuated by 
these actions.  
 
The participants’ reactions in this case could highlight significant awareness of 
how the media formulates ideas and depicts information, and an understanding 
of the shaping of the news agenda and what this means for individuals and 
groups of the diaspora. However, it could also represent a lack of factual basis 
for these assumptions given the political sensitivities of this issue on both the 
Palestinian and the Israeli side,  
 
For the majority of the diaspora participants, however, the Palestine issue was 
placed on a par with the Kashmir, Chechnya and other liberation struggles, as 
these were considered by most of the respondents to be similar struggles where 
Muslims were seeking independence. For many, following more probing, such 
views reflected thought processes handed down to them from their parents and 
peer groups on a subject they had debated and argued over for many decades. 
This clearly had an impact on their identity as it echoed with them on a daily 
basis and represented a significant concern for those of the same religious 
persuasion, emphasising a stronger sense of Muslim community globally. There 
is also, in this context, much more empathy for independent or liberation 
movements that have an Islamic influence and seek to champion the cause of 
Muslims in different parts of the world. It is a reminder of the influence of the 
parental contribution of their version of the colonial experience under British rule 
in India and what is now Pakistan is. The legacies of empire in the Middle East 
and elsewhere provide yet another perspective on this theme.  
 
This statement echoes this overall view: 
 
 ‘My parents always went on about Kashmir and I never understood what 
 was so important but with Gaza I do, it’s the same in Chechnya and even 
 Bosnia, it’s about pushing down Muslims who want their own freedom. 
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 But Muslims around the world stay united and that is something they 
 don’t understand or care about.’ 
Punjabi male Luton  
 
Parallels were also drawn between what the BBC said and the government’s 
stated position on national and international events, particularly, many felt, 
reflecting on Pakistan and as a consequence, on the Pakistani population 
resident here. Within that association was a subtext on Islam and Muslims, 
synonymous with the lexicon of terrorism. Many spoke of how BBC news stories 
about Pakistan or British Muslims were always negative: examples of forced 
marriages were represented as common and as evidence of the downtrodden 
state of the veiled Muslim woman in need of Western liberation, as identified in 
Said’s Covering Islam (1997). 
 
The interviewees expressed a view, that they were aware, that in any 
community these issues were prevalent, including in British Pakistani society. 
However, they objected to the lack of balance in reporting and to the framing of 
these issues within a narrow racial and social context. Many spoke of how it 
reinforced stereotypes of their communities widely held by the public and how it 
was used against them in daily interaction with indigenous-origin communities, 
particularly for those who had close contact with a range of non-Muslim social 
groups, such as young Pakistani male taxi drivers who took part in this 
investigation. These taxi drivers often spoke of how white passengers, in 
ignorance of their faith, had questioned them on Islam and their cultural heritage 
whilst alluding to terrorism, implying difference and a perception that they did 
not belong in Britain. For example, as cited in Chapter 4 on Islamophobia, some 
taxi drivers spoke of being asked, explicitly or implicitly, of their reasons for 
being in the country. These incidents have parallels with the literature in how 
the ‘Other’ is personified when cultural practices are viewed as alien and 
contrary to a perceived British way of life, as echoed in the work of Hall (2001). 
 
There was much time including follow-up reflection spent on this area, with 
respondents stating repeatedly that news reporting from the BBC and Sky was 
fundamentally misleading in comparison to other terrestrial media such as ITV 
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and Channel Five, although, rarely viewed. Alternative channels such as Al-
Jazeera English and the Iranian London-based English news channel, Press 
TV, were viewed as less biased and more reliable. In both these examples, it 
was felt that the production of news information, the associated content and 
framing were more balanced or evenly slanted in relation to Islam rather than 
against it. The anti-Western stance of Press TV, in particular, appealed to 
sections of the cohort group members who felt at ease with a level of negative 
reporting of Western governments, which they considered was denied to them 
by mainstream media.  
 
However, it is also important to note that the genuine concern over the plight of 
the Palestinians and their treatment was formed independently by the diaspora. 
This was through alternative audio and visual consumption of independent 
reports on Palestine and also anecdotes from fellow Muslims, who had travelled 
in food convoys to besieged cities in that region. The role of YouTube and the 
internet played an important role in this regard, as they provided topical and 
uncensored personal accounts and documentaries that were not available in 
mainstream media production. It is a wider recognition of how diversified the 
global and new media has become that it has allowed these alternatives to 
exist. Importantly, this diversification also signals a potential lack of dominance 
of Western media broadcasters, where much richer non-Western based media 
outlets are beginning to grow in confidence and challenge the ‘natural’ media 
order. This development includes production companies from Asia and the 
Middle East funded by oil rich countries and leaders, to provide alternative 
voices to the world. The diaspora in this study were gradually realising this and 
taking advantage of the alternatives that the global media village now had to 
offer.  
 
A respondent stated: 
 ‘So many countries have English speaking news so we can make sure 
 we get information from elsewhere not just CNN or BBC, we can get it 
 from Russian news, Iranian television, Pakistan and other Muslim 
 countries too, so it’s good for us.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
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It became apparent that, for many within the cohort groups, their concerns over 
specific broadcasters were based on their own viewing interpretations of 
organisations they had felt would be more objective in their reporting. This 
illusion of the independence of the media, drilled into them from early on as 
consumers of information, had been challenged as a response to the attention 
given to Islam and to consequently them.  
 
In probing further for the rationale in reaching these conclusions, it became 
evident that many of the respondents felt that editorial content was too pro-
Western, with depictions and discourse reflecting a language of difference that 
was reinforced in interviews with people who often promoted an anti-Muslim 
and racist discourse. This experience mirrors work done by Conte (2001) on 
media representations of Muslims and also Poole (2003; Poole and Richardson, 
2006). As this respondent stated: 
 
‘Come on, you can’t tell me it isn’t planned by the media that they want to 
show us as not liking the West. I mean, look how they twist people’s 
words, we don’t know what they’ve really said. We are outsiders here, 
even if we were born here and this is our home and they keep reminding 
us.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
Again, the scripted text accompanying the short clips of such interviews also 
disturbed the contributors, who compared the lexicon at play for news items 
featuring militant Christianity and those for militant Islam. The gentler term of 
‘evangelist’ was always utilised in media reports of strong and dominant 
Christian personalities who attacked Islam with much rhetorical zeal, whilst 
Muslim preachers were described as either fundamentalist or extremist in 
holding similar views of Christianity, as Conte (ibid.) has recorded. This is also 
appropriate to consider within the wider racialisation of minorities emphasised in 
the work of Downing and Husband (2005) that impacts on the diaspora.  
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5.3 Race talk 
 
The manner in which the media articulates key messages and frames members 
of the diaspora community and Pakistani British Muslims, as viewed by 
respondents, within the wider context as racial minorities, has created much 
anxiety and insecurity. The diaspora were clearly aware of how the dominant 
media was depicting them, they were conscious of this fact in their day-to-day 
activities, and sourced other media to reaffirm their identity.  
 
Clearly, this awareness was in itself a key finding in that it displayed a present 
anxiety amongst this group concerning their negative image within wider British 
society that, an anxiety that, in the eyes of many participants, greatly affected 
their sense of belonging in their place of birth. It was their belief that the 
elements of production and editorial control sought to promote specific aspects 
of the emerging Pakistani diaspora, and to place them within a very narrow set 
of parameters, which increases a sense of siege and alienation, which in turn is 
amplified by stereotypical and racialised framing serving to stress their minority 
status and feelings of insecure tenure as citizens. Some participants spoke of 
how this was meant to make them ashamed of being Pakistani and Muslim 
because of the actions of a minority of extremists, again highlighting the 
portrayal of Islam as being a homogenous faith rather than diverse one that 
crosses cultural barriers, as referred to by Poole (2002). The racialisation of 
Muslims also impacted on the sample diaspora, as reflected by the work of 
Downing and Husband (ibid.), who speak in the same terms of the role of media 
in depicting negative racial identity in the production of news that is expanded 
into religious life for the diaspora. 
 
Again, the respondents acknowledged that supposed homogeneity of the British 
Muslim population is presented within the media frame, rather than an 
acknowledgement of the diversity of the global Muslim population that is 
reflected in the United Kingdom. This struck a particular cord with the 
participants, who felt that diversity was significantly played down within British 
media to display a continued homogenous unity of all within the faith of Islam. 
By doing so, the media in their view branded each Muslim with the same guise 
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as a potential suicide bomber and anti-Western collaborator with terrorism. This 
understanding further elucidates the deep-rooted insecurity felt amongst this 
section of society, which is perhaps internalised rather than overtly expressed 
within the public domain. As this comment highlights: 
 
‘All Muslims are not the same. I mean, there are millions of Muslims from 
around the world, we all don’t get on with each other, but they just show 
us all together as one big club of Muslim fanatics, but I think they meant 
to do that.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
Accordingly, some 90% of those in the respondent groups were of the opinion 
that they had very little or no faith in the mass media to report information and 
stories objectively or even honestly. Their perception was of a media that was 
more interested in highlighting their racial and religious identity to characterise 
them as lacking a sense of Britishness and conformity to the norms of Western 
society. This was an extension of the discourse on cultural racism that has 
become so prevalent and has led to Islamophobic sentiment gradually 
becoming part of normality as perceived by the diaspora.  
 
These issues clearly relate back to news production in many ways. They reflect 
editorial decision-making as to how a story is to be presented and aired. The 
ethnicity of individuals would in most cases be irrelevant, but here it is 
personified to a larger extent to boost the story and frame the item for maximum 
impact, the item then being disseminated through the potential reinforcement of 
existing media and audience prejudices as argued by Said (1997), McQuail 
(2005), and Downing and Husband (2005) as part of the systematic 
organisation of mass media production. Again, this perception was reinforced 
by many cohort members, who interpreted their own consumption of media 
production and information reflecting specific group ethnicity, which seemed to 
focus more on the British-born Muslim of Pakistani origin being seen as the 
‘Other’.  
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Additionally, some participants took the opportunity to reflect on their past 
encounters with the media in situations where race, culture and religion were a 
key factor. For the Pukhtoons, who had undertaken internal migration from one 
city, Bradford, to another, Oxford, the memories and associations with 
journalists seeking sensationalism was all too apparent. The inner city 
disturbances of 1995 and 2001 in Bradford were reflected upon in this study 
and, for some, cast a shadow over their continued apprehension of the mass 
media. 
 
The deprived area of Manningham in Bradford, home to a large Pakistani 
community, was the scene of riots in 1995 that brought it to national 
prominence; the events of 2001 with riots in Oldham, Bradford and Burnley 
brought further attention to the Pakistani diaspora in national and international 
media. Some of the respondents recalled how the media was more assimilated 
within the agencies of law enforcement and seemed to articulate their concerns. 
In one such incident, rather than address issues of police harassment, the 
media focused on the police version of events that described the disturbances 
as generational issues. This analysis was captured in a community-based 
response entitled Voices must be heard: a community response to the 
Manningham disturbances (Foundation 2000, 1995).  
 
These local findings summarised news reporting in terms of perpetuating the 
Muslim radical, as journalists at the scene directed representation for the 
following days’ papers and related headlines, as captured later by one 
respondent in this comment: 
 
‘I saw how the media asked young Muslim men to put scarves over their 
heads and act militant so they can take pictures of them as some kind of 
warriors. It was wrong, it gave the wrong impression but it made me 
understand to some level, how the media operate with our communities. 
It makes you think.’  
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
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In such circumstances, past experiences of interaction with the media, as well 
as consumption of media, had increased sensitivity and heightened a sense of 
bias in journalistic practices that in the past focused on culture and colour and 
now included a stronger focus on their faith.  
  
The data revealed that it had become common practice for respondents to 
analyse the press on a daily basis, again, informed by their sensitivity to critical 
output by the media in general. Cultural racism and the whole element of 
racialised language, they argued, was a key component in many news items. It 
perpetuated, in their minds, the language of difference and cultural racialisation 
of Pakistanis and Muslims as separate from mainstream society. Some in the 
groups commented on how religion was referred to in a media report when a 
person was Muslim, yet this was not the case for an Anglo-Saxon Christian, 
who might have committed the same crime. This replicates the writings of hooks 
(1995), who speaks of ‘race talk’ in everyday use within the media to reinforce 
the inferiority of the minority person and or community. As this comment shows: 
 
‘I remember the Bradford riots they wanted to show Pakistani’s as 
breaking windows and looting but why would we do that from our  own 
shops, but that is what they wanted to tell everyone, it was lies.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
‘Bradford, man, when it lit up in ’95, I mean, they wanted to show it  as 
jihad or something, the Muslims attacking the white coppers, crap man.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
Participants felt that the media increasingly played up the Islamic identity of any 
offender whilst minimizing it when they were a victim. And with international 
coverage, many felt that the images that accompanied the story-lines, for 
example, yet again, Muslim women clad in hijab and men with beards and 
prayer hats, fitted the Western stereotype of a tribal Muslim person more 
familiar in the East than in the streets of Britain. The strong perception was of a 
purposeful attempt to depict British Muslims of the diaspora as predominantly 
backward and alien in their own homegrown environment. This is in many ways, 
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as Said (1997) and Poole (2002) have reflected, the Orientalist approach of 
media production that continually depicts Muslims as the Other, their culture 
and belief systems minimised as anti-Western and anti-liberal in a more 
progressive Eurocentric age. It is a depiction of the inferior civilisation 
reminiscent of the writings of Matthews (1926) documenting his journeys in the 
Arab and Eastern worlds, a discourse reflected upon by Lewis (1990) and 
Huntingdon (1993).  
 
Such perceptions among participants are significant in another respect, as they 
show this cohort group was aware of the nature of the news information that 
they consumed, rather than being passive and benign recipients of media 
information. By doing so, they were able to remain alert to an increasing threat 
to their well-being and potential for harm in times of increased anti-Muslim 
feelings. The distortion of objective reality by the media as echoed in the work 
of Gieber and Johnson (1961) was an element they felt a need to be vigilant of.  
 
It was also clear in the data analysis that this fed into a sense of alienation, 
which became clear as the study and interviews progressed. It assisted the 
researcher to develop the empirical data that fed into the wider discourse and 
analysis of this subject, that, in essence, the participants represented and 
encapsulated a significant body of experience of media consumption of British 
media providers.  
 
These are all powerful intersections within the diaspora’s understanding of their 
own struggle for identity. It is a search to resolve a complex relationship with 
transnationalism and an evolving hybridity that conflates the religious with the 
cultural, as mirrored by Samad (2013). 
 
For the vast majority of the respondents this was a constant shadow they lived 
under, with continuing media attention concentrated on this agenda, in 
mainstream British media, satellite and cable news channels.  
 
Yet again, the anti-Islam message was seen as part of this strategic formation, 
as pointed out by Lippmann as far back as 1922. It emphasises the prevailing 
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political doctrine at the time, ‘regime change’, as the panacea to combating and 
preventing terrorism against the West (Dabashi, 2008). 
 
The respondents felt strongly that there was less concentration on this 
relationship between Islam and terror within culturally specific media (see 
below), given the links of the diaspora to the Indian sub-continent and Pakistan 
in particular. Indian news programmes did, however, contain such stories, and 
the diaspora participants reflected on the animosity between Pakistan and India 
as at issue here, rather than the British Muslim. Their comments included the 
following: 
 
‘If you watch Pakistani news, you always see them bad mouthing India, 
and then you look at Indian news and it’s the same. Usually  over 
Kashmir and terrorists, they don’t like each other.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
 ‘Indian TV news especially, if you watch STAR News, seems to have 
 a go at Pakistan and you can tell it’s not positive, always linking 
 terrorism and Pakistan, even when I am in Pakistan, people hate 
 India.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 Within these wider discussions, such sentiments echo the work of Herman and 
Chomsky (1994), Goodman and Goodman (2006) and Dabashi (2008) that 
indicates the political power play at work, whereby the media is an active 
participant within global political strategic thinking promoted by the West.  
 
With such wide access to mass media provided by the plethora of satellite and 
cable broadcasters, there was now a choice of relevant and wider global 
diverse news and information channels (see next section). Participants were 
interested in news from Pakistan and news of what was happening to other 
Muslim populations around the world with which they could identify most easily.  
As one respondent stated: 
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‘It’s amazing what you can find out when you just go through all the  news 
channels, Russian and Chinese English-speaking channels,  you can get 
a different side to the stories the West gives you.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
In that context, the diaspora has created its own response to this sense of 
media bias, by searching and consuming alternative forms of media. This media 
was more in tune with their own development of identity, which included 
transnational cultural and religious relationships with a wider diasporic 
community, part of what Gajjala (2010) refers to as ‘digital diasporas’ (p.211).  
 
 
5.4 Alternative media 
 
The use of alternative media is a key response to the bias within media 
production perceived by many of the respondents. As already stated, 
broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera English and Press TV were viewed with more 
openness than existing British-based news providers such as the BBC and Sky. 
This comes with greater use of cable and satellite services, as echoed in the 
work of Gajjala (ibid.) in respect to South Asian diasporas and that of Rinnawi 
(2010) in relation to Muslim diasporas. Consequently, it has led to the cross-
referencing of material between networks and other sources, such as YouTube 
and the global internet and other diaspora transnational networks located 
through web-based search engines and word of mouth. YouTube was a much 
favoured medium for gathering information and insights into events that were of 
keen interest to the diaspora, as in Gaza and other trouble spots, including 
news of Pakistan that bypassed mainstream news sources. This resource also 
allowed access to specific linguistic and cultural context for both the Punjabi 
and Pukhtoon communities, through documentaries and discussion shows such 
as Ghairati Pukhtoon on Apna (our) TV.com or accessed through Pakfiles.com. 
Again this highlights a need for religious and cultural enrichment, as pointed out 
by Gajjala (ibid.) and Rinnawi (ibid.) in relation to media consumption of such 
diasporas.  
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According to participants: 
 
‘The internet has given us the chance to see what is really out there 
culturally and politically. We can just google and find all kinds of media 
that we can see on YouTube or internet. I can check news  from around 
the world to know what is really going on.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
‘Getting Pukhtoon music and dramas is amazing. It really helps me  to 
know more about my culture and understand my background.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
This cross-referencing of news material was not only enterprising but also 
showed an assertive response to what was perceived to be a lack of objectivity 
in Western media circles. It was born out of frustration with the content of 
predominantly British and American news content, which many of the diaspora 
did not consider reliable. Additionally, they felt strongly that such broadcasters 
perpetuated the stereotypes of the Muslim terrorist and of the internal Muslim 
threat that so impacted on them individually and collectively as the Pakistani 
diaspora.  
 
They considered the internet as providing them with more open access to 
engage with similar diasporas across the world such as the Pakistani–US 
alumni network www.facebook.com/PakAlumni but more importantly, through 
Facebook, with other Pakistanis in Pakistan, Canada and elsewhere. Many had 
come across forums and discussion sites that allowed them to relate their 
transnational identity to others across continents.  
 
This was clearly evidenced from the range of focus groups and the one-to-one 
interviews held with each participant, a strong sense being expressed that other 
sources of news information had to be researched in order to achieve a 
balanced viewpoint of world events. Participants also felt that there was a need 
to be better informed in order to challenge the unbalanced media 
representations offered to the British audience and as such, to their work 
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colleagues and people they interacted with. This relates to a clear process of 
self-awareness and self-education, articulated in the work of Modood (2005), 
Moll (2007) and Samad (2013), which reflects the interviewees’ concerns with 
media manipulation and distortion in reporting.  
 
As stated previously, many participants expressed their concerns about how 
news media seek to reinforce stereotypes of specific groups. This then 
promotes an image of the internalized threat from a minority population that 
does not conform to Western standards, however these may be defined. There 
is, of course, the contrasting view held by cohort group members that news is 
blatantly invented at some level to promote a specific political agenda, as 
documented in the literature (Molotoch and Lester, 1974; Goodman and 
Goodman, 2006). 
 
The analysis reveals that the diaspora is politically aware and conscious of the 
limitations of the British media, even more so in light of such events as Leveson 
(2011) and the trials of former News of the World editors and journalists on 
charges of phone hacking (Independent, 2014). 
 
This was notable in the period of time respondents were involved in the 
research, as these comments show: 
 
 ‘I think I am more aware of how the media operates because I think 
 about the news and media when I am watching it. It’s not what I did 
 before.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
‘You have to be careful what the news and television tells you, it’s  not 
always real news.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
‘I always thought the media was, you know, telling the truth, but the  more 
I have thought about it, I think they are just full of it.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
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In ending the discussion of this specific theme, it is important to note that these 
concerns were aired anonymously in private conversations with cohort 
members who did not wish to place such views in the public domain. They 
preferred non-attributable commentary to highlight these issues of how media 
production affected their identity. There was, indeed, a sense that such 
narratives might elicit unhelpful comments from others who might consider such 
thoughts to be in the realm of unfounded conspiracy theories and as extreme. 
Yet their contributions do have value in aiding this research study related to 
their media consumption and its impact on identity, which was profound.  
 
The desire for anonymity reinforces one of the prevailing themes of these 
conversations, that of deep-rooted insecurity about how participants were 
viewed and accepted by society as a whole. It could also mean that cohort 
members did not wish to add more controversy to a debate they see as futile 
and uninterested in their viewpoints, given the dominance and power of the 
media in addition to a fear of misinterpretation.  
 
These fears are important in their own right as the data reveals a high degree of 
concern about personal safety as a result of the way media has represented 
participants. It results from those images that are so powerful in setting, within 
the mind of the viewer, a picture and thought process of the external threat 
within the internal boundaries, by people who are of another culture but of the 
same place. In doing so, they have allowed ignorance to develop and 
extremism of the anti-Muslim variety to flourish to the detriment of the British-
born Pakistani diaspora, who continue to assess the consequences.  
 
5.5 Media stakeholders  
 
The researcher made several attempts to contact a range of media providers, 
including Sky, the BBC and cultural broadcasters serving the Pakistani 
communities in Britain. In addition the Foreign Office was also contacted with 
respect to the findings of the emerging data. The researcher felt it important to 
give these organisations the opportunity to feedback on the concerns and 
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anxieties of the respondents. No engagement was forthcoming or possible to 
continue this line of enquiry and it seemed too time-consuming to pursue.   
 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
The importance of media production was not lost on the diaspora within this 
study, nor its association with perceived bias against the Muslim in Britain and 
globally. This is reflected widely in the literature through Poole (2002), Poole 
and Richardson (2006), Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008) and others who 
stress the role of media in framing the Muslim as the ‘Other’ on a daily basis. It 
is this thought process that leads to the Orientalist approach so identified by the 
diaspora in this study, who seem to be most sensitive and aware of its impact 
on their identity and status.  
 
The contributions of the respondents relating to media production support points 
made in the literature concerning how media consumption has reflected on 
diaspora identity. The literature echoes the lack of objectivity in media observed 
by interviewees that is part of the daily editing and framing of news and global 
information that is aligned to the interests of power (McQuail, 2005, Downing 
and Husband, 2005, Dabashi, 2008). These may be big business or 
government at large, as argued by Goodman and Goodman (2005) and 
Herman and Chomsky (1994), which have a direct impact on the formation and 
dissemination of news and information to an often unsuspecting world-wide 
audience. This is in line with the concerns of the participants who argued that 
the quest for oil is the real motivation for invasions and actions in Muslim 
countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. This was reflected in their media 
consumption that draws them to Press TV, an Iranian news broadcaster they 
feel can provide an alternative viewpoint, more in tune with their own.  
 
In addition, many participants considered that this interest in resources is 
supported and often aligned to government agendas that maintain the interests 
of capital in conjunction with the media. The ‘war on terror’ and build-up to the 
war in Iraq in response to the ‘weapons of mass destruction’ were two specific 
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examples. The management of information, therefore, was considered by 
participants to be a political strategy to ‘win hearts and minds’. These political 
actions leading to military interventions that are so interlinked with the 
‘embedded journalist’ in the war zone are referred to by Poole (ibid.) as a form 
of media performance. This is where foreign policy drives through an agenda 
that creates a heightened sense of an external threat that is then addressed to 
the satisfaction of the public at large.  
 
The process of cross-referencing was thus a response employed by the 
diaspora to challenge this distorted and biased view they encountered each 
day. The proliferation of media organisations and news broadcasters globally 
aided this approach, as did the internet and rise of new social media to create a 
specific diaspora public sphere, reflected in the work of Downing and Husband 
(2005). This is clearly related to the impact of ‘race talk’ on this group and the 
continuing cultural racialisation of the Muslim in Britain as ‘the Other’. As argued 
by Gottschalk and Greenberg (2008), this framing of Muslim and anti-Muslim 
feeling has come about as a result of information fed to the public at large. It is 
also emphasised and continued within the wider arts and cinema world through 
negative depictions that place a racialised and negative view of people of colour 
articulated by Hooks (1995) and Walker (2013). 
 
For the interviewees, these perceptions of them had an impact on their relations 
within communities and society in Britain, which created discrimination founded 
on Islamophobia, that in turns only added to a sense of isolation and continued 
alienation. Additionally, it fuelled resentment and political action from right-wing 
bodies such as the EDL that reinforces uncertainty and animosity from 
mainstream society.  
 
Therefore, there was an overwhelming feeling, amongst both cohort groups, of 
being under constant attack by Western media through undermining their 
Islamic perspective and casting doubt on the peaceful nature of Islam as a 
major religion. Western media displayed Islam in a purely confrontational 
manner that reinforced a world view of Islam as hating the West and what it 
stood for, a view contrary to the reality of Islam’s true nature as stated by Said 
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(1997), who has often challenged these neo-conservative views, reflected by 
Lewis (1990). To many, Islam was the new global threat to Western hegemony 
if not civilization, because of its reach across cultures, communities and 
societies that are so diverse and unified by the teachings of Islam. This anti-
Muslim discourse was therefore framed in the same image and language that 
was reserved for communism in the past. This has been referred to by 
Goodman and Goodman (ibid.) as a policy of promulgating fear.  
 
It is inevitable that participants’ response to the challenge was a more assertive 
process of seeking alternative media that reinforced their own personal and 
group identity. The use of web-based information including YouTube 
increasingly offered them the opportunity to reaffirm their Islamic and British 
identity and so to enhance the evolution of their hybrid diasporic identity. The 
diaspora were also using the web to challenge the media production of the elite 
organisations by creating their own images and representations for uploading 
onto YouTube and social media. This also enhanced their transnational sense 
of identity through connectivity with similar diasporas across the World.  
 
This reinforces the close connectivity and aids a deep-rooted sense of 
belonging that is being negotiated, as suggested in the literature of Modood 
(2005), Moll (2007) and Samad (2013) amongst others. This new assertiveness 
present among British Muslims – despite the sense of discrimination they 
consider brought on by the media and how it signifies them in society – is their 
positive response to what they have perceived, as revealed by the data, as 
media production that undermines their presence and positive contribution to 
the economic and social life of a country they consider as their home: Britain.  
 
In observing the participants, the researcher was slightly concerned by some 
conspiracy theories that some of the respondents believed. The predominant 
one concerned how Jewish people had orchestrated 9/11, and the media 
complicity in denial of this. At times these accounts seemed farfetched and 
challenged. It felt that these assumptions that were circulated through networks 
and hearsay were taken for granted, rather than assessed by some 
respondents. To the researcher, this felt like denial by these particular cohort 
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members that Muslims could undertake such an act. Alternatively the 
researcher was somewhat surprised by how aware respondents were of the 
perceived media bias in the production of news, in particular their response to 
this. The cross referencing they undertook by using the internet to search 
similar news stories by a range of global providers. They were not passive 
recipients of the media but actively critiquing their personal media consumption 
of Anglo-Saxon media. In addition there was a strong interest in cultural media 
with gender and cultural differentials. Some of the assumptions of the 
researcher were therefore not only challenged but re-programmed in light of 
these observations. The male respondents spoke with much passion and at 
times, much excitement of how they recognised media bias and anti-Muslim 
sentiment. The females were more refrained when speaking of their 
consumption and not subject to the same excitement or competition to all speak 
at once; as was with their male counterparts.  
 
In these exchanges and on this specific topic related to media production strong 
correlations and a firm belief was made between British foreign policy and 
media production; the Iraq war being often cited as the major example. This 
then fed into what many considered as Government inspired propaganda that 
relates to the work of Goodman and Goodman (2005) and Herman and 
Chomsky (1994). The researcher was also interested to note in these 
discussions of the immense respect and support for the Iranian State funded 
Press TV. For both the Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort groups, male and female, 
they prided on their consumption of this predominantly anti-Western 
broadcaster. They ignored the association of Shia Islam with this brand; 
especially the Pukhtoon who were regarded by the researcher, as strict 
observers of Sunni Islam. It perhaps typified the old political maxim of – the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend – within a new media world. For the 
researcher it also attested to the fact, that Press TV was perhaps the only 
medium cohort members could identify with as challenging Western media 
hegemony, Al-Jazeera English was seen as a poor relation in this light, given its 
over reliance on journalists who had previously worked for Western media 
outlets. The wearing of headscarves for instance by female presenters on Press 
TV was seen as a reflection of that provider’s pro-Islamic stance and for many 
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female respondents, one they could easily identify with.  
 
This then asserted itself in a call for more media production that reflected their 
presence in Britain, with positive characteristics of their faith, culture and 
contribution to being British. This, the researcher felt, was for many an assertion 
of their British hybrid identity. However, it was not a call for action but of 
expressing concern and complaint, of current Western media production they 
consumed. Once again, the researcher felt that these respondents were 
highlighting feelings of insecurity and concerns of their status in British society – 
the transmigrant nature of their perceptions was once again, all too present in 
this discourse.  
 
This provides a specific diasporic contribution to the wider debates on new and 
social media and diasporic identities. The primary concern among the Pakistani 
diaspora in this study is the perceived anti-Muslim bias of the predominant 
Anglo-Saxon media. The element of cross-referencing links relates well to the 
work of Karim (2010) on how diasporas use the internet to challenge mis-
representations, in this case by sourcing alternative media to counterbalance 
Western editorials. In addition, the consumption of the Iranian-based Press TV, 
Al-Jazeera English and Peace TV as well as specific Pukhtoon and Punjabi 
dramas and music via the internet are all, as Karim (ibid.) highlights, forms of 
cultural and religious consumption that seek alternatives to the mass output of 
the dominant culture. The search for Islamic education and understanding that 
the second and third generation of the Pakistani diaspora seek for their children 
correlates with Rinnawi’s (2010) work with Muslim Arabs in Germany. It thus 
aids what Karim (ibid.) regards as cultural production, which extends as part of 
the analysis in this research, where fusion music and video-clip making related 
to cultural practices are norms of diasporic cultural production related to hybrid 
identity. The plight of the Palestinian population in Gaza also created a 
politicisation and frustration that was channelled through new and social media 
as an outlet of resentment towards the BBC and Sky refusing to broadcast a 
Disasters Emergency Committee appeal. It became an opportunity for 
transnational networks and groupings to challenge the dominant Western 
corporate media hegemony referred to by Watkins (2014). A sense of 
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‘community’ was created that Gajjala (2010) refers to as contact zones. The 
diaspora is becoming more digital, globalisation creating new spaces that link 
local, global and transnational communities that share same group dynamics to 
form new virtual worlds. These are in themselves real online communities as 
related by Gajjala (ibid.) that denote the present evolution of the Pakistani 
diaspora participants in a new media format.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Transnationalism and identity affirmation  
 
The previous chapters set the wider context of prejudice and discrimination felt 
by the British Pakistani diaspora, which included perceptions of bias in the 
general media. This contributed to a sense of alienation and a form of 
separation from mainstream society as a result. This chapter seeks to offer a 
response to how the diaspora addressed their concerns about the mass media 
within a wider transnational context, which allowed the sample diaspora to 
affirm a specific hybrid identity which they sought to articulate to the wider 
British population.  
 
Furthermore it is within this section that the rationale of transmigrant in a new 
media age is further amplified through the narratives of the respondents. This 
feeling of being neither belonging to one nation of origin nor one of birth is 
symptomatic of their perceptions of negative status and place in society.  
 
The impact of the ‘war on terror’, as it has been referred to within the political 
and media lexicon, is a central cause of anxiety for the diaspora that has 
resulted in a search for and negotiation of transnational sense of belonging. It is 
within that context that a particular response of the diaspora’s own making has 
surfaced, articulated by respondents in this study as a desire to maintain 
cultural and religious affirmation through connectivity with a sense of dual 
homeland, encompassing Britain and Pakistan, which will be explored here.  
 
These explorations, as will surface within the analysis, create clear 
contradictions in the role and impact of the media, and between East and West, 
in a struggle between competing values, for example corruption being more 
overt in Pakistan than in Britain. The outcome has been a growing Muslim 
assertiveness that is using the medium of the internet as a method of 
developing transnational communities of interest, a process in which new 
technologies and new media play a critical part. As one respondent stated: 
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 ‘We don’t have to accept what Western media tell us. The internet   
 helps us find our real identities, the best of two worlds, British and   
 Pakistani. I can explore all of that on the internet and on my mobile.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
The discussion here contributes new research and ideas to enhance the 
existing body of literature. 
 
It is within these parameters, the researcher would argue, that the diaspora 
have created their own sense of worth and responses to their perceived insight 
of media vilification. This has resulted in a determination to create a social and 
political identity they feel comfortable and secure within.  
 
Primarily, the ‘war on terror’ was a key process of media and political alignment 
that created much apprehension revealed within the data and analysis. More 
specifically, the media interest in Muslim communities in Britain and Pakistan 
was seen as part of the wider coverage and analysis guided by the philosophy 
prescribed by George Bush. The term ‘war on terror’ refers to a virtual concept 
of war that denotes a lack of a theatre of warfare taking place in the 
conventional sense of two armies in battle. This phraseology resembles the 
political lexicon used on the ‘war on drugs’ by politicians, poignantly used in the 
1980s in the West, a war that often has no visible enemy or chain of command. 
It does however; create within the public mind a need for political leadership 
and action to deal with this perceived menace and/or threat. 
 
The sample diaspora in the research, like many others, drew comparisons 
between reactions on the part of the dominant broadcasters to Western victims 
of violence and those in Pakistan. A strong distinction was perceived in the 
levels of reporting of these two contrasting landscapes, with Pakistan seen by 
participants in the research to be as much a recipient of terror bombings as the 
West, or more. In the participants’ view, this had often been ignored as a matter 
of fact by Western and British media.  
 
A cohort group member summed it up in the following words: 
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 ‘We don’t really matter to the West. If it’s a Pakistani killed, well, it’s  
 okay, they were probably a Taliban anyway, we all are, that is how   
 they see us, in Britain and in Pakistan.” 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
This point was important as it signified and reinforced wider societal perceptions 
of whether the Pakistani population as a whole were responsible for the actions 
of a few terrorists. These then resulted in stereotyping of the Muslim as ‘Other’ 
at best and the enemy at worst. Within the cohort groups this was a reoccurring 
theme, with much animated discussion within both male and female research 
groups. For some this led to a feeling of not belonging expressed in these 
comments: 
 
 ‘They make you feel that you don’t have a home, they don’t   
 accept us here and they don’t accept us in Pakistan, it’s like being   
 between two worlds.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
 ‘My dad used to say that they’re [British] are gonna send us back   
 home. But it’s not home for us, this is, not sure it is, don’t know  
 where is, then.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
Allied to this specific media portrayal, as assessed by respondents, was the 
portrayal of Pakistan within a global terrorist network associated with Al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban never far removed from media commentary and international 
analysis. This included commentary from global think-tanks such as the Council 
for Foreign Relations (2011a) and intelligence sources based in the West.  
 
The daily discussions and comments the diaspora encountered within their work 
places and amongst associates inevitably reflected this impression which has 
become deeply embedded in the mainstream population. The diaspora are 
therefore not only alert but sensitive to what the media depicts and broadcasts; 
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it then relates to how respondents analysed their personal media consumption. 
It corresponds to Poole’s (2002) description of the relationship between policy 
and media framing that evidently sees Islam as the enemy. It adds further to 
this feeling of alienation. A respondent stated: 
 
 ‘They think we are stupid if we don’t think they planned to   
 target Islam, and make us to be the enemy in our own country.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
This process of how the ‘war on terror’ is packaged has created a real sense of 
insecurity for the Pakistani diaspora through the transnational association 
between their current territory and their land of origin. In terms of the sample 
diaspora’s own allegiance to Pakistan within the context of ‘war on terror’, they 
have summed it up in the statement: ‘Pakistan too has suffered.’  
A number of cohort members expressed the view that: 
 
 ‘People and children are dying in Pakistan killed by bombs but we   
 do not hear much about that. If we did in the British media, then   
 they’d see we are all victims.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
This was an obvious statement to make but one which many of the respondents 
felt required amplification as feelings on this issue existed at a number of levels 
for participants. They empathised with the victims of terror in Pakistan, with 
whom they associated culturally if not genetically, as mostly innocents of the 
Pakistani population caught up in the carnage that was in some parts of the 
country a daily occurrence. This was specifically relevant for the Pukhtoon 
cohort group who, given their proximity and relationship with the Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, were more acutely aware of the impact of 
extremist violence. The Pukhtoon participants often spoke of their closeness to 
the violence and how on their regular visits they had to be more vigilant than 
most.  
 
For both Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort groups, there were also anecdotes 
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recorded by parents or elder relatives back from their visits to the homeland that 
gave rise to much compassion from both sexes. It was, however, evident in the 
analysis that for female members of the cohort groups this impacted at a much 
deeper level that corresponded to affinity with same -gender victims and loss of 
children in particular.  
 
They would often use the term ‘we’ to signify the oneness with the Pakistani 
population and relatives in Pakistan. This also had significance in how they 
associated this transnational identity with their media consumption at a time of 
turmoil in Pakistan. This related to consuming more Pakistani satellite media 
that provided a sense of association with the Pakistani people and their plight in 
Pakistan. The clear empathy they had with the people of Pakistan brought their 
identity into more focus and personal analysis, the researcher would argue. As 
this comment highlights: 
 
 ‘I can relate to people in Pakistan. When I see it on ARY, it’s like my   
 own family was involved and it feels so close.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
The repeated concerns over the reporting of these issues by Western news 
providers and over how images were framed remained the central element of 
concern in this context. Additionally, they felt the Western media did not make 
the facts as transparent as possible nor did it analyse the effect on the country 
and its society as a whole, or on the diaspora, in respect to their transnational 
identity. For the participants, there existed this void of explanation that many felt 
compelled to speak out against in creating a more balanced understanding of 
the global issues of terrorism. This may have been an unrealistic ambition of the 
sample diaspora, given how news is more responsive to events within a fast-
moving global and competitive news media.  
 
Again, within the frame of the ‘war on terror’, there was a united feeling among 
the participants that no distinctions were made between those fighting against 
the Taliban, mostly the Pakistan army, and the Taliban or other subversive 
elements. Amongst the chief concerns was how Osama bin Laden, a Saudi 
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national of Yemeni origin, was often confused as a Pakistani by mainstream 
British society. Given his prominence in the 9/11 attacks and his role as head of 
Al-Qaeda, there was a fear that many in the West considered Pakistan as the 
head office for anti-Western terrorism. The attack on his compound in 
Abbottabad in Pakistan and his death only seemed to reinforce this message to 
a wider global audience.  
 
It was this continuing view of Pakistan as a hub of terrorist activity which, 
through these accounts, affected the diaspora. It corresponds to the views of 
Tony Blair, the then prime minister, who commented in an interview in The 
Economist: ‘What happens today in Pakistan matters on the streets of Britain’ 
(Blair, 2007). The collective experiences of the group of taxi drivers in Oxford in 
this study provide realistic testimony to this fact. Their experiences narrated 
encounters with ordinary people who, as passengers, wished to speak openly 
about the subject to elicit conversation with what they perceived to be a white 
taxi driver. This ‘race talk’, addressed in an earlier chapter, is aligned to imagery 
associated with violence and the Muslim. It is, as hooks (1995) and Walker 
(2013) have referred to it, how many people of colour feel about the negative 
impact of the media on racial minorities, echoed at a transnational level.  
 
The sample diaspora viewed this as an aspect of the malaise of indifference 
towards them in the majority society that they were compelled to accept. They 
gave examples of how often they had to take part in memorial rituals at work or 
in public spaces for mostly Western victims of extremism. Their personal views 
in this matter were not openly displayed for fear of further accusations of 
insensitivity, if not treachery. Yet many felt quite strongly on this issue and 
considered it to be another example of racism and a sense of superiority 
expressed by the majority. This feeds into Ansari’s (2002) and Abdullah’s 
(2009) discussion of Muslims’ fears of discrimination following the 9/11 attacks.  
 
Research participants also made comparisons with the coverage of the 
bombings in Mumbai in November 2008 which, some felt, gained much more 
attention from the Western media and politicians than daily atrocities carried out 
in Pakistan. Some felt that the media interest in this specific story was to 
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reinforce the message that Pakistan instigated the bombings by supporting 
Muslim terrorist groups abroad. This fuelled the existing perception amongst 
some of the cohort group members of a bias in favour of India in the British 
media, some participants speculating that India’s rise as an economic power 
helped it gain a better press, linked to its economic activity and commercial 
interests. They also highlighted the connection between the Indian-based STAR 
TV network and its parent company, News International, the owners of Sky 
News. This fact was considered most relevant in reaching their conclusions, 
once again highlighting their extreme frustration within this complex geo-political 
situation.  
 
Respondents also expressed concern over their personal safety and that of 
family when in Pakistan, a perception conditioned by the level of casualties 
covered minute-by-minute on multi-ethnic Pakistani news channels 
broadcasting into the homes of the British-based diaspora. These images and 
repeated visualisation of violence had a clear impact on these viewers. The 
association with a strong sense of frustration was once again mirrored with 
resentment over the lack of home-grown coverage, or only passing mention, of 
the mayhem. The conclusion was often drawn that Pakistani society, and by 
implication the diaspora, were not equal victims of terror, but were framed within 
a purposeful discourse of the Muslim as both perpetrator and saboteur, 
responsible for their own demise. As one female respondent stated: 
 
 ‘It makes you feel like you are a second class person.’ 
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
Alternatively, despite these feelings of concern for the Pakistani citizen, they 
also felt unsafe with Pakistan being a permanent place of residence at a 
personal level. Many respondents echoed these sentiments: 
 
 ‘With all that violence and the way the country is, I don’t think I   
 would like to live there or have my kids experiencing that.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
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The analysis of this issue is revealing, as it depicts the diaspora rooted in a 
strong political connection with a Pakistani identity and showing allegiance at 
some level to the heritage of that nation state, despite personal reservations. In 
addition, the objectivity of the respondents on this issue seemed to be also 
influenced by current and historical antagonisms between India and Pakistan 
passed down by their elders and at some level articulated in these discussions. 
Their defensive attitude to Pakistan, in respect to this issue, highlighted a strong 
attachment to their culture and the prevailing discourse of animosity towards 
India embedded amongst many of the elder generation and unfortunately 
inherited by some of the diaspora in this study. However, it is also accounted for 
by semi indoctrination by the anti-Indian state shaped by the legacies of two 
wars between India and Pakistan, by memories of partition and a divided 
Kashmir, all of which are drip fed into the system from an early age, by parents, 
by the wider Pakistani establishment at home and during visits to the region.  
 
This was most evident within the Punjabi cohort group and reflects the 
relationship some had with Azad Kashmir and views of what they described as 
‘Indian-occupied Kashmir’. It was less so for the Pukhtoons, who rather looked 
towards Afghanistan as a source of enmity and solidarity, depending on who 
was in power.  
 
Again the researcher would argue that these views need to be assessed in line 
with the constant negotiating taking place amongst the sample diaspora. They 
were seeking to accommodate aspects of culture handed down from previous 
generations with a more modern outlook. This is the nature of evolving identity, 
reflected in the work of Sauter (2003) concerning the Turkish diaspora in 
Germany, for instance. It is reflected in the following: 
 
 ‘You never know, they might just throw you out of Britain using the   
 excuse of terrorism and sending us back to Pakistan, they just need   
 an excuse.’       
 Punjabi male, Luton  
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 ‘Even in Pakistan they don’t like us or want us there. We don’t really fit in   
 and our children hate it.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
Within the media sphere, there was a desire to relate media output to this 
evolving sense of hybridity that is transnational. Accordingly, this may reflect a 
desire for organisations such as the BBC and Sky News to provide, in 
mainstream television, more coverage with which the diaspora can identify. 
 
Interestingly, however, from the data it became evident that respondents were 
avid viewers on visits to Pakistan of both the BBC and Sky, through their 
international affiliates, BBC World and Sky News, transmitting to a global 
audience that includes Pakistan. This was the only English-speaking medium 
they related to whilst abroad, and was watched to accentuate their 
separateness and sense of elitism over Pakistani-born relatives. This may be 
another example of the contradictions within some of the data and responses of 
the participants, which perhaps highlights the continual and evolving search for 
meaning in their transnational identities, revealing the ongoing negotiations and 
understandings taking place, mirrored in Samad (2013). Again, it brings into 
focus the discourse related to the notion of ‘diasporic transnationalism’ (Baubock 
and Faist (2010) p17, Safran (1991). 
 
It was also revealing that, again, on a more personal level, many of the diaspora 
privately felt strong animosity towards the political establishment in Pakistan, 
including the military and civilian administrations. Participants spoke of the level 
of corruption and negative personal experiences when in the country on regular 
family visits. In other words, within the public sphere a more defensive tone was 
adopted to support the Pakistani people as victims participants could identify 
with, whilst in private conversations they expressed a contradictory view of the 
state of the political and economic make-up of Pakistan. This view of many 
participants was summed up by one Pukhtoon respondent, who reflected on the 
words of an uncle in Pakistan, in summing up the country: ‘Good people, bad 
government’. This raised much laughter but also vigorous nods of agreement 
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within the focus group at the time. Indeed, this was the prevailing view, that 
Pakistan’s civil society is better than the institutions that define the state. It 
provided further empirical evidence of the sense of being a transmigrant to 
which the researcher refers in Chapter 2. Many respondents commented in 
terms similar to the: 
 
 ‘Come on, we know all the politicians in Pakistan are corrupt, not   
 building the country but themselves. They hate us for having the   
 reds [slang for British passport].” 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
The view was expressed in a context that is liberal democratic context, despite 
experiences of Islamophobia and discrimination in Britain, and refers to 
principles of meritocracy rather than nepotism and openly corrupt practices.  
Through their consumption of Pakistani news and political issues there was 
interest in the political parties of Pakistan but not active participation. These 
statements represent a range of views: 
 
‘I think Zardari cares about anyone else apart form number one, he is 
totally loaded but I think Imran [Khan] is a good guy.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
‘Nawaz Sharif is a business man so he knows how to run the country and 
builds things but he and  Musharraf really hate each other isn’t it ? ’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 ‘Imran hopefully might change things if he gets into power, but the   
 old politicians and parties don’t like him.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
This was about seeking to accommodate the two halves of their existence, 
inevitably set as it is in a transnational context that places them in two distinct 
ideological systems, traditions, cultures and societal norms, arising from two 
separate hemispheres. The media, through its focus on issues related to the 
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‘war on terror’ has impacted on this trajectory defined by a hybridity captured in 
the literature of Krieg (1999), Faist (2000), Chul-Byung (2002), Engbersen 
(2007), Gayer (2007) and Samad (2013; n.d.).  
 
The constant negotiation of transnational and new meaning in an evolving 
hybridity is linked to a sense of personal and group security, so vital in this 
equation. In this process, the perception of Pakistan as a place of sanctuary, 
reflected in Bhabha’s (1994) notion of ambivalence arising from doubts within 
the diaspora of their place in British society, is aiding that transnational quest. It 
was clear that within the sample diaspora this had created an awareness of a 
need to consume much more diverse media in order to assist aids this transition 
between identities or working towards accommodating the ambiguities and 
transmigrant nature they sought to reconcile within an East-West discourse. 
Evident also was the profound influence the media had had on a sense of 
political awakening as a result of their daily mass media consumption.  
 
 
6.1 Political awakening and response 
 
An examination of the new political consciousness or awakening experienced 
by the sample diaspora is useful in assessing the role of media and its impact 
on the diaspora, given that participants argued that media bias impacted greatly 
on their identity. The researcher would argue that this strong perception raised 
a robust political edge and consciousness within many of the cohort members.  
 
This political awakening was a subsidiary response to the diaspora study 
sample’s view the mass media was growing more extreme in its hostility to their 
faith and, as a consequence, to them as visible minorities. It can be argued that 
further political awakening, or what Modood (2005, 2010) has referred to as 
‘Asian assertiveness’ (2010, p.134), can even be translated as ‘Muslim political 
awareness’ capturing the hearts and minds of many of the diaspora sampled in 
this study. In fact, many participants were highly politically aware of global 
issues and international relations specifically related to Muslims and Islam. 
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Within this paradigm the trigger for many was their consumption of a greater 
range of media, both Western and other, that framed this raised consciousness 
and led to greater alertness of what the media were saying. In turn, this created 
a form of assertive action in acknowledging and validating their own sense of 
being, as British and as Muslim. This was in many respects a continuation of 
their journey of self-exploration into who and what they were, with the media 
raising much consciousness and debate and impacting on their day-to-day 
reality. 
 
As a consequence, they developed a daily practice of continual cross-
referencing within an international dimension, between by global news media 
both from the East and West, which was then echoed in the discussions with 
respondents and featured in nearly all interviews that conveyed their key 
opinions on these specific matters.  
 
The following comments, the first of which has already been quoted, offer some 
insight from some of the female interviewees that emphasises a growing 
political awareness of international issues and the media. Again, they are 
reflective of the immense concern and anger felt over a range of issues they 
maintained are targeted at Muslim nations by stronger Western states: 
 
‘The truth is that the Americans want to dominate the world and use their 
power to dictate to the rest of the world. Muslims are rising up and 
defending themselves. That is not what they really like.’  
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
 ‘I don’t really care what they think about me, I am proud to be 
 British, Pakistani and be a Muslim. If they don’t like it, it’s their 
 problem.’ 
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
The women also explained their irritation over the much-abused term ‘jihad’, 
which was interpreted in the extreme sense by Western press and politicians 
alike. In their view, jihad denoted a movement against injustice rather than one 
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for war; the latter was the sense embodied in Western depictions of militant 
Islam. In many of the focus groups and one-to-one interviews, these women 
maintained the opinion that their new political awareness had come about 
because of this international discourse that had been reinforced, at some level, 
by their own experiences. Foremost in their minds was their perception of 
American aggression and active interference in other countries’ affairs, often 
denied or not mentioned in the mainstream media. This corresponds to the 
research undertaken by Rinnawi (2010) into the Arab Muslim diaspora in 
Germany where he touches on the term ‘McArabism – a kind of instant 
nationalism’ (p.268). It also relates to the tensions between globalisation and 
localism referred to by Gajjala (2010). In this context, the researcher would 
argue, a sense of instant Muslim nationalism is being shown by these 
respondents as a consequence of their consumption and analysis of Western 
media.  
 
The role the media played within in this, in particular the BBC and Sky 
networks, were often referred to, as this comment, reflected in many others, 
demonstrates:  
 
‘The BBC and Sky still want to show us as bad Muslims blowing up the 
world, but they ignore murder in Palestine, makes me very angry.’  
Punjabi female, Luton 
 
It is apparent that the wider global political dimension was understood by 
individuals of both sexes and both ethnic cohort groups. They perceived the role 
played by the dominant superpower as all-pervasive, its strength being used to 
ensure compliance with its own interests, economic and political. This directly 
corresponds with the work of Herman and Chomsky (1994) and Dabashi 
(2008), who have argued on the relationship between Western capital in 
seeking global domination and the media as a key instrument to further 
economic goals and power. This seems to be an extension of the ‘propaganda 
model’ advocated by Herman and Chomsky (1994) which relates to the 
respondents’ perception of the power of oil companies in influencing the 
invasion of Iraq and business interests seeking mineral resources in 
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Afghanistan, as reported by Risen (2010) in the New York Times. These views 
of the participants also reflect Poole (2002) in connecting political policy with 
media performance. The work of Gilboa (2001) in seeing how media diplomacy 
is a tool used to promote international relations aligns to the views of the 
interviewees, who referred to the media as a principal actor in promoting and 
advocating Western foreign policy objectives.  As this comment states: 
 
 ‘You can tell the British media are peddling what the Government   
 want them to. Look at what they are saying about Iran. Don’t tell me   
 it’s not part of the government agenda.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
The sample diaspora also articulated the perception of certain international 
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations, 
not only being used to perpetuate Western interests, but of the inadequacy of 
such organisations and their ineffectiveness in helping poorer and weak 
nations. The United Nations was primarily viewed with hostility as a vehicle for 
promoting American and Western foreign policy. Participants also emphasised 
what they considered as Western duplicity in manipulating the UN when it was 
deemed appropriate to obtain validation for military action, whilst on occasions 
ignoring the institution when the West’s agenda was not served. The cohort 
gave Iraq as the tangible example, whilst highlighting Chechnya as a 
comparison. The role of the media was seen as complimenting this power 
equation by reinforcing the key messages promoted by Western political 
administrations.  
 
This opinion of double standards in the West was quite common amongst the 
interviewees, who felt strongly that Britain and America were preaching 
democracy and freedom on the one hand, whilst undermining Muslim nations 
on the other. The researcher found evidence of deeply embedded attitudes 
towards Western media and their political affiliations. Some participants spoke 
of the relationship and power of Rupert Murdoch and close workings with 
Western administrations. This has now been borne out by the Leveson Inquiry 
(2012), which highlighted the closeness between News International and the 
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British government, if not its institutions. Others focused on the way the media 
as a whole was perceived as anti-Islamic in its rhetoric, tone and imagery, 
constantly reminding viewers of the militant Islam they wished to personify as 
the new global demon, whilst ignoring the peaceful nature of the religion as 
articulated by respondents time and time again.  As one interviewee stated: 
 
 ‘Politicians always want to please Murdoch so he doesn’t   
 slate them, but they never say anything positive about Islam,   
 it’s always about violence. It’s all a game with politicians and  
 newspapers working together.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
These perceptions were embedded within the diaspora’s own developing 
feelings of identity, encompassing faith, multiple identity and culture to merge in 
a more Westernised outlook, albeit one with a sharper political edge. It is 
perhaps more than a sense of a cultural and religious familiarity that binds the 
diaspora to a distant place. That connection reinforces a sense of 
transnationalism, an aspect which may have been eroded with the arrival of 
new generations, although this was evidently not the case for participants in this 
research. The global political dimension reinforced a more personalised political 
awareness that shaped their own frameworks of the world, giving expression to 
strong sentiments of distrust in the large volume of information provided by the 
Western press. Consequently, this new politically heightened sensitivity had 
become more critical, analysing every nuance and storyline as part of the 
participants’ personal assessment of their credibility and validity. By doing so it 
developed into a proactive and conscious response to perceived media 
distortions of their communities. As this comment illustrates: 
 
 ‘We really have to stand up for ourselves as a community, otherwise the 
media, the EDL and the rest of them will push us down. We have to think 
of the future generations who shouldn’t put up with this.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
A proactive response, therefore, had been for many, on these numerous 
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occasions of doubt, to seek alternative forms of media and information sources. 
The use of the internet, in particular, afforded scope to search the web for what 
participants believed to be more objective reporting and analysis of news. For 
some, this had become a preoccupation. The internet allows consumption of 
relevant cultural, religious and social programming to meet personal or group 
needs. It signifies a much stronger political alertness to the messages, frames 
and techniques deployed by the media to provide a form of social construction 
of society, as McQuail (2005) has theorised. The findings in this research also 
relate to the work of Said (1978) on the cultural apparatus, referred to in 
Chapter 5 on media production. 
 
The process of cross-referencing, referred to earlier, the researcher would 
argue, is in itself a strong sign of self-assertiveness and political action, initiated 
and engaged in by diaspora members. It shows a constructive response to the 
lack of trust and sense of frustration and resentment felt by many, of much of 
what they viewed, read and listened to, in predominantly Western media. The 
multi-channel satellite and cable outlets on the airwaves provided them with 
alternatives and choices that were global and easily accessible.  
 
The role of the Iranian-based Press TV was discussed with the cohort groups 
who had an interest in this network. The researcher felt it useful to probe with 
participants the reliability of this source, given the divergence of faith between 
Sunni and Shia Islam, the latter of which Iran embodied. Some questioned the 
merit of the query itself and felt uncomfortable; however, others stated quite 
clearly and categorically that they were cognisant of this fact and aware of their 
reasons for consuming this specific news media as an alternative source.  
 
They argued quite passionately about the role of this unconventional 
broadcaster in helping them to evaluate British and Western media in particular, 
including how the news items were framed and in what order. These 
comparisons were vital, they added, to give them a better balance of 
information that did not reinforce a sense of alienation or feelings of low morale 
as negative storylines were continually thrown at them. There was a small 
sense of pride in how Iran was challenging the dominance of the Western 
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media itself and that this was a source of some inspiration, aiding their own 
political self-development.  
 
Participants made some comparisons between Press TV and Al-Jazeera 
English, the Qatari-based station. Many felt Press TV to be more outspoken and 
sharper in its coverage of global news, whilst Al-Jazeera presented a more 
Eurocentric outlook, although editorially it was considered as objective and 
informative. The difference in these two regional networks was their relationship 
to the West and it was these political considerations of Iran challenging 
America, that were viewed as tangible evidence of true independence of mind. 
This is in itself interesting, given the sectarianism that is often quite vehement 
amongst Sunni’s and Shias in the wider Muslim world, and so evident in Iraq, 
Bahrain, Pakistan and Syria with much sectarian bloodshed taking place. That 
this element was not considered as vital for the sample diaspora when 
consuming this specific broadcaster perhaps indicates the diaspora’s strong 
frustration with the mainstream media they consume and the lack of alternatives 
available.  As this respondent indicates: 
 
 ‘Al-Jazeera is better than the BBC, but Press TV is better than Al-  
 Jazeera. But that is the only two I tend to watch. I can’t stand CNN   
 or Sky.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
This viewing of non-religious significant press is further evidence of the 
transnational nature of media consumption that has become a political and 
social response to what is considered subjective Western coverage. This was 
demonstrated within the lengthy exchanges that took place in both cohort 
groups at different periods of the research. It was a strong indication of how 
more politically aware the participants had become over the course of the 
research project in their viewing of news media. The views were quite 
outspoken in this respect and again the association with the British 
establishment and political agenda was stressed, although there were a 
minority who were vociferous in this analysis, whilst others remained silent.  
 
225 
 
In hindsight, such a discussion was valuable, as at the time of writing there is 
much global political debate about Iran and its nuclear development. A 
ramification of this growing hostility may have been the closure of Press TV in 
London (Sweeney, 2012). The growing media war between the BBC and 
Iranian authorities with respect to its Persian service led to accusations against 
Iran of press control (BBC News, 2012). These are all key factors at play that 
have provided an additional contribution to this debate, in what has been 
described as an emerging 'cold war' by the British foreign secretary (Quinn, 
2012). However, the researcher concludes that if Western media compliance 
with their respective governments is involved, as is the diaspora’s perception of 
what they consume, then this is surely also the case for other media they 
entertain, such as Iranian (Press TV) and channels operating in Pakistan. In the 
case of the latter two, there are no independent regulatory bodies that would 
ensure the separation of state and media.  
 
Many participants did not distinguish a conflict of interest in state involvement in 
broadcasting news and information, directly or vicariously. Many had not even 
considered the role of Voice of America within a mainstream Pakistani 
broadcaster such as Geo News consumed regularly by many of the diaspora. 
This reflects a lack of awareness on this specific issue and signifies the sample 
diaspora’s interest in the content rather than the ownership.  
 
Because of this wider global picture, a correlation between the political and the 
social for this group of the diaspora is apparent. Although many respondents felt 
that they had been aware of politics and semi politicised at an early age by the 
disputes over Kashmir, Afghanistan and Palestine, events and changes in the 
international political landscape had given them much more impetus to be alert. 
The only evolving difference was how close groups and individuals felt to the 
issues abroad. The Pukhtoon cohort felt more aligned to their traditional border 
areas near to Afghanistan, hence had a wider interest in this region and its 
people. For the Punjabi groups, there was a wider concern over the Punjab 
which also related to the political issue of Kashmir. The Pukhtoon interviewees 
were, however, more inclined to research and analyse the interconnections with 
their identities in relation to both Pakistan and Afghanistan, whilst for many of 
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the Punjabi interviewees there was a split between those with links to Azad 
(free) Kashmir and the wider Punjab.  
 
Consequently, this new self-awareness has led respondents to source 
alternative information bases, as well as construct media images that define 
their own sense of hybrid belonging. In doing so they are finding new platforms 
to assist in becoming more assertive in their own right and seeking new media 
as a process by which to articulate this desire to be a transnational citizen.  
 
 
6.2 Political alertness and new media 
 
This section will develop some awareness of how this political aspiration is 
structured within these specific groups. It is not developed into political agitation 
or explicit political action through confrontation on issues they feel strongly 
about. It is, as already stated, a political act of Asian assertiveness that has 
formed a political understanding of how to resolve some of the constant and 
inevitable negotiations taking place in relation to their evolving identity. In the 
context of the media, this has played out with what the researcher has 
described as active cross-referencing with other data sources. This is in itself an 
enterprising development and shows some independence of mind in 
investigating the objectivity of news items many feel compelled to disbelieve. 
The process also acts as a valuable funnel to channel a range of frustrations 
and emotions that are amalgamated with these strong feelings of media 
misrepresentation. For participants this proactive process of researching other 
media to validate Western produced information, is a positive contribution to 
their own quest for understanding of transnational identity. It therefore highlights 
a level of confidence in their dual heritage and sense of kinship with two 
different worlds that share cultural and religious affiliation at some level. It has 
allowed self-expression with the medium of new technologies and has 
articulated their own sense of belonging and achievement, as the following 
statements highlight: 
 
 ‘I’m always on WhatsApp with my cousins in Pakistan and we send   
227 
 
 messages in Punjabi English, if you know what I mean. They send   
 me jokes and I send them to my mates.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
  
 ‘I can send messages on Facebook to my cousins in Pakistan and   
 Viber them for a chat, they go to a pizza place to use their wi-fi.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 ‘I Skype my aunties now and we can chat about family, films and   
 fashion and they send me clothes that I like.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
Within this wider discourse of the cohort groups, however, is a lack of active 
political citizenship in advocating these concerns within a more public sphere. 
Many in the cohorts have argued that this is not a failure, such as that of elected 
representatives who share the same cultural characteristics but do not speak 
out about growing Islamophobia, but a sign of their own personal strength in 
building their confidence as transnational citizens, who take pride in their 
multiple inheritances. Their political awareness and awakening is reflective of 
their desire to support personal development rather than engage in external 
political activity to bring societal change. In many respects they are no different 
from mainstream society and the lack of trust and confidence in it for politicians 
and the political system. 
 
It is also at some level an acknowledgment of their own personal limitations and 
a desire not to inflame what they consider as existing tensions within 
communities, where they form a visible minority. In effect, they do not wish to be 
recognised within the public or media eye, so great is the concern over 
stereotyping and further recrimination that has impacted on their lack of esteem 
and confidence in wider society.  
 
It is also perhaps a reflection of what has stagnated the diaspora in this regard, 
the fear of continued marginalization, discrimination and animosity based on 
their culture and faith that has led them to remain silent and in many ways 
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subservient within mainstream society. Although this may feed into the cycle of 
victimhood, it is also a self-preservation mechanism they consider essential in 
the prevailing climate and media discourse. So, there is one mask for public 
viewing and one for private contemplation that focuses the minds of the 
members of the diaspora. This comment speaks for itself: 
 
 ‘What is the use of being political? Nothing is going to change and   
 it’s not really worth the agro – just get on with it.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
Yet some would consider this to be a self-effacing rationale for not engaging 
actively through political campaigning in addressing their grievances. Within 
many of the discussions held with cohort members, it was evident that most, 
although interested in wider politics in Britain and abroad, were unfamiliar with 
the workings of British politics and or its institutions. Many were not even aware 
of using their Member of Parliament as a vehicle to address their concerns. 
These passive sentiments reflect comments reported earlier concerning a 
sense of insecurity in being British and a reluctance to speak against what are 
perceived as injustices against them or their communities. In essence, 
individuals would rather maintain a public silence and only speak in hushed 
voices or in private conversations, as the following section indicates.  
 
An illustration of the political articulation and manifestation of using new 
technologies to advance cultural and religious hybridity was evident after the 
death of Osama Bin Laden on 2 May 2011, which in itself could have resulted in 
inner reflection and critical outer perspectives being formed. However, the knee-
jerk rejoinder was a bright and brilliant display of comical genius that showed 
the British-born Pakistani diaspora offering a taste of its cultural prowess in the 
age of the new media and Smartphone technological era. These are highlighted 
in the following examples of this flair that further signifies, if not enhances, the 
transnational concept of this formation within a Western prism that is evidently 
nurtured and proclaimed as part of this process. 
 
‘President Bush tried, and failed. President Clinton tried and failed.  
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Obama tried and succeeded. The moral of this is … 
If you want someone done, hire a black man.’ 
 
‘Osama Bin Laden sends Barack Obama a coded message to let him 
know that he was still alive: “—37OHSSV -0773H----------“ 
Barack is baffled. The FBI, CIA and NSA cannot decipher it. They ask 
Britain’s MI6 for help but MI6 could not do it, so they sent it to ISI HQ in 
Islamabad,  
They replied within hours: “Tell the President he’s holding it upside 
down.” ‘ 
 
There are also a number of examples of intentional self-deprecation intended to 
highlight the contradictions within the British-born Pakistani diaspora, of which 
the following is one: 
 
‘My name is Sheikh Surfi Mufti Imran Muzaffar Khan Chowdhury, bros, 
just to remind you need to book your hire cars early from Dream Car 
Hires as demand amongst local bad boys is high this year. You will 
receive a free Pakistani flag for Eid day to wave around like morons, 
(while stocks last). Don’t forget that it is cheaper to drive up and down 
Alurock Road or Cov Road because there are more hills so u can roll 
your cars down, saving on petrol. Michaels drink stop will give 10% 
discount to anybody who walks in without hiding their silly patterned 
haircut under their oversize hoodies. Fake designer gear also available 
from Ali’s corner shop. Credit will be available to those awaiting their 
jobseekers allowance. Plz bring your Pakistani nadra cards as proof of 
age and caste.’ 
 
Question:  What do you call a Pakistani Elvis impersonator? 
Answer:  Amal Shukup. 
 
A further example: The release of the film, The Four Lions (2010) ignited much 
interest and debate amongst the British-born Pakistani diaspora by touching a 
central chord of feeling within this community. 
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The British-made film, set in the northern steel city of Sheffield, with a 
respectable Pakistani community, tells the story of a group of men seeking to 
become Muslim suicide bombers. The uniqueness of this black comedy was its 
significant emphasis on multi-lingual dialogue that the diaspora could relate to, 
whilst setting out the wider global geo-political situation about the ‘war on terror’ 
and perceived role of British Muslims. This caricature of British Muslims and 
Pakistani diaspora Muslims simultaneously highlighted the absurdity of 
terrorism whilst emphasising the anger over international issues, such as Gaza 
or Kashmir. It also revealed the minority nature of this extremism and depicted 
victims on the streets of Britain of such professed religious zealotry as being 
from all backgrounds, ethnicities, religions and racial groups, including diaspora 
British Muslims. For many of the diaspora, as evident in the discussions with 
respondents, this specific film touched a sense of familiarity.  
 
In many ways, for participants the film highlighted the complexity of the internal 
debates on extremism and terrorism as related to their specific communities 
and in particular their own identities in Britain. There was much empathy with 
the root causes of resentment by Muslim youth and wider population and 
equally an abhorrence of terrorism as a means of seeking justice. Although 
these views were captured after the main fieldwork had been completed, the 
researcher felt it important to gain the views of participants on this film.  
 
An additional feature of this data collection was that it was done through a 
different process of engagement. Text messaging and Whatsapp instant 
messaging were used as the method of conducting this small additional 
research. The use of this new technology as a mechanism for data collection in 
this example highlighted how much of a resource these techniques have 
become for the diaspora. It also reiterated how such new techniques were 
becoming vogue as an expression of their transnational identity. Within the 
wider analysis however, there remained many vehement concerns that were 
expressed more privately than through any public medium or technology.  
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6.3 The public and private face of identity  
 
This section examines further another aspect of the continual negotiation taking 
place amongst the sample diaspora, as illustrated by these private 
contributions. In many ways, these conversations were the most revealing in the 
investigation, as the inner thoughts of the respondents, which became more 
apparent in needing to be expressed as the data collection period progressed.  
 
It was therefore important for the researcher to have an opportunity to discuss 
these embedded feelings. This was to allow expression to what the researcher 
sensed as participants’ feelings of semi-persecution by the media of their 
personality and presence in Britain. This was seen to be exacerbated by the 
organs of state, such as the police or intelligence services, by government and 
national politicians. For the participants, this spotlight was not only 
uncomfortable but added to the pressure not to place the totality of their views 
‘on the record’. Already acknowledged in the methodology chapter as a risk 
arising in this research, this now seems to have some validity.  
 
The hesitancy of some respondents masked a concern over what was 
acceptable to be recorded and what was considered as too delicate to state 
within a public sphere in any study. However, these non-attributable comments 
were deemed important to help shape a greater understanding of the diaspora 
mindset at the time of data collection. They have been summarised 
anonymously and generally, to help understand the key issues but also 
maintain discretion. Interviewees agreed to the use of these conversations 
without their being identified, an ongoing concern in this context. It was 
considered important to have these sentiments recorded, as they are as 
important as the comments made on tape. 
 
The researcher found that, following formal completion of the formal interviews 
and once the recording device had been turned off, some of the participants 
became more engaged in expressing their anxieties about the media and how it 
impacted on their personal space and identity. These ‘snapshots’, taken within 
an anonymous and safe space and not formally recorded, were much more 
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animated and revealing. Many participants felt less inhibited and stated their 
opinions more forthrightly and much more assertively, complaining of the vast 
media bias, in their view, in depicting Islam that made many of them vehemently 
opposed to British media reporting. Views were further amplified in these private 
sessions of the ‘so-called war on terror’ being a bogus front for Western 
imperialism, with Western media actively in support of this policy. The BBC was 
seen as an active advocate of the British government whilst at times pretending 
to be critical of ministers and the political establishment. The reporters were 
often viewed as potential masters of espionage working for the British 
intelligence services and only seeking out stories that inflamed anti-Muslim 
feelings amongst wider British society. As respondents stated: 
 
 ‘We don’t want to say it on tape because you don’t know where it   
 will end up and who is listening these days.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
 ‘I’d rather not say it on the tape or have it recorded. I don’t want to   
 tell anyone how I really feel about all of this.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
An interesting view about the media expressed by participants reflected that 
found in the work of Goodman and Goodman (2006) about the links made 
between reporters and the CIA. Correspondents in general could not be trusted 
and those working for Sky or BBC News were held in particular contempt. 
Mention was often made of the pro-Israeli conspiracy theory about the power of 
the Jewish lobby, aided by the hand of America behind such attempts to 
mislead the global public through its widespread control of media machinery.  
 
Many participants articulated what they perceived was the real motivation in the 
West and in respective government circles for this Islamophobia expedition on a 
global stage: the growth and power of Islam that was spreading across the 
world. Western converts to Islam were increasing, as were Muslim populations 
in these countries, who were not only feared, but also seen as potential disloyal 
citizens within predominantly Christian states. The role of the previous Pope 
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Benedict XV1 in seeking to halt Turkey’s admission to the European Union was 
cited as one example of this concerted push to make the religion less popular 
and weak in Europe. Some also cited the examples of reports of one Cardinal 
Turkson, who questioned the growth of Islam in Europe, and of the Catholic 
Church’s response to this growing Muslim demography (O’Leary, 2012). 
 
These sentiments are aligned to the role Islam may play as the new ‘bogeyman’ 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union that has led to much discourse on the 
role of the faith and relations with the West. This is reflected in the work of 
Bernard Lewis on Islam (Lewis, 1971, 1990, 1991, 2003, 2012). 
 
In assessing these issues, there was some element of belief in the existence of 
a continued conspiracy against Islam and Muslims, both in the West and 
worldwide. It would perhaps be simpler to view this conspiracy as anti-Islam 
hysteria rather than analysing the complexities of Islam and its various sects 
and branches of belief. Many of the respondents would prefer not to be critical 
of Islam itself, however practised and demonstrated, given their strong faith. In 
some cases it was an instant reaction to the critique of Islam or its followers, 
after a high-profile event, such as the bombings in New York, London or 
elsewhere.  
 
There was a view that those who called themselves Muslims and carried out 
atrocities were not adopting Muslim values that abhorred such violence. 
Alternatively, participants suggested that some may have been indoctrinated at 
some level by intelligence agencies and that Western agencies such as the CIA 
had a hand in such activities. This polemical view echoes the work of Goodman 
and Goodman (2006), which refers to subversive activities of intelligence 
services, including media infiltration. This thought process emerged clearly from 
the data as well as observations made by the researcher. In that respect, it was 
a theory framed with inductive logic that some of the sample diaspora felt 
needed to be aired. This comment highlights what was repeated often and 
again, by various respondents: 
 
 ‘We’re really not accepted here. They also tell us to integrate, but to   
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 what? They want us to stop being Muslim and lose who we are.’  
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
It is interesting to note that, although many of the respondents consistently 
referred to their wariness of Western media, they often cited such press and 
news agencies as evidence to reinforce their own theories. Interpretations such 
as the impact of the Jewish lobby, the anti-Muslim embedding of the BBC and 
news reports that are therefore, in the main, misleading and ill-informed, were 
reflected in the collective theorising amongst groups of young people among the 
respondents.  
 
A natural extension of concern was the perception of an intentional programme 
to malign Islam globally. This was said to be exemplified within the area of 
public policy by strategies to combat violent extremism and increase a sense of 
community cohesion, such as Prevent and Respect (Parliament 2012), which 
were viewed with much disdain and hostility by many cohort group members. 
They were assessed as marketing ploys openly constructed to pacify the white 
majority communities after the riots in the Northern cities in England during 
2001. This view was coupled with a fear that, within the Muslim and Pakistani 
community, there were people who acted on behalf of the security services as 
informants to keep an eye on suspected troublemakers or community activists. 
Some even gave names of individuals in the two cities whom they suspected of 
being such minor agents of the state, concluding that most people in the 
community, through word of mouth, knew them. Therefore, many avoided or 
side-lined such suspected informers, even acknowledging that some people, 
aware of their dubious allegiances, fed them false information they knew would 
rebound back on such interlopers.  
 
This lack of confidence is reflected in Fekete (2006) on how one aspect on the 
‘war on terror’ has been the impact of stop and search on Muslim men and 
overzealous policing. There were claims by the sample diaspora that this just 
added to resentment in the diaspora and did not help the case of the 
government or law enforcement agencies. In this line of thought, there was an 
additional concern and criticism levelled at what they referred to as some so-
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called Muslim converts from the West who attended their mosques. They were 
viewed with suspicion as another potential source of intelligence-gathering 
present in these places of worship.  
 
The respondents also questioned the representativeness of bodies such as the 
Muslim Council of Britain, which many considered as leaning towards 
government admiration rather than speaking out for the interests of Muslims 
and emerging diasporas. A feature of such groups is to claim to represent the 
whole Muslim interest, which participants considered as contradictory, given the 
diversity and tensions within Islam itself. The British Muslim population is 
extremely diverse based on religious discipline, branch of faith, class status, 
geographical differences and so forth, and on that basis such national bodies 
cannot in totality be the spokesperson for such a wide body of opinion or 
community. Another feature of complexity in this discourse, which some 
respondents had not considered, was for government perhaps to have several, 
rather than just one, body representing Muslims to engage with. It mirrors 
Poole’s (ibid.) view of the constant media portrayal of Islam as a monolithic faith 
that is also framed within political circles. The following was a common 
perception in both cohort groups: 
 
 ‘Asian politicians, especially the Muslim ones in parliament, are   
 complete wankers, just making a name for themselves. They   
 haven’t the guts to speak out.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton 
 
In essence, such concerns add to the researcher’s perception of insecurity of 
identity as a recurring theme, together with a need to continually assert the right 
to belong within the narratives of being born in Britain, yet being treated unfairly 
and, as they perceived, as second-class citizens. Consequently, some 
participants considered that their views were misrepresented by what they, 
once again, considered as unrepresentative individuals and groups seeking to 
speak for the very cosmopolitan groups of Muslim communities in Britain. Many 
of the participants felt that no one safeguarded their interests or spoke up for 
their concerns of discrimination and anti-Muslim feeling. Those who were often 
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invited to speak to the media on their behalf were seen as middle-class 
individuals who would not and could not relate to the mass of disadvantaged 
Muslim youth represented, for example, by Pakistani Muslim young people or 
other marginalised people, such as Bangladeshi youth. This yearning for equal 
treatment and equal rights was a sub-theme of this wider analysis in parallel 
with other threads of thinking.  
 
There was a strong sense of emotion during these exchanges paralleled by a 
reluctance to speak out or campaign against what they felt was such injustices. 
When pressed on this matter, the same defeatist response came back: “What’s 
the use, who’s going to listen to us anyway, no one really cares what we think.” 
This increasing sense of isolation and withdrawal may have similarities with that 
of young people in mainstream society. This was put to participants, who 
argued that their experience was unique as the level of animosity towards them 
was considered premeditated and orchestrated by the media to reinforce a 
global image of the Muslim adversary. At some level within this discourse, there 
was a strong reinforcement of their parental fears, intravenously fed into their 
thoughts and sub-conscious. Unrealistic parallels such as the expulsion of 
Ugandan Asians by Idi Amin in 1972 were drawn to reinforce this fear of one 
day being thrown out of Britain for not being British. Again, this was a view 
promoted and held by parents and elders, who continually seem to pass on 
their own sense of insecurity of British tenure to their offspring, despite their 
legal status as British-born citizens. This heightened insecurity exacerbated the 
need to have a place to belong and, in some of the diaspora’s minds, made 
Pakistan attractive not only as a refuge but also as a haven from all the 
prejudices and injustices they perceived in the West: a naïve viewpoint given 
their overall concern for the rule of law and sense of justice – core values 
instilled in them as part of their British citizenship – which they felt were denied 
in Pakistan.  
 
It may also be argued that, given the mixture of weakness and strength within 
the sense of Muslim Britishness, these contradictions and indecisions signify a 
continual personal and group struggle, and are part of the process of formation 
of a new hybrid identity. It is a reminder of the constant negotiations taking 
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place within the diaspora, at a deep personal level and in group interactions. In 
that sense, these juxtapositions are inevitable, if not needed, to test out their 
experiences and exploration and potential affirmation of hybrid identity.  
 
The perceived and actual discrimination felt by some women frightened them, 
as they felt increasingly powerless, despite legislation to combat religious 
discrimination. Similarly to the male interviewees, many of the women felt that 
no one was speaking up for them and that their concerns were not being 
addressed. Some spoke of not wishing to raise their voices in case enmity from 
mainstream society increased; this was repeated often by respondents. 
 
The women specifically spoke strongly of how anti-Muslim sentiments they 
perceived had made them resilient in their beliefs that were completely 
absorbed into their identity as a whole. The Pukhtoon women, particularly, were 
of the opinion that Islam was a complete way of life with no distinction made 
between their culture and religion. The media vilification of their faith globally 
was misleading and only as a Muslim could one appreciate the falseness of 
such claims and portrayal. The shared experiences of Muslims around the world 
were emphasised as being evidence of a single community of faith or Ummah, 
whilst their British Muslim personality provided them with an affirmed sense of 
being rooted in Britain.  
 
They were well aware of the opportunities afforded in Britain rather than 
Pakistan. This also demonstrates a strong allegiance to being British as the 
most fundamental element to their transnational sense of history. In many 
respects it also emphasises the reality of life, as many would struggle with living 
in Pakistan on a permanent basis, given the lack of meritocracy, the 
bureaucracy and endemic corruption that is openly visible in most daily 
interactions with officials. The researcher would further argue that many of the 
diaspora only return to Pakistan for short breaks out of necessity, often 
complaining about the lack of electricity and respect from relatives who see 
them as too ‘English’. In fact, it is a world removed from their own Western 
experiences and values that would not be economically sustainable or even 
materially comfortable as a place to live for the vast majority of the diaspora. It 
238 
 
is perhaps more a romanticised aspiration than a reality that will actually take 
effect. It is also perhaps a knee-jerk response to what are perceived as small 
injustices in Britain reinforced by the lack of real knowledge about modern 
Pakistan and its many political, social and economic complexities. It is for some 
a much desired safety net.  In this context, in the summary of this chapter (6.6), 
the researcher refers to a new form of transmigrant with class distinctions.  
Inevitably there is no plan b as Britain is home and this is reflected in the wide 
range of quotes contained in this document.   
 
Although these discussions in private were animated and revealed an 
overwhelming sense of frustration and level of resentment, there was no sense 
that this anger would lead to any form of retaliation or public display of 
animosity towards other communities and peoples of alternative faiths. There 
was a silent irritation and acceptance, as highlighted before, of this status quo.  
 
In these cases, there is a need to argue that this shared experience resulted in 
a desire to understand not only Islam but also their sense of heritage that builds 
their esteem and pride. Yet the researcher cannot help but conclude that 
perhaps those making these contributions needed to assess the validity of their 
claims as ordinary members of society, taking into consideration the many 
intricacies of the global geo-political situation, rather than maintaining an over-
sensitivity to a critique of political Islam itself. 
 
Without doubt, for the researcher, this segment was one of the most interesting 
parts of the fieldwork process, as it revealed different views presented in 
different circumstances behind the discourse that both groups engaged in. It 
also highlighted the level of anxiety felt by the diaspora in openly discussing real 
feelings for fear of animosity from the majority of inhabitants in Britain as well as 
not seeking to reenergise stereotypes of fellow Muslims, if not of themselves. 
These were exceptional comments aired within a private domain that were 
cautiously and hesitantly offered as a part of their reality of life and perception of 
everyday media consumption and their identity. Clearly, many areas of concern 
and pessimism are attached to their viewing and consumption.  
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These anxieties found some transformation into a more assertive and proactive 
search to obtain a more positive and personalised media that depicts a 
constructive self-image through self-learning. In making use of new and 
emerging technologies, participants believed they might find a new beginning, 
an empowering process to tackle perceived media bias. The researcher would 
again argue for some re-evaluation of the conclusions they reached in 
generalising about all Western media promoting anti-Muslim bias.  
 
The role that media and new smartphone devices can play in promoting the 
positive nature of the faith is more demonstrable for the sample diaspora. They 
spoke of using media images, texting and the internet to develop and 
disseminate positive images of Islam. For them this exemplified how the use of 
such media promotes not only a sense of active citizenship but hybrid 
assertiveness. This directly related to their defined sense of identity and added 
strength in enabling them to feel being both comfortable and confident in their 
own skins, at the most basic level of interpretation. It was this new-found 
optimism and vehicle that allowed a new phase of self-awareness and 
articulation of their troika of identities – British, Pakistani and Muslim – 
communicated through a new inter-linking lexicon that comprises all three major 
aspects of who and what they are, and want to become. It is within this sphere 
that confidence is expected to grow and the response to their sense of 
victimhood to be continually be addressed.  
 
 
6.4 Language and use of new technologies in generational identity 
 
The increasingly fast pace of development of new technologies provided, in 
many respects, a unique and stabilising influence on the diaspora, as 
represented within the research cohort groups. It created an opportunity to 
challenge their often-told frustrations by a new method of communication, which 
has a profound effect on their identity. This produced a new assertiveness 
through the patronage of new flexible forms of communication such as easy 
messaging, social media and downloading. The resourceful use of language 
connecting past and future individual characteristics metamorphosed into a 
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growing diaspora sub-culture spanning an Eastern heritage combined with 
Western modernity. By doing so, it found a niche to strengthen a transnational 
affirmation as part of an on-going contribution to personal and group hybridity.  
 
There seem to be a number of relevant and important sub-themes emerging 
from this analysis. In the first instance, there was an interest and fascination in 
Pakistani culture per se. Second, there was a new distinction and demarcation 
being made between the diaspora born and brought up in Britain and others of 
their own heritage, within their own communities, whom participants considered 
as representatives of the past. These individuals were out of touch with what 
they defined as a new diasporic space or sphere. It reflected the differential 
between those ‘made in Britain’ and newly arrived Pakistani immigrants, 
brought here either through marriage or migration. A third element of class 
distinction is also at play here and needs recognition, indicated in the following: 
  
  ‘You see these yardies [slang term for those newly arrived from   
 Pakistan] with their oiled hair and chains on, look like real chavs.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
The separation and compartmentalisation of members of their own sub- 
population into a class-based categorisation was a new trend. This movement 
also signified at some level the growth of a self-designated process of 
embourgeoisement where one group has asserted a self-proclaimed superiority 
over another, regardless of their same group dynamic. It is the new diasporic 
sense of modernity that is at the heart of these arguments, similar to the 
thoughts of Ramadan (2006), encompassing an element of a British-inspired 
Pakistani Muslim faith, created and being evolved by the diaspora. It also 
relates, again, to Engbersen’s notion of transmigrant as referred to in Chapter 2 
that amongst others raises key questions on identity formation (2007). 
 
This growing sense of class-consciousness was a major theme in the 
responses of some elements of the sample diaspora who were beginning to 
identify with certain values and beliefs, associated with wider consumption, 
material or otherwise, of which new technologies are an important part. Indeed, 
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the ability to purchase modern forms of smartphones and multi-functional 
portable gadgets such as iPhones and iPads is part of this emerging material 
difference. 
 
Aspects of this new sense of modernity and class-consciousness relate to what 
Bhabha (1994) has referred to as mimicry, the adoption of Western values and 
dress as more accepted within mainstream society, which will be explored 
further later. The researcher would argue that the significant use of modern 
technology by the sample diaspora relates to Bhabha’s (ibid.) work on hybridity 
and construction of a new third space for negotiating insecurities and doubts on 
identity that also leads to affirmation and assertiveness.  
 
Of the two sample cohorts, the Pukhtoon were at an advantage. Many were 
able to speak Urdu and Punjabi as well as Pukhto (while the Punjabis could not 
speak or understand Pukhto), so they had wider access to bi-cultural and bi-
lingual material, whilst also retaining information in English. Cultural languages 
for the Punjabi, such as Urdu, were not used as much as Pukhto was by the 
Pukhtoon, who seemed to move easily between their own cultural languages 
and interacted readily in their mother tongue. Both groups, however, used 
English as the preferred language throughout the data collection period.  
In this light, new technologies were seen as a tool to increase understanding of 
separateness and togetherness by acknowledging a level of diversity within 
difference itself, evident by the linguistic mix referred to above. This included 
slang words in English, Punjabi, Pukhto and Urdu that became the new 
language of communications that evolved into text and word speak amongst the 
diaspora. It was a new hybrid transnational shorthand for these diasporic 
groups creating new diasporic spheres of communication and interaction. The 
internet, smartphones and web searches all provided a strong and positive 
medium in which to explore their emerging sense of Britishness and being 
Asians. As respondents stated: 
 
 ‘You can get these videos of Pakistani life with music and all these   
 sounds –  looks backward but it’s really funny.’ 
Punjabi male, Luton  
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 ‘I listen to Pushto music on my phone and just download it. I really   
 like the songs in my language as well as the Hindi ones.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford 
 
 ‘My kids are always messing with my iphone and downloading   
 Bollywood songs, and when I need to use it my battery is dead.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
Respondents spoke of how the new information tools equipped them as 
transnational citizens to reinforce multi-identities and provide a sense of 
heritage and understanding which their parents did not have, nor could provide. 
One mother spoke of how the internet and Google maps allowed her to show 
her children the home of her forefathers.  
 
 ‘I show the kids the village their grandparents came from and also   
 the cities near the family house in Pakistan. It’s really good.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
Another spoke of how it provided cultural reinforcement through learning Urdu 
or learning about the Quran from the internet. Others spoke of its value as a 
research tool to undertake the cross-referencing referred to earlier of media 
stories of Muslims around the globe.  
 
An emerging theme within the discussion was the use of new-generation tools 
such as smartphones, WAP browsing services and other accessories that are 
personalised modes of mass communication, through texting, videoing, editing 
and other aspects of transmission of language, images and voicemail. They 
allowed members of the diaspora to create items that included videos mimicking 
Pakistani and English culture, and multi-lingual text messaging in English and 
English Hindi or Urdu and Pukhto, to celebrate religious festivals and personal 
moments. On a lighter note, jokes were been engineered that poked fun at 
traditional cultural or family practices that are considered outdated and out of 
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step with this new breed of cultural entrepreneurs. All these contributed in their 
own way to this newly designed identity of the future.  
 
For instance, there was been a proliferation, within this media form, of small clip 
videos and anecdotes that combined cultural aspects with modern audio and 
visual formats. These included video images of traditional Pakistanis dancing to 
Western rap music, or mimics of Western nursery rhymes spoken in English 
with a heavy Pakistani accent and accompanying sitar music, most notably, 
‘Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star’. Amongst other innovations are Punjabi and 
Pukhtoon spoofs of prank-calling Asian businesses and orchestrating banter 
and cultural profanity in these incidents that are then shared with others 
nationally, if not internationally, through diaspora networks and cultural 
contacts. 
 
Again, an interesting variation within the diaspora is how in the case of the 
Punjabi prank calls there is an overt use of Punjabi profanity that is common in 
the vocabulary signifying class differentials. Amongst Pukhtoons, there is no 
swearing, again highlighting a cultural difference in tone and expression. The 
role of the Pukhtoon as the ‘Other’ in Pakistani society also emerges within 
these examples, with the Punjabi often chastising the Pukhtoon for his their 
perceived backwardness. This is another indication that the prejudices of the 
past are inherited in this modern age for some elements of this generation, and 
also represent the class variations of the wider diaspora. 
 
It is inevitable, in a way that the pattern emerging is of a split along gender 
lines, with the male respondents strongly associated with this use of bad 
language, which was non-existent among the females.  
 
Such vignettes offer an insight into the multi-layered functioning of identity 
amongst these interviewees. They also show how they looked back on a 
previous generation that they believed represented their lost past heritage and 
legacy. This was truer of the Pukhtoons than of the Punjabis, and represents 
ancestral links to Afghanistan and Pakistan that connect languages and cultures 
of that region. Participants also spoke of how new inventions such as Skype 
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and Facetime on iPads, had replaced calling cards to keep them in touch with 
family in Pakistan. It was important for them to keep lines of communication 
open at a time they felt attached to their origins, an impulse reflected in the work 
of Appadurai (1997).  
 
These discussions also reflected an assertiveness of participants’ transnational 
identity, which throughout the study the researcher perceived to be a burden on 
or incompatible with their evolving sense of Britishness. It was in these forums 
that many spoke strongly of the value of their transnational role and of being 
British and Pakistani at the same time. Importantly, many derived strength from 
this reasoning given the overwhelming thrust of the discourse in the data that 
spoke of open hostility and prejudice that had left many deeply scarred and 
lacking in confidence and a sense of their own self-esteem. This made a distinct 
impression with the researcher who felt much empathy and understanding of 
this group given that he too was also part of this diaspora community in his own 
right.  
 
This multiple heritage in many ways give them pride, albeit cautiously defined 
within their own parameters of understanding that often highlighted the 
dichotomy apparent through cognitive dissonance of who and what they really 
were. Such issues all fed into what can be best termed as a complex mosaic of 
identity formation within these groups, that in many ways may well be the last 
vestiges of cultural and linguistic links with parents and grandparents born and 
brought up in rural Pakistan. It may be that the third and subsequent diaspora 
generations will be different both linguistically and culturally. A pattern is 
emerging of fourth- and fifth-born children having no or very limited knowledge 
of Urdu or Punjabi, and not wishing to utilise it in day-to-day communication, 
except in very rare cases. The old discipline of speaking to one’s parents in 
their mother tongue has become a past relic, with most verbal dialogues 
conducted in English, signifying the predominance of the diaspora, now set in 
the reality that, for most, the mother tongue is indeed English and thus does not 
pose the same cultural and social dilemma it did for their parents. That said, for 
the Pukhtoon there was a stronger allegiance to their language as, for them, it 
represented a wider transnational relationship not only with Pakistan, but with 
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Afghanistan also. To this group, therefore, new technologies offered a unique 
opportunity to reconnect with a historical dispersal from this primary and natural 
home, in which language was preeminent, more so than for the Punjabi cohort.  
As these respondents stated: 
 
 ‘I use the internet on my phone and help the kids with their  homework 
and show them verses from the Quran and Mecca when   
 it is Eid.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton 
 
 ‘I think it’s important my children speak Pushto and I encourage   
 them, even looking at things on the internet that are useful.’ 
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
The new inventions of the media age had a clear impact on the defining and 
redefining of future character of many of the cohort group members. As part of 
that process, participants were forming a unique mould of being British, that is 
not a replication of their parents’ experience. The development of fusion music, 
images and anecdotes that circulate the cellular networks are a reminder of how 
inventive the diaspora has become in investigating their own personal and 
group identity, by provoking and challenging cultural and social stereotypes.  
 
Such stereotypes include the Pakistani male spouse arriving in England 
wearing 1960s clothes; Pakistani rural life is mimicked and old-fashioned 
dialects are accompanied by rap lyrics. This promotes greater differences within 
a diversity that is continually redefining its value base and assertiveness 
through creative form and expression. This example closely relates to the work 
of Samy Alim (2012), where hip-hop originated in the ghettos of America to give 
poor blacks a voice and form of expression against considered injustices in their 
neighbourhoods and in society generally.  
 
An alternative use of this new media has been to cross-reference media in 
respect to reinforcing pride into their Muslim origins. YouTube and other forms 
of easy-access media have allowed people to not only research but augment 
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their cultural and religious identity by providing evidence of a more enlightened 
and educational global Muslim fraternity.  
 
Feelings of guilt by association have now been turned into membership of 
groups with common Islamic understanding that are challenging and redressing 
the negative global image of the faith. The vanguard in this respect is a wider 
worldwide Pakistani diaspora, more educated and becoming more elite in some 
countries with a higher social standing, as in the United States and Canada. In 
using such methodologies to reinforce transnational cultural and religious 
validation, both the Punjabi and Pukhtoon are transforming through a lexicon of 
their own choice related to their personal perceptions, as one essential feature 
of belonging. In so doing, they are enhancing their sense of assertiveness and 
shaping their presence within modern British society. Allied to this is a need for 
media consumption that reflects this changing personality and order. The 
diaspora in this research became the architects of their own defining of 
transnational hybridity or of a new Pakistani diaspora set within a Western 
context in the public sphere. This clearly signifies a search for viable options 
that reaffirm their own sense of being and understanding. 
 
 
6.5 The search for an alternative and responsive media 
 
Inevitably, this led for a clear call by the diaspora participants for a more 
representative media to aid this new emerging hybrid identity, and so facilitate a 
greater understanding of their specific diaspora needs. This would include a 
proactive articulation of positive aspects of the people of the diaspora that 
included their faith, culture and contribution to Britain. 
 
This, they believed, would enhance the reputation of this community of interest 
and give further expression to the formation of new British multi-individuality, 
encompassing their faith and culture. This would in time become self-evident 
and established within British mainstream society and would promote a plural 
society. It is in many ways an acceptance of multiculturalism in its most holistic 
form that reflects the work of Kundani (2014) in valuing this approach. In turn, 
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some participants felt the manifestation of anti-Muslim feeling prevalent in the 
media itself would thereby be challenged. There is much scope for debate as to 
the merits of whether the bias perceived by the sample diaspora could be 
indeed challenged by the adoption of a self-sourced alternative media 
discourse.  
 
In reality, with such a diverse international media now in existence, there may 
not be a need for this at all; the growth of global markets has created more 
competition within the cable and satellite industry. This has allowed most 
nations of the world to operate some form of transnational media broadcast, not 
only for their selected diasporas but for wider international consumption 
promoting positive messages of their nations. It also enhances international 
stature, exemplified by China’s English-speaking international channel CNC 
World, launched in July 2010 and termed a ‘multibillion pound soft power push’ 
(Tania, 2010). This is not dissimilar to the Voice of America that existed to 
perpetuate the foreign dominance and policies of the United States during the 
Cold War era, and which in changed formats still exists.  
 
However, for the British Muslim diaspora of Pakistani origin, as sampled in this 
study, such media outlets may well be irrelevant, as they have no impact on the 
British public and their framing of the diaspora. It is media consumption within 
Britain, so present and real, and with such adverse impact on their status in 
British society, that matters.  
 
A clear response to that analysis was that they wished to source media that 
matched their specific needs and desires to counter that negative element in 
their place of birth. At the same time, respondents recognised that current 
combinations of media consumption, whether terrestrial, cable and multi-ethnic, 
did not cater for their quest for a reaffirmation of this transnational entity which 
they so longed for. Within that paradigm of representation and affirmation was 
not only the need for positive media reinforcement but also consumption that 
catered for their evolving transnational hybridity, in a format that recognised 
their Britishness. As these comments signify: 
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 ‘It would be good to have more dramas that are of Pakistani culture  
 in English. At least I could understand them.’ 
Punjabi male, Oxford 
 
 ‘I wish they had more Pukhtoon things on television for us.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
 ‘There is nothing that shows us as positive people. We have done   
 so much in this country.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
Participants argued that there had been and would be many documentaries and 
discussions on extremism and terrorism associated with their culture and 
religion, as argued earlier, that had framed them unhelpfully, yet there remained 
little that was inclusive of them. There were no positive elements within this 
current model of representation, which so frustrated and incensed many of the 
contributors. The internet gave them the ability and opportunity to assess and 
reassess information to cross-reference facts averred and assumptions made 
by British and Western media.  
 
The only deviation on this subject came in part from members of the Pukhtoon 
cohort who felt a need for a distinct broadcaster tied into their own sense of 
heritage. This specific request was intended to reinforce and personify a 
predominant Pukhtoon character through the consumption of a Pukhtoon media 
provider. The need for specific cultural and linguistic channels was more than 
apparent in comments by interviewees, inevitably to address the perceived 
cultural deficit that they existed as they grew up and lived in the West. There 
was a strong desire to have a channel or media that would marry these sets of 
ideas to provide them with one alternative range of viewing to meet this East-
West trajectory of personal understanding. Many spoke of how valuable it would 
be to have programmes that represented young British Muslims as part of 
British society, with a distinct youth culture and British way of life. Many of this 
diaspora felt the media they visualised would enhance their status as citizens of 
Britain rather than as denizens as reflected in the work of Engbersen (2007). 
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The relationship to personal identity of individual viewing habits was a strong 
determinant in how participants built up their personal profile to enhance their 
hybridity, whilst at the same time seeking to screen out the bias they believed 
so prevalent in mainstream broadcasting. Moll (2007) has demonstrated how 
important a role positive media portrayals of Muslims of the diaspora has had 
on this development and given an important vehicle for assertiveness.  
 
The diaspora in the study felt it incumbent on the British media to show, in 
particular, constructive images of their communities that would also further a 
validation of their presence and sense of place in the country. In that respect, 
their focus was the mainstream of British society and changing perceived mis-
representations impacting on their daily functioning as ordinary citizens. 
However, these were statements of aspiration without any intention of follow-up 
action to promote their interests in this regard, and indicated a lack of political 
and/or social action to achieve this goal.  
 
The respondents articulated a view of the limited choice available to them within 
the terrestrial medium that demonstrated the diversity of many urban cities, or 
incorporated content specifically commissioned to suit minority communities. 
What existed was limited to what they described as tokenistic gestures, such as 
the odd outdated Bollywood film in the early hours of the morning. Other British 
films, such as East Is East, depicted for many yet another stereotypical 
overview of a Pakistani traditional way of life. However, this production could be 
seen as an attempt at describing the generation gap between the diaspora and 
their parents in an enlightened manner.  
 
Within radio, the creation of the BBC Asian Network was a move towards 
addressing the gaps in established media for this unique population, but it 
remained specialist, not mainstream. This, more than any other medium, 
signified a more proactive, Westernised style of media consumption combining 
elements of Indian sub-continental culture that engaged with a much more 
energetic youth culture, mixing news and entertainment.  
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The BBC’s toying with the closure of its Asian Network, although it was 
reprieved, was given as further evidence of a lack of enthusiasm for cultural 
programming. Such behaviour also fuelled a perception that there is no real 
commitment within the mainstream programming and broadcasting elite to the 
needs of minorities, as has been argued by Downing and Husband (2005), for 
instance. This Asian Network station, however, represents a very small 
segment within the wider BBC portfolio and of course it is limited to radio.  
 
Western media tends to cater for a wider audience which spans millions rather 
than small minorities: that is the reality of the global media. To exist, it needs to 
increase its revenue and return to shareholders, if it is to survive in a cut-throat 
global competitive market. Yet in Britain, with the exception of Channel 4 News, 
there are very few representatives of the diaspora in front of the camera on 
terrestrial television, a fact that authenticates the respondents’ concerns.  
 
Accordingly, most respondents in this study remained switched off from the 
majority of terrestrial viewing and therefore solely relied on cable television and 
cultural channels to meet their needs, which remained largely unfulfilled. There 
remains a vacuum in this medium for this specific generation of Pakistani British 
Muslims, seeking reassurance and a form of endorsement, which in many ways 
instils a stronger sense of belonging. The Pakistani satellite broadcasters were 
not English-speaking channels and that was important to the diaspora. As this 
comment stated: 
 
 ‘At the end of the day we are British, so they need to have more   
 channels or shows for us that we can understand and other people   
 can also see.’  
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
To hope for positive representations in mainstream media might be a false 
expectation, arising from a psychological sense of insecurity seeking 
recognition through the placing of positive mainstream visualisation of their 
identity in front of wider society. Such an aspiration perhaps also recognises 
that their needs would be a recognition of their importance as a distinct 
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community with specific needs as consumers of media information. 
 
In the meantime, within this mosaic of cultural and religious media, there were 
notable channels that attracted the attention of the sample diaspora to meet the 
vacuum of self-identification. For instance, in respect to greater understanding 
of religious identity, Peace TV, an Islamic channel, was considered a positive 
influence, giving information on Islam in English which was accessible by new 
generation adults and the growing third generation.  
 
Such religious and cultural channels (ARY, Geo TV, STAR) allowed participants 
to explore and comprehend their faith within their own homes in the vernacular 
of choice, as explained by this young mother of four:  
 
‘Peace TV makes you understand about the Quran because it’s in 
English not like other programmes in Urdu or Arabic. Dr Zakri Naik3 is 
really good because he explains in English to you and answers your 
questions about what is written in the Quran, word for word. Before it was 
Arabic waffle on TV and I didn’t understand the answers to some of my 
own questions.’  
Punjabi female, Luton 
 
Clearly, there remains an audience and unmet demand for a combination of 
media that satisfies the thirst for knowledge to reinforce a transnational hybrid 
personality and key challenges facing young Pakistanis of the diaspora. Within 
the mainstream, there is no relevant vehicle at this stage that can assist them in 
this process, except a journey of self-discovery aided by individual taste in 
programmes of interest that could also be eclectic for each person.  
 
Analysis of the data showed up a further interesting division significantly based 
on gender. Most females watched a range of cultural media related to 
                                                 
3
 ‘Dr Zakir Naik is a medical doctor by professional training. He is renowned as a 
dynamic international orator on Islam and comparative religion. Dr Naik clarifies Islamic 
viewpoints and clears misconceptions about Islam, using the Qur’an, authentic Hadith 
and other religious scriptures as a basis, in conjunction with reason, logic and scientific 
facts.’ – Islamic Research Foundation website: http://www.irf.net/drzakirnaik.html 
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Bollywood dramas, talent shows and music videos. Religious programming also 
featured within that mix, most specifically during cultural events such as 
Ramadan or the festivals of Eid. Religious media networks were considered 
most useful for information and increasing awareness of religious events as well 
as being educational for their children.  
 
As reported above, based on the discussions and observations within this 
research, the data shows that there is a continual process of assessing and 
reassessing viewing that then supports the growth of a sense of hybrid identity, 
aided by a phalanx of multi-media channels. However, there is a stronger sense 
within the female cohort groups, especially from those who were young parents, 
that this search for their own identification with certain media had supported 
their children in retaining a strong sense of multiple heritage, which they 
considered an important role for them to fulfil as mothers in the new media age. 
This was an interesting point of fundamental difference between the sexes, 
where the males talked more of the language of self, related to their personal 
interests of choice (football, car buying), whilst the discourse for the women 
focused on family and the future development of their offspring. This point is 
significant in relating to a feminist approach to discourse analysis and 
highlighted in the work of black and minority feminist writing such as Walker 
(2013) and hooks (1995). 
 
On the other hand, for the males, there is not much appetite for the random 
selection of channel hopping favoured by their sisters, mothers and spouses. 
Some males opted for the pre-ordered and predictable Western menu of 
programmes that catered for their personal sense of British identity. At the same 
time, however, many of the males spoke of a need to retain their own cultural 
language, whether Pukhto or Punjabi, as an essential element related to the 
progression of generations. This correlates with the work of Hall (2001) in how 
communities interlink and make sense of the world and what Barker and 
Galasinski (2001) have spoken of as language and culture being naturalised 
through codes and signs into a form of cultural coding (ibid., p5). This is further 
evidence of a need to maintain the quality of a personality entrenched within 
their Pakistani Asian being. However, as part of these viewing patterns, the 
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females were much more confident and assertive in speaking cultural 
languages than the males, particularly Urdu, which accounts for the primary role 
of mothers as teachers of the mother tongue to their children. As respondents 
stated: 
 
 ‘My husband’s Urdu isn’t brilliant, so I speak to the kids. I tell him to 
 watch the Indian movies, but he doesn’t like them that much.’ 
Punjabi female, Luton  
 
 ‘I want to teach my kids both Pushto and Urdu as it’s important for   
 the future that they know.’ 
Pukhtoon female, Oxford  
 
What one can see from this is a myriad of programming accessed by these 
communities all related to group or individual desire, supported by the 
increasing role of cable satellite broadcasting. Such a choice allows each 
individual to select a multitude of viewing that can feed into a personal profile 
and development of hybridity. This multiple viewing takes place within 
households and within the broad range of audiences. This is the new age 
sphere of communication that has been reflected in the work of Vertovec (2003, 
2009). However, there is still a demand for a new media that addresses the 
formation of this new identification which remains elusive. This is the key 
paradox for the participants who, in many ways, are struggling with this 
developing distinctiveness. It is ironic, that awareness of this unmet need it is 
due to this diversity of media provision which allows the diaspora to explore and 
modify their identity within a construct that is personal and political and of their 
own choice.  
 
The plurality of mass media has allowed much greater consumption of a range 
of information that previously did not exist. It has provided a unique space in 
which to construct a transnational identity that combines ethnicity, nationality, 
faith and race amongst many other human characteristics. It is now aided by 
smartphone technology, on hand anywhere, for instant use of the internet and 
messaging, including downloading of hundreds of applications (apps) available 
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for the diversity of special and other interests, that has widened consumption to 
a far broader set of tools than the old-style television ‘box’. 
 
In all senses, the internet and use of YouTube have contributed a vast amount 
in the new media age in nurturing and developing a sense of personal identity, 
forming a valuable library from which to gain various strands of information that 
help shape personal hybridity in defining the individual. This is evident in the 
figures referred to in the introduction to this research. It is useful to consider that 
this format is seen to be more impartial than any state or private sector media 
conglomerate broadcasting to these audiences. The videos placed on YouTube 
are from individuals wishing to share information within the World Wide Web 
and not connected to government or officialdom in terms of control of output 
but, rather, using new media as more a process and vehicle of self-
determination.  
 
It is important to note that this also indicates a genuine desire to understand the 
past or heritage to create a new future self that remains evolving at this stage, 
utilising new forms of media that fill a vacuum left by mainstream and satellite 
media. In other words, the internet addresses a gap and appetite for self-
discovery that has not been met by the plethora of cable and satellite channels 
that seek to cater for every need imaginable. The ease with which one can 
search thousands of search engines on the web gives the individual much more 
freedom and scope to study, if not consume, new formats that are relevant to 
them at a particular time and space. This would seem to make the diaspora’s 
need for consumption of diverse and appropriate media on their screens 
redundant. However, their argument of a need to ensure indigenous-origin 
communities see more positive framing of them on national television remains a 
compelling argument. 
 
This search for relevant cultural, if not hybrid, programming, has created an 
agency that did not previously exist and by so doing has given much more self-
awareness and interest in multi-dimensional identity. This is profound, as 
reflected by Morey and Yaqin (2011), in looking at the range of media and 
Muslim representation. 
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There was further significance of this need for new representative media as it 
provided access to global peer reviews of self-identity from young people of the 
Pakistani diaspora, across other continents, seeking their own alternative 
meaning to belonging and wishing to marry Eastern tradition with Western 
living.  
 
Consequently, it will be interesting to note how far this medium will enter into 
the lives of the diaspora hand-in-hand with social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter, as well as other emerging technological developments.  
 
The main point, however, is the importance of these new vehicles that are 
creating more and more interest and activism through outlets that are open to 
the diaspora for exploitation without being confrontational to mainstream 
society. What remains a personal and silent revolution within the diaspora itself 
is aiding their own growth of what they may consider as a new form of multi-
national hybridity and sense of belonging. In many respects it is about 
combining the many facets of their individual uniqueness into a single form that 
not only achieves recognition but is accepted as part of society as a whole. This 
is not only a juxtaposition in the argument but also the dilemma that is the 
reality of growing up in two worlds and trying to achieve the appropriate balance 
and much-needed affirmation.  
 
In all respects therefore, the data raised a number of key issues that required 
exploration and elaboration. They highlight the parallels between the two cohort 
groups based in their respective cities. The issues raised in the main highlight 
significant and very similar concerns, which in themselves are a fascinating and 
revealing phenomenon. The divergence in opinion came across through a 
cultural and religious prism related to their own experiences and regional 
heritage, impressed upon them by their parents and elders, reinforced by 
infrequent visits to and experiences of Pakistan. These were enhanced by 
cultural-specific media consumption in Britain. What is clear is that these 
narratives are real, they exist as a daily fact for many. They view the 
mainstream media, chief amongst them the BBC and Sky, as primarily agent 
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provocateurs, and often considered oppressive, prejudicial and divisive in 
intention and nature. Although they are regarded with much concern, they 
remain relevant viewing. This is the narrative that relates to the ‘war on terror’ 
that manifestly defined these concerns of the diaspora and led to this 
reassessment of the media and its depiction of their present identity. It created 
a shared grievance amongst this sample diaspora as part of their devotion to 
their faith, whilst also creating cultural group differences. 
 
Apparent in this chapter have been some of the ethnic differences between 
Pukhtoons and Punjabis that also correspond with gender and differences in 
linguistic ability and geographical boundaries of history. This is not the 
monolithic Muslim fraternity that is so often reported within the media discourse 
that impacts on this subject group so greatly. Within this dynamic, as the males 
seemed more vociferous about concerns that related to their sense of belonging 
and exclusivity, the females expressed silent concern at the future of the next 
generation of the diaspora, namely their children, in a context of Islamophobia 
and racism. The prevailing shadow of the repercussions of wider society’s 
perceptions of a Muslim Pakistani association with terrorism was a constant 
reminder echoing in the numerous conversations.  
 
These were some of the complexities arising from the research question that 
required some response, to what participants saw as an onslaught by the 
means of communication, on global audiences that so infringed their collective 
and evolving diaspora identity. Their response to this virtual ‘war on terror’ was 
to engage with the virtual media to counter the rejectionism they perceived from 
the dominant broadcasters of the West. 
 
The discourse of the respondents in the diaspora sample reflected the literature 
of Husband (1994), Ahmed (2006), Modood (2003), Samad (n.d.), bringing 
together the ideas of the media racialising minorities and the evolving nature of 
hybrid and transnational identity. This discourse gradually became more 
assertive and challenging of such media stereotyping in part through developing 
the practice of cross-referencing through active critiquing and analysis of media 
reporting of Islam, Muslims and British Pakistanis in Britain. 
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Foremost in their minds were the historical legacies of colonialism, early 
migration and resentment at their continuing settlement and development in 
what is now, for the diaspora, home (see section 2.1), as these comments 
highlight: 
 
 ‘My grandparents used to tell me what it was like under British rule.   
 It was a really massive empire and you can see what they did to   
 India and Pakistan before and after partition.’ 
Punjabi male, Oxford  
 
 ‘My grandad was a solider in the army in India, well, we didn’t have   
 Pakistan then, but he wasn’t treated nice. My dad told us all those   
 stories his dad had told him” 
Punjabi male, Oxford  
 
 ‘You just have to watch films like Gandhi to see how bad the British  
 were in India and how Pakistan was created, really badly.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
 
“What is clear is that the diaspora, through their parents’ experiences, are 
constantly reminded of this initial journey within a pessimistic discourse 
reinforced by the language of rejectionism and yearning for an ideal they refer 
to as ‘home’, meaning security. This is fixed in distant memories that have no 
association with present-day modernity of the sub-continent. 
 
 
These inherited rural traits for the mass of the Pakistani population echo in the 
words of Kabbani (1987), who has written of how migrants displaced from rural 
life of the East to cities of the West have found this transnational uprooting to 
have caused much cultural and social upheaval. It is this burden of their 
children adopting signs of Western culture, whether through dress, language or 
attitude, that further adds to the high level of insecurity and perception of self-
denial that are embedded with the psyche of the older generation. 
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A number of males and a few of the females spoke of how important it was for 
their parents that they married someone from the homeland, particularly from 
the village their ancestral families belonged to. As one commented: 
  
 ‘My dad comes from a small village near Gujar Khan and wants me  
 to marry a village girl, but it’s so backward there, when I go I don’t   
 feel happy. It’s not like the cities in Pakistan, especially Lahore and   
 Pindi. They’re all a bit TPish [slang term for typical Pakistani] in the   
 village. 
Punjabi male, Luton  
 
Experiences of rural life were also represented in discussions of the building of 
new homes that some, like their parents considered important. 
 
 ‘We’re about to build a house in our village because at least it’s   
 something better to stay in when we are there. I want to do it for my   
 parents when they go to stay for a few months a year.’ 
Pukhtoon male, Oxford  
  
This is at odds with a small group of the respondents, emboldened by their 
economic and social success, who have only affirmative experiences and 
attitudes to strengthen their sense of Britishness.  
 
Yet the reality remains that, for the vast majority of British-born Muslims of 
Pakistani origin, there is a consistent truth in their assertion of wider society’s 
unease and ill-feeling towards them, persistently elaborated upon within British 
and other Western media. This sense of animosity by mass media reinforces 
the view held by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia which 
heard testimony across Britain to that affect (Runnymede, 1997). It also 
corresponds to what has been described by Doward and Hinsliff (2004) as the 
unsettling fragility of Muslim populations being eroded by 'ignorance and 
intolerance' (p.10). An adjunct to this are fears placed within the discourse of 
perceived tenuous links with terrorism within the wider diaspora population. 
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Comments such as: ‘The attitude among the majority of the population is that 
terrorists are Asian’, articulated by Professor Angell in a public debate in 2010 
only seek to reinforce this animosity in the wider public domain. It is the mindset 
that has been precipitated by media framing and imagery that personifies Islam, 
in a way Conte (2001) has alluded to, as the only global faith with an element of 
militancy. In addition, organisations wishing to exploit this division, such as the 
English Defence League and British National Party, create more animosity 
between the races that is blatantly Islamophobic and culturally racist in intent 
and action.  
 
These perceptions of the sample diaspora echo Dabashi (2008), who refers to 
the challenge of Western capitalist interests that have defined terrorism within 
an Islamic resistance to economic interests. This in turn, he argues, has 
resulted in the increase in warfare, supported by Western media that articulates 
and reinforces this complex power play, picked up by the respondents in the 
diaspora, who see such a construct as so damaging to their identity and status 
as British citizens.  
 
 
6.6 Summary  
 
This summary will draw upon some of the key issues debated within this 
chapter and aligned to the relevant literature on the subject. Foremost in the 
researcher’s mind has been how best to respond to a question posed in the 
Guardian of 30 November 2004, of defining one's identity as a British Muslim. It 
is a central point of debate in this investigation and perhaps best answered by 
the article itself in the following words: ‘It’s not about what people feel, but what 
they are allowed to feel’ (The Guardian, 2004). In that sense it corresponds to 
the empirical data in this study in how the sample diaspora feel as a new 
transmigrant of the modern age that are based on their profound perceptions 
and experiences of living as citizens in Britain. Thus their media consumption 
has defined their response to their identity that within modernity has been 
facilitated by new and social media; as vehicles of expression and affirmation.  
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As Gajjala (2010) points out, new media has created new spaces and locales 
within which South Asian diasporas operate. The sample diaspora in this 
research relate well to the idea of a ‘digital diaspora’ utilising social media to 
engage with their hybridity. By doing so, they are also creating transnational 
networks and communities, culturally, socially and politically that relate to their 
sense of home. Furthermore, their politicisation corresponds to Karim (2010) in 
how they seek to defend their faith from external demonisation by creating 
counter cyber representations of themselves, their culture and faith via 
Facebook, MySpace and uploads of videos on YouTube.  
 
Gender differences are also important to note as they continue to show the 
diaspora as diverse, non-homogenous and containing varied thought processes 
on identity. Similar to the work of Rinnawi (2010) on Arabs in Germany, faith is 
an integral element of the Pakistani diaspora hybridity that is not only a primary 
identifier for many, but a source of strength. As for the female Arab diaspora in 
Germany, cultural media is an essential tool in maintaining cultural reference 
points, including language and religious events for future generations. As the 
narratives in this research have indicated, the Punjabi and Pukhtoon women 
were keen that their children should be aware of their Islamic faith and cultural 
heritage. New and social media are now emerging as the principal mechanisms 
for that to occur among the diaspora: for example, the learning of the Quran via 
the internet with the student in Oxford, and the Imam based in Pakistan versed 
in both Arabic and English to facilitate this transnational connection and 
network.  
 
It is within this context also that the women in this study spoke of the use of the 
term ‘jihad’ as one of dual meaning for the West and for the diaspora. This is 
further explored by Rinnawi’s (2010) work. He argues that the term has dual 
interpretations based on localism and tribalism that are not related to the West’s 
portrayal of ‘holy war’. He argues its place as a ‘struggle’ or ‘effort’ internally, 
against the power of the ego. As such:  
 
 ‘the penetration of new media technologies into the Arab (South   
 Asian) world and their expansion via the transnational media have   
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 created a confrontation between the localism and tribalism of Jihad   
 and globalisation forces.’ (p.268)  
 
This is reflected by the Pakistani diaspora in this investigation in their 
consumption of and analysis of Western media output and their struggle for 
meanings that, as Gajjala has expressed (as stated in section 2.13), ‘occur at 
the intersection of local–global, national–international, private–public, off-line–
online, and embodied–disembodied’ (ibid., p.211). 
 
The impact of globalisation and new media has therefore, as Guo-Ming and 
Chang (2010) state, redefined notions of community where local is more global 
and whereby citizens can adapt their identities. Communities are not only about 
proximity and fixed location; as Gajjala (ibid.) points out, virtual communities are 
also real ones. This is true of the sample diaspora as analysed through the 
narratives, ethnography and one-to-one discussions.  
 
The realisation of transnational and diaspora rites of passage has led to the 
evolution of a global citizenry defined by a geography that is symbolised by its 
pliable nature and support for international affiliations, as reflected upon by 
Samad (2013) in respect to the Pakistani diaspora and by Eade (2010) on his 
work on the Bangladeshi generations. This version of the global city, so closely 
interrelated to transnationalism and diaspora, identities a manifestation of a 
future that differentiates and categorises hybridity within the wider geopolitical 
parameters of globalisation. It is a new coming of digital age that has not only 
created new communities linking similar diaspora globally but also become 
borderless. It has also constructed, or reasserted a stronger sense of Ummah 
within Western Muslims (see section 2.3). This may have created a 
‘McIslamism’ similar to the McArabism referred to by Rinnawi (2010) – a kind of 
instant Muslim patriotism (ibid., p.268) within diaspora Muslims in response to 
negative Western media consumption, and as an assertive response to it. In 
that respect, in an increasingly technologically advanced and virtual world, there 
is a single global ‘mega’ city.  
 
 The discourse will therefore continue this trajectory of reassessing and 
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reframing these personalities that is so revealing of the cohort group members 
who are, as the researcher reiterates, transmigrant(s) of a new media age.  
 
This has been confirmed in the process of observing the cohort groups over a 
long period of data collection. The researcher felt the term ‘transmigrant’ 
referred to by Engbersen (2007) was repeatedly a central theme of how many 
of the diaspora felt. It related to strong contradictions of belonging, on the one 
hand British, but without a sense of a firm footing in their place of birth. 
Alternatively, they looked to Pakistan as a destiny for an escapism that offered 
sanctuary from isolation, marginalisation and discrimination and being made to 
feel the ‘Other’ by mainstream society. Yet, in the place of their parent’s birth, 
this was coupled with anxieties of corruption and being seen as the foreign 
outsider. It became clearer that this sense of not belonging to either world had 
become a transmigrant characteristic in a new media age. Diaspora members 
were thinking through who and what they were and where they felt was home. 
Key to this assessment was the degree of a sense of security. Those feeling the 
most marginalised felt a much stronger sense of vulnerability and instability, 
while the opposite was true of the more educated, middle-class generation with 
strong roots and occupations in Britain. In this latter group there was no sense 
of fragility in their identity and status, they were strongly embedded in British 
citizenry and strong enough to repel any notions of outsider status. For the 
researcher, this came across strongly in the one-to-one interviews and 
interactions with other cohort group members within the focus groups.   
 
It clearly links into the narratives of the Pakistani diaspora and the analysis from 
the wider data including ethnography and observations. It is within this 
paradigm that a fluid British diasporic identity is evolving for this specific group, 
facilitated by internal and external debates that relate to status, inclusion, 
participation and belonging. 
 
It is inevitable, as Moussa (2004) claims that the rise in this sense of British 
Muslim identity has come about because of a sense of crisis within this 
population. This sense of crisis is evident through the narratives in this study 
related to anxieties of belonging and a sense of insecurity, all perceived through 
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discrimination and Islamaphobia, as discussed in Chapter 4. This sense of 
crisis, for the researcher, is related to their evolving hybridity and defining who 
they are. It can also relate to the work of Rinnawi (ibid.) on the internal battle of 
the ego that is described as ‘jihad’, within the context of globalisation, 
materialism and adherence to faith.  
 
 This follows on from the work of Modood (2003, 2010) and Samad (2013; n.d.), 
who provide an insight into this new emerging assertiveness of the British 
Muslim and their dilemmas as characterised by respondents themselves.  
 
The sense of personal discovery and self-awareness through accessing certain 
media has manifested a dual juxtaposing analysis. On the one hand, it signifies 
the dispiriting representation of the British Muslim by the mass media; whilst on 
the other, it provides an opportunity for greater self-awareness and creativity in 
setting the boundaries for one's identity. This is; in tune with what Goffman 
(1969) has referred to as the 'back' and ‘front’ region, displaying the public and 
private image, a concept familiarised within this data through the voices of the 
participants. 
 
The participants’ search for global diaspora similarities led to the awakening of 
positiveness and even pride in their culture and faith that so eluded them in the 
earlier stages of debate. It mirrors what Chul-Byung (2002) has interpreted as 
the opposite to what has been described as the cultural imperialist view of 
media consumption. They are thus not passive consumers but armchair 
analysts of what they watch. The sample diaspora, in this regard, has overcome 
some of its demons to articulate a stronger sense of this new-found and 
creative personal British Muslim individuality through new and social media 
spaces. The growing transnational element is a clear marker of what many of 
the diaspora see as a growing assertiveness of their combined Islamic religion 
and cultural associations, that give them not only familiarity but strength in their 
daily lives. There is much ease, therefore, in this on-going belief in global 
solidarity supported by faith and a common set of values and purpose that 
transcends national borders or a single space that is defined as the sole place 
of belonging. It corresponds to how Dahinden (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2009) 
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suggests ‘diasporic transnationalism refers to the ties of migrants and their 
collectives who entertain sustained social formations across borders while being 
settled in countries of immigration, thereby forming transnational fields or 
spaces’ (Bauböck and Faist (2010), p.17).  
 
Again, this global movement is now facilitated by the new media age, as 
illustrated in the data findings that makes the world a much smaller and 
accessible place at the touch of a button. Once, as Appadurai (1997) has 
emphasised, it was calling cards and other partly or largely superseded means 
of communication that were important to the generation preceding the diaspora, 
they have now been replaced by the smartphone community, evident by the use 
of iPhones, iPads, YouTube, the internet, instant messaging and social 
networking sites, Skype, Facetime, Facebook and Twitter amongst the most 
important, to harness, facilitate, construct and affirm this transnational 
citizenship that goes beyond formal limits. It correlates with what Hall (2001) 
has emphasised as the multi-faceted development of individual personality that 
takes into account language, cultural features and what he describes as internal 
and external distinctiveness. 
  
Additionally, the experiences and testimonials recounted in this chapter give 
weight to the arguments of those within the literature who speak of this evolving 
nature of hybridity that places diasporic groups into a place of two worlds. This 
is mirrored in the work of Turner (1994), Naficy (1993), and Vertovec (2003), 
which has created a body of literature with Downing and Husband (2005) 
emphasising the elements of the media impact on racial discourses and follows 
on with Samad (2013; n.d.), Engbersen (2007), Sen (2009) and Modood (2010), 
linking the specific Pakistani diaspora with new transnational movements and 
political identity.  
 
The literature also provides evidence, within the above body of work (again 
corresponding to the data), of what Engbersen (2007) has called 'transnational 
social fields' that are participating in 'transnational activities' through proactive 
involvement in Muslim networks in the predominantly English-speaking world, 
specifically in the United States and Canada, both with sizeable diaspora 
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population groups. Such organised and sporadic systems of connections 
through these new media mediums further reinforce what Modood (2003) refers 
to as ethnic assertiveness that plays a pivotal role in moulding their ‘hybridic 
Asianness’ (ibid., p.78). The power of this stronger self-awareness is depicted in 
the level of ownership that the diaspora seem to be taking of the development 
of their identity, gaining security in the process. Their sense of belonging is 
directly linked to their feeling of security, similar to the experience of Turkish 
young people in Germany, represented in Sauter (2003), who define their own 
personal safety within that European setting closely allied to a sense of 
attachment and familiarity they are comfortable in. The Pakistani diaspora, 
therefore, in showing that same trait, are creating the public and private space 
within domestic British society to become more secure and aligned.  
 
Their tools within this evolving hybrid development relate closely to the rise in 
fusion rhythm, and the use of smartphone technology and multimedia creativity 
that are retranslating this hybridity into a stronger affirmation of who and what 
they are. This is their new modus operandi that is seeking a resolution to 
internal investigations of their transnational identity.  
 
The streetwise sense and traditional background born of inner city experiences 
that have shaped their lives echo the experiences of black impoverished 
Muslims in the poorest districts of America (Samy Alim, 2012). The use of new 
media as a form of social action, short of full and overt political action, has been 
instrumental in giving these disenfranchised people the voice and much needed 
self-esteem and confidence that are perceived to be denied by mainstream 
society.  
 
These alternatives are now taking shape and hold within diaspora groups who 
are setting out their road map of self-discovery and realisation. The research 
indicates a powerful attachment to cultural and religious symbiosis within this 
group, with little distinction of nationalities made in this growing development. 
Both are uniquely blended and married together; Islam and being Pakistani are 
evidently the source of this self-pride defined in their Pukhtoon and Punjabi 
inheritance. This transforming identity is also symbolic of the desire to avoid the 
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discourse of deculturalised Islam that has become so in vogue in recent years. 
 
This new thinking on Islam is reflected in the writings of Talbi (1992), Arkoun 
(2001), Ramadan (2006) and Wadud and Mernissi embodied within an edited 
volume entitled The New Voices of Islam (Kamrava, 2006). As part of that 
search for meaning, there is a need to understand the competing theological 
interpretations that for the modernist is what Kamrava (2006) has set out as a 
prevailing view of some writers on Islam, who state that the faith should not be 
‘linked to a given culture and can therefore fit within every culture’ (ibid., p.24). 
This proposition would negate current thinking of the majority of the sample 
diaspora in how they seek to define their own specific transnational hybrid 
identity.  
 
Instead of a culturally specific, organically grown, multi-identity, this intellectual 
difference emphasises the fluidity and importance of the current debate on 
Islam set within the wider philosophy of winning hearts and minds, so troubling 
Western political elites. Instead of challenging the cultural racialisation, they 
may be seeking to ‘eurocentricise’ Islam to accommodate and or assimilate into 
a Western framework. Alternatively, the framing of the diverse Muslim fraternity 
within these defined boundaries of descriptive semantics negates the self-
discovery of this diaspora to seek self-determination and awareness within their 
own perceived struggle. Furthermore, it creates a clear distinction between the 
intellectualised middle-class Muslim elite and the wider and more impoverished 
Muslim communities of Britain and the rest of Europe. It is perhaps an attempt 
to deflate the ‘McIslamism’ spoken of earlier, where instant Muslim nationalism 
occurs as a response to perceived international attacks on Islam or Muslims as 
a global community. The Palestine issue and case study being a case in point.  
 
For the sample diaspora, their lack of interest in this class-structured debate is 
evidence itself of the disconnection between these two worlds of philosophical 
thought and actual experienced living, as voiced by the respondents. What has 
emerged is how the media itself has been an enabler of the respondents in this 
study, self-generated through what Moll (2007) and Modood (2003) have, in 
many ways rightly, assessed as a discourse of ownership, which has reasserted 
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their sense of belonging to Britain through the innovative use of smartphone 
technologies and the internet, and the use of tools and methods, such as 
YouTube.  
 
The British Muslim, particularly of Pakistan origin, described as ‘a title with an 
empty page’ by Naveed Akhtar (Akhtar, 2004), is gradually taking responsibility 
for being the architect of his or her own construction of this meaning of 
transnational hybrid identity that will continually evolve and emerge within the 
private and public sphere, to ensure a greater ownership of presence in wider 
society. This remains in most regards an on-going journey on a transnational 
pathway of exploration within a changing, challenging and complex world that 
sees mass media proliferating at an increasing rate to meet consumer appetites 
for news, information and new ways of connectivity.  
 
The diaspora have the opportunity to influence society at large. Whilst some are 
taking on this exciting new adventure of self-discovery, others remain self-exiled 
from these new trends of modernity, uninvolved except at a low peripheral level. 
How these transnational concepts will emerge in the future will be the most 
illuminating part of this work in defining a future generation within a new media 
and technological age, far removed from the first arrivals to Britain from the 
developing towns and agrarian societies of Pakistan.  
 
In essence, the researcher could appreciate both positions yet also felt that 
those feeling insecure about their presence in Britain had to assert their right of 
birth to belong. An extension of this, for the researcher, was that such feelings 
of insecurity and instability should not exist in the first instance, as they fed into 
the media depictions and discourse of the British diaspora of Pakistani origin.  
 
It seems more helpful to see operating between transnational spaces as set out 
by Dahinden (ibid.) as a natural evolution of hybridity and constant negotiating 
of multiple identity, often referred to by Safran (1991) and Samad (2013), for 
instance.  
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It is no surprise that these feelings of being a transmigrant should exist within 
the main body of the diaspora in this study, based on their consumption of the 
Anglo-Saxon media that dominates their current spheres of life and society 
around them.  In that sense, the researcher felt it may therefore be a weakness 
in their status as British citizens and in asserting this right. However, this 
perception, for the researcher, has also now evolved as a natural and positive 
contribution to the diaspora, individually and collectively, as a stronger evolving 
sense of Britishness.  
 
It is a celebration of all their identities – British, Pakistani, Muslim, Oxonian, 
Lutonian, former Yorkshiremen and women, Punjabi, Pukhtoon – into a new 
sense of being made in Britain. 
 
In that regard, Alonso and Oiarzabal (2010) in their edited volume of work on 
diasporas in the new media age have referred to diasporas mapping out an 
atlas of identity that is diversified by language, location and different ideological 
constructs as well as levels of integration and transnational links with similar 
groups and what was once the homeland. The internet and new media provide 
the opportunity to sustain and maintain these reference points as well as 
facilitating new ones in a globalised world. Distance as such has no meaning in 
a technologically advanced society, nor is time a constraint in ‘cyborg diasporas’ 
that are also asserting not only global affirmation of their identities but also a 
new form of political activism challenging traditional power structures. In the 
final analysis, it is these elements, individually and collectively reflected in this 
study, that offer a specific contribution to the available literature on the 
discourse on identity and new media. The researcher hopes that such voices 
have made a lasting and reflective impact on the discourse of British Muslim 
identity.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
269 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion  
 
This research has taken a journey to explore, and at some level determine, the 
nature of identity for the Pukhtoon and Punjabi diaspora as they consume 
everyday media. It is a passage that has included the researcher as an insider, 
making sense of the internal and external debates and perceptions of cohort 
group members. The grounded theory approach, as well as ethnographic 
evidence, has provided important empirical information on the basis of which to 
make some key findings. At its heart has been an attempt by the researcher to 
ensure a non-Eurocentric anthropological approach to the question in capturing 
the participants’ views. In that same vein, mindfulness of the need to challenge 
the Orientalist discourse has also been central in the analysis and conclusions 
of this final chapter. In that regard, the literature of Said (1978) and Hutnyk 
(2006) has been important in providing guiding posts. Furthermore, this study is, 
as McLoughlin (2014) observes of Alam and Husband (2006), an attempt by the 
researcher to challenge the prevailing liberal discourse on Pakistanis and their 
faith, if not place, in Britain. The researcher feels it important to emphasise this 
in this last chapter the value of the emic approach in making a distinct 
contribution to the life of this study. This final summation of the key discussions, 
data, the literature and insight, provides a final narrative on this subject area. By 
doing so, it not only relates the literature to the key themes emerging from the 
respondents’ viewpoint but also captures the nuances of the wider socio-
economic and political world that many respondents feel they not only relate to, 
but also are part of.  
 
The contribution made by this study intersects between identity and new media 
and the emerging relationship between identity and new media as set within the 
literature (Eade 1977, 2010a, 2010b; Hall 1997; Chul-Byung 2002; Poole 2002; 
Alam 2002, 2006; Modood 2003, 2005, 2010; Ali 2003; Ali et al. 2006; Poole 
and Richardson 2006; Ansari 2006; Alexander 2006, 2010; Brah 2006; 
Engbersen 2007; Samad and Sen 2007; Abbas 2007; Alam and Husband 2009; 
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Gajjala 2010; Alonso and Olarzabal 2010; Rinnawi 2010; Samad 2013; 
Kundnani 2014). 
 
In essence, Anthias’s (2002) view that little value is placed on empirical data on 
identity is asserted here. Much emphasis has therefore been placed on the 
narratives of location and positionality applied by Anthias (ibid.). These 
correspond strongly to the views, perceptions, anxieties and future aspirations 
of the sample British Pakistani diaspora who engaged in this investigation. 
Many felt a sense of semi-persecution by depictions within Western media of 
their faith and belonging in Britain. These undermined their sense of citizenry in 
Britain and in consequence their sense of security of place in their home. As set 
out in Chapter 4, the level of discrimination felt, the impact of Islamaphobia and 
perceptions of state high-handiness (via law enforcement agencies) all 
contributed to these perceptions of alienation, and to a sense of being viewed 
as ‘different’, even of being the ‘Other’.  
 
Additionally, language is an integral internal group feature that provides 
community connectivity for the diaspora, as argued by Barker and Galasinski 
(2001), and bonds them culturally and socially at some level. The researcher 
has referred to this and defined it as a clear example of societal culture, as 
espoused by Kymlicka (1995). Language was characterised as Pukhto and 
Punjabi for each group, while Urdu and fusion – a mix of English, Hindi, Urdu 
and cultural street slang – were synergised for wider use. Yet English remained 
the language of choice, particularly abroad on visits to Pakistan, when it not 
only reinforced their Britishness but also provided them with a sense of 
assertiveness in a country where they understood the cultural norms less and 
disliked the everyday corruption they witnessed. The watching of English-
speaking news channels (BBC World, Sky) was an example of this, cited in the 
preceding chapters, as well as the reported narratives of a politically corrupt 
Pakistani system. Their personal experiences at airport arrival and departure in 
Pakistan were often mentioned in discussions.  
 
At another level, language was also a signifier of representation used 
extensively by mass media that impacted on this specific diaspora. Van Djik’s 
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(1993) work on discourse analysis relating to such minorities refers to the 
spoken and written word that provides space for words of meaning, articulated 
in different ways, that perpetuate what he refers to as ‘elite racism’ (p.2). In 
other words, ‘through their influential text and talk, [elites] manufacture the 
consent needed to legitimate their own power and leadership in maintaining the 
dominance of the majority ethnic group’ (ibid.). This elite racism is carried out 
within business interests, in the political sphere, education and academia, to 
construct a dominant power balance. This further correlates with what Said has 
historically referred to as Orientalism (1978), a concept that in the new media 
age has been refreshed by Sardar (1999, p.37) as a neo-orientalism that 
continually and systematically perpetuates the superiority of the West over the 
inferior Orient. Global media, largely owned by Western capitalist interests, is a 
main vehicle for perpetuating this ideology. This has ultimately manifested itself 
in a discourse of Islam being at war with the West that has signified the political 
doctrine of the ‘war on terror’ as a rallying call for global action against an 
unseen enemy. It relates closely  to the work of Poole (2002; Poole and 
Richardson, 2006), which assesses in detail modern-day depictions of Islam by 
British media in particular. This recalls the political ideology that was prevalent 
within neo-conservative thinking during the Bush presidency in the 1990s. 
 
This was clearly reflected in the statements of the respondents who spoke 
continually of being associated with ‘terrorists’ perpetuating ‘jihad’ against the 
West. The experiences of the taxi drivers in Oxford provide much evidence of 
these concerns of how the sample diaspora, British Muslims, were viewed by 
elements of wider society. Their purpose and allegiance to Britain were being 
questioned and doubted in these recorded testimonials. The respondents felt it 
underlined how they were depicted within Anglo-Saxon media, particularly in 
times of tension. The attacks on New York and the London bombings were 
often cited as key pressure points resulting in anti-Muslim feeling felt by the 
sample diaspora at work and in public. Headlines and column inches in 
mainstream newspapers and other news media have also provided testimony to 
this fact, as highlighted in Chapter 2 and set out in chapters 4-6.  
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Thus, the study illustrates power of the media has been utilised to maintain the 
information war to remind millions of viewers of an external threat against 
Western modernity and civilised liberal values, echoed in the work of Lewis 
(1990) and Huntingdon (1993). Media representations have created the cultural 
apparatus defined by Said (1997) that portrays Islam, and Muslims globally and 
in the West, as particularly the ‘Other’, suspected of being benign saboteurs 
promoting extremism and hostility. Again, this relates strongly to the narratives 
of the respondents in both Luton and Oxford on the impact of the EDL and 
philosophy promoting cultural racism. 
 
Accordingly, for the Western Muslim and for the British Pakistani Muslim 
diaspora, this has resulted in a growing sense of insecurity and instability, 
leading to what Hall (2001) has described as a crisis of identity. It has also led 
to a more asserted Muslim identity as an enhanced response, described by 
Moussa (2004), because of the growing sense of Islamophobia and wider 
discrimination felt by the diaspora and recorded by the respondents. For some, 
this daily adverse reality they encounter in their working and social environment 
has gradually eroded their own sense of esteem and self-worth as British 
citizens. The concerns of the women, for instance, were for the future of their 
children in growing up within this sense of hostility towards their faith and 
presence in Britain. These psychological feelings developed further, to be 
interpreted and aligned into a sense of being a transmigrant citizen, part of two 
societies, as reflected upon by Engbersen (2007). In other words, for the 
diaspora, this may mean Pakistani and British, East and West, Islam and semi-
secular, a hybridity that has involved the cultural negotiating of their presence 
and their status in Britain as a response to perceived media bias. It is what 
Downing and Husband (2005) have referred to as ‘diasporic public spheres’ 
(p.45), an appropriate state for the sample diaspora in this context. It is these 
new spheres that the Pukhtoon and Punjabi cohort members described in their 
contributions and narratives that default into lines of separation and segregation 
leading to self-sourced links with transnational and cultural networks that 
Samad (2013) has related to. They feel that they are between two worlds 
competing at a global level (as played out in the media) and with divided 
loyalties that they are seeking to accommodate. In that sense, the term 
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‘transmigrant’ is fitting within a new media age where transnational relations and 
anchors for this diaspora remain essential, as survival mechanisms, while they 
work through this paradigm of belonging.  The ‘researcher believes the ‘trans’ 
element of the ‘trans-migrant’ concept, is important to emphasise as it relates to 
the ease of movement and communications in a new media age, across 
borders.   
 
Such global relationships input further into hybridic transnational identity, as 
identified in other diasporic communities such as the Iranians in Los Angeles 
researched by Naficy (1993) and Turkish young people in Frankfurt as reported 
by Sauter (2003). They also provided a natural response to the feelings of 
isolation, social exclusion and alienation precipitated by Islamophobia and right-
wing ideologies and political parties in Europe espousing cultural racism as the 
new xenophobia. As such, these transnational spheres bring with them a 
stronger sense of security and stability that supports a psychological attachment 
related to a positionality and locality described by Anthias (2002) that 
corresponds closely with the voices of the respondents in this study. Take, for 
instance, the interest in cultural media and Pakistani cable and satellite 
television as a means of understanding their historic legacies.  
 
In the final sequence of in the journey of this study, meaning is offered through 
the work of Bhabha (1994) on hybridity and identity that refers to a third space 
and its parallel in the analysis of this sample diaspora. Most importantly, this 
third space is a virtual entity created by the smartphone generation embracing 
new media to combat negative representations by the old media. The internet, 
YouTube and social media are the new vehicles used to create the assertive 
British Muslim who enhances his or her evolving hybrid and transnational 
outlook. This is shared with a similar international fraternity and diasporic 
community of interest that provides not only validity but also much needed 
security as a present and future citizen of Britain, of their own choosing.  
 
In a modern arena and set within this ‘third space’ is the role new and social 
media has played in maintaining and solidifying an assertive transnational 
identity. This is the ‘digital diaspora’ referred to by Gajjala (2010), who explore, 
274 
 
reaffirm and promote their own specific hybridity through these new media. It 
corresponds with Ellison (2013) on the impact of social media on identity 
formation.  
 
 These new social spheres and cyber spaces are at present unchallenged by 
elites and governments, state institutions and law enforcement. They not only 
defend their own identities but their faith and culture, as has been addressed by 
Karim (2010). Their simplicity is the availability of this resource to anyone, 
especially the disenfranchised and those who perceive themselves as socially 
excluded. The new ‘space’ has allowed the diaspora and others to challenge 
what they perceive as injustices. Its use in the ‘Arab Spring’, a media-inspired 
term in itself, in 2010 and 2011 was a case in point, as was its recent use by 
Chinese citizens to expose corrupt officials pointed out by Hollister (2013). It 
has emphasised the role of the citizen journalist and is reflected in new 
opportunities for the citizen to provide alternative viewpoints. The Huntington 
Post and Democracy Now are two such examples of people-power media 
opportunities for self-journalism and self-expression and, as often repeated in 
this study, they form part of the smartphone generation.  
 
At its best, the new media is a tool of empowerment and active citizenry, and at 
its worst, it is a license to abuse, accuse and incite. In a religious context, for 
the sample diaspora Muslims, new and social media has aided a sense of 
‘McIslamism’ that is an instant Muslim reaction to global events, referred to by 
Rinnawi (2010). In elements of the sample diaspora it has, as he argues, 
created an internal ‘jihad’ of the ego. The researcher would contend this is a 
struggle between Western modernity and their Eastern legacies and traditions. 
Each member of the diaspora feels this sense of ‘personal crisis’ and seeks to 
redefine their amalgamated identity – again reinforcing this concept of the new 
‘transmigrant’ within a media age. Here cable and satellite television as well as 
the internet and new media have played a part to help them maintain their 
cultural, religious and even political reference points – in other words, to create 
new the societal culture(s) Kymlicka (1995) speaks of, which are elaborated on 
in Chapter 1. In the third space, this digital diaspora remain between two 
societies, two cultures and two hemispheres, and maintain transnational 
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affiliations and communities. For some it may remain a constant journey of 
exploration. Others may feel that this ‘safe’ space is where they wish to remain 
and perpetuate their new media ‘transmigrant’ status, obtaining the best of both 
worlds and maintaining a fluid identity. Others, particularly the most advantaged 
of the diaspora, will continually affirm their status in Britain, with faith being 
discreet and deculturalised, relating well to the work of Talbi (1992), Arkoun 
(2001) and Ramadan (2006). Such a group may reflect the mimicry of Western 
culture and social norms Bhabha (1995) refers to, as well as consuming new 
lifestyle magazines catering for this upcoming group – Vogue for a middle-class 
aspiring Muslim audience, as reflected in the work of Moll (2007). However, 
whether such specific magazines (EMEL, Q News) will maintain a presence, 
interest and circulation in a new and social media world remains to be seen. 
Additionally, their transnational links will be minimal, through few or no visits to 
Pakistan and even when on such visits, remaining in Western style hotels and 
comfort, rather than the modest homes of distant relatives, if contact is indeed 
maintained.  
 
This is the essential journey of discovery for the Muslim of the diaspora, where 
religious identity is linked to cultural association and Britishness. It is where 
strength of purpose is found in evolving their hybridity, a process on which the 
mass media has impacted as a consequence of wider political ideologies and 
interests. Despite the stated anxieties contained in this work and epitomised by 
the narratives of the sample diaspora, there was a new strength in how their 
new-found identities were asserting themselves. This was a non-threatening 
articulation of multiple identities developing the combination of being a British 
Pakistani Muslim. It was an accommodation of past heritage and experienced 
learning from elders and parents with enhanced future aspirations and a sense 
of belonging as permanent and respected residents of Britain, albeit with a 
transnational edge. In that respect, they were not unique but typical of similar 
diaspora communities and traditions across the world. 
 
Furthermore, they are similar to the experiences of the wider Asian communities 
reflected in Chapter 1 that also mirror class variations. The communities of 
Bradford, Birmingham and East London are very similar in how generations 
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evolve and redefine their status through multiple identities, reflected in the work 
of Ballard (1982), Eade (1996, 1997, 2007), Ansari (2006), Singh (2006) and 
Abbas (2007), for instance. The elements of difference, as outlined in Chapter 
1, related to racial inferiority and as the ‘Other’ placed within the indigenous 
community during and post- empire, as referred in the work of Zubaida in Brah 
(2006). It is this deeply embedded genetic subjective view of Asian populations 
perpetuated within society and institutionally that is then articulated widely by 
the media. The Muslim, placed within the wider global arena of the ‘war on 
terror’, holds a preeminent position in the minds of many in mainstream society, 
as the potential and perceived enemy within. For the Bangladeshi and the 
Pakistani diaspora of South Asian communities more specifically, this 
continually provides unease about presence and further insecurity not only 
about belonging but also about being accepted. It is a narrative often reinforced 
by the media. The most recent cases of Muslim ‘takeovers’ in schools in 
Birmingham in 2014 and Lutfur Rahman being stripped of his elected mayor 
status in Tower Hamlets in 2015 (Daily Telegraph 23 April 2015) remain 
examples of how race and faith remain integral to mainstream media reporting 
of South Asian populations.  
 
 That said, the researcher believes, as evidenced in this investigation, that such 
diaspora is much more resilient and, as the smartphone generation, will 
continually assert their multiple identities and challenge, in their own way, 
discrimination and Islamaphobia. Furthermore, transnational identities and 
communities are aided by the concept as Guo Ming and Chang (2010) 
emphasise, the strong relationship between cultural identity and globalisation, 
its changing nature and positive contribution. With new and social media, 
communication and networks are borderless and unrestricted, creating a virtual 
‘one mega city’. This is not lost on the sample diaspora who connected with 
their like-minded diaspora in the United States, Canada and Europe, 
communicating via Twitter, IMO, Viber, MySpace, to name a few of the growing 
‘apps’ used to support these transnational networks.  
 
Additionally, many of the respondents spoke of how their involvement in this 
investigation provided a reflective approach, not only to their media 
277 
 
consumption but also to an evolving identity. To many, it validated their 
perceptions that at some level they instinctively felt Western media bias in 
reporting Islam, Muslims and their own communities. For the researcher, this 
reflectivity of the sample diaspora signalled further validation of the insider 
mode of research, and of the anthropological approach adopted purposefully as 
accounted in the experiences of Foster (1994). These In short exemplified the 
value of someone from the same community undertaking research with that 
community.  
 
This approach also, in every sense of the word, supported the aims and 
objectives of the research question that were set out in the introduction. These 
are revisited here briefly. They were to: 
 
 Investigate the type and range of mass media utilised by the Pakistani 
diaspora within two specific cohort groups, namely the Punjabi and 
Pukhtoon, and consumption of new forms of media by second- and third-
generation Pakistanis, by gender and class. 
 Assess the impact of the range of media consumption on the formation, 
redefinition or enhancement of identity. 
 Assess any differentials based on cultural variations within the two specific 
cultural cohort groups (Punjabi and Pukhtoon) of British-born Pakistanis. 
 Investigate whether the media plays a significant part in the reinforcement of 
personal and/or group identity within the Pakistani diaspora and how this is 
reflected and translated on a day-to-day level. 
 
These key aims related to the research question as a whole, with specific areas 
needing to be examined in more detail that focused on ten key points of 
investigation:  
 
1. Defining participants’ personal identity at the time of the investigation 
and during the stages of this research study, to assess any 
modifications.  
2. The specific characteristics of group identity.  
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3. What national, transnational and international media were consumed. 
4. The range of media sources utilised by the diaspora and the reasons 
for the choice made. 
5. The role of new media and how is it utilised. 
6. How differences within the Pakistani diaspora are distinguished. 
7. How cultural and religious practices are reflected in this formation of 
identity. 
8. Impact of the media in reinforcing or deconstructing this identity, in 
particular new media. 
9. The major responses to mass media, if any, with respect to identity 
formation. 
10. The role of new media within this construct. 
 
The researcher feels that the aims and objectives of the research have been 
met.  
 
In participating in this process, the sample diaspora has in many ways been 
transformed, encompassing the key characteristics of diaspora defined by 
Safran (1991) at the outset of this research, within the digital and cyber age.  
 
The researcher feels that he has addressed the key issues as set out above in 
‘The process of analysis’ (section 3.5), where it is stated, ‘In essence, for any 
theory to hold validity it should meet certain requirements. The theory espoused 
within this research should link into the data.’ Clearly, the diaspora feel a sense 
of alienation and insecurity due to the media portrayal of Islam and Muslims 
globally and in Britain. This detrimental impact has resulted in an assertiveness 
demonstrated in a new media age, as exemplified by the Happy British Muslims 
video on YouTube (Honesty Policy, 2014). Within this diaspora landscape, there 
is a diversity of status, first, those who feel like new age ‘transmigrants’, either 
still on a journey of discovery, or content with this ambivalence. Others are 
rooted in a purely Western approach of a model citizen, comfortable in their 
income, status and presence in Britain. Finally, there is the transnational 
diaspora citizen who, whether as part of the global city concept or fixed in his or 
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her multiple identity, wishes to maintain like-minded networks and communities 
across continents.  
 
In addition, as quoted in Chapter 3 on methodology, ‘The key themes drawn out 
from the analysis should be reflected in the hypothesis that is the outcome for 
this work.’  As discussed in this chapter, this has been achieved by using what 
has been stated as ‘necessary to ensure that the reference group – a 
representative number of volunteer participants – spans the interviewed clusters 
and ethnicity (Pukhtoon and Punjabi), and cultural differentials)’ (Chapter 3). 
Their empowerment in understanding the research question and fully 
participating in the grounded theory approach is evidence of this contribution at 
the various stages of the fieldwork. This has allowed the added objective of 
ensuring that ‘the theory itself has to satisfy the precondition that it is 
comprehensible to lay people’ (Chapter 3). The conclusions reached are not 
complex or daunting but realistic in using the data effectively to assert meaning 
in the voices of British-born Pakistani Muslims of the diaspora that will 
undoubtedly make a difference to their own and others’ perceptions of them and 
of the world.  
 
What is equally important is the future development of the diaspora, given that 
the media focus remains on this group and Muslims in Britain. This is within the 
context of the rise of Islamic State (IS), their ease in connecting with the Muslim 
diaspora globally and in many respects, offering not only an asserted Muslim 
identity but a so-called caliphate for the Muslim Ummah. To some this is 
attractive, yet for the vast majority of Muslims, it remains abhorrent and un-
Islamic.  
 
The present emphasis on preventing extremism and ensuring young Muslims of 
the diaspora are resisting the IS call to arms may well create a continual sense 
of insecurity and feelings of injustice. In addition, the continual and more 
forensic examination of the communities by security agencies may further 
alienate the diaspora. There is a danger that, with perceptions of state 
animosity towards the diaspora and suspicions of their intentions, many of the 
new generation may become more vulnerable and excluded further. The 
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aptitude of IS to utilise social media to promote their message and promote 
mass appeal has its dangers, as do new laws to collate data from users of 
social media. How the diaspora respond to these challenges will be of interest 
to many interested in this field.  
 
In the final analysis, however, the researcher feels that the diaspora itself, as 
diverse as it is, will utilise social media to not only assert their identity and right 
to belong at home in Britain, but reinforce their faith-based multiple character. In 
doing so, they will seek to challenge the Islamaphobia, suspicion and 
discrimination from within, but also challenge those misinforming the world of 
the values and principles of their faith. In that sense, not only should their voices 
be heard, but their status in British society should be valued and respected, that 
of equal British citizens.  
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